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Summary 
This thesis analyzes the postwar political economy of the global 
photography industry, i. e. camera/lens and film, up to 1995 and finds that the 
Japanese industry has met unprecedented success. The question addressed in 
this thesis is: who drove the success of the Japanese photography industry, the 
government or firms? The words "rivalry' and 'cooperationý are used in this 
thesis because they most aptly describe the three main relationships in the 
photography industry during the postwar period: bureaucrat-politician, 
government-industry and firm-firm. Cooperation and rivalry always existed 
in these relationships, but one often took precedence over the other. 
The camera/lens makers in Japanýs photography industry benefited 
from cooperative relationships through export promotion and import 
protection policies from 1950 to 1973. Export promotion was effective because 
Japanese camera/lens firms began to 'export' to US military postal exchanges 
in Japan during the Allied Occupation (1945-1952). After that time, the US 
market was wide open to Japanese exports due to Japanýs balance of payments 
problems and America's mounting security concerns in Asia. Exports of 
cameras/lenses to the US and Europe expanded throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, while photographic film manufacturers (who also produced 
cameras/lenses) caught up technologically and enjoyed a protected domestic 
market for film. After 1974, rivalry increased in the three main relationships 
primarily due to changes in the international trading regime and within Japan. 
In particular, firm-firm rivalry in cameras/lenses and film grew throughout 
the 1970s and intensified during the 1980s as new technological advances 
raised the stakes for global market shares. 
This thesis shows that some firms have been successful despite 
government involvement in the industry, while others have been successful 
because of it. Cooperation between the government and industry was 
important in the early years because of the tight controls placed on industry 
(up to the early 1970s). But the influence of the government waned as the firms 
within the photography industry went global and rivalry among firms 
increased. Additional sectoral studies of Japanýs early export industries (e. g. 
sewing machines, bicycles, clocks/watches) are needed to provide additional 
evidence of the extent to which there was cooperation and/or rivalry in the 
three main relationships in Japan's postwar political economy. 
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1. Overview 
Introduction 
The question addressed in this thesis is: who drove the success of the Japanese 
photography industry, the government or the firms? There are at least three 
reasons why this question should be asked. First, the spectacular rise of the 
Japanese photography industry since 1945 has largely been ignored. The 
popular perception in Japan and the United States is that the industry was not 
on the receiving end of beneficial Japanese government policies as were other 
more strategic industries, e. g. steel, automobiles, computers and 
semiconductors. This is a myth and the story that unfolds throughout this 
thesis reveals why. 
Second, there has been little trade friction between Japan and the US in 
photographic products, at least until recently. The sudden surge of interest in 
the 1995 Section 301 (of the US Trade Act of 1974) case brought by Kodak 
against Fuji Photo Film which subsequently was turned into an early test case 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) process brought by the US 
goverru-nent on behalf of Kodak against the Japanese government and Fuji is 
evidence of how bilateral trade disputes can affect those industries which are 
perceived as important. These perceptions color the choice of cases which are 
considered worthy of academic analysis. 
The 1960s camera and lens battle between Japanese and West German 
manufacturers went largely unnoticed by the English-speaking community. 
This was perhaps because of the different structures in the Japanese and US 
photography industries and because most accounts of the battle were not 
written in English. Today, however, the battle is in photographic film, an area 
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where the US has an important industrial presence. And suddenly, as with so 
many other industries that have fallen prey to US-Japan trade disputes, 
everyone is interested in how the Japanese photography companies have 
become such formidable, global competitors. 
Third, little about the twentieth-century evolution of the Japanese 
photographic industry has been written in English. And that which does exist 
often suffers from short time horizons, a fascination with the art of Japanese 
photography, or is merely out-of-date. ' General studies of the 'world' 
photography industry tend to focus on history, often confining the time frame 
to the nineteenth century when technological evolution was dominated by 
European and later American contributions. 2 One notable example is the work 
of Reese V. Jenkins (1975), whose research concentrates on the institutional 
and technological changes in the industry in the United States up to 1925. 
The lack of adequate source material in English necessitated the use of 
an array of Japanese sources. Technical explanations and the trade war 
between Japan and West Germany during the 1960s in cameras and lenses are 
two examples of information found mainly in Japanese. 3Finally, interviews 
with senior businessmen, bureaucrats and scholars were carried out to 
enhance the often dry company and industry histories that also lacked 
analytical perspective. Because of the popular perception in Japan that the 
photography industry is uninteresting as a subject of government-industry 
interaction, additional interviews were often necessary. Fortunately, everyone 
seemed to have a special warmth in their hearts for the 'friendly industry. ' 
There were, however, two problems in this research project that are not 
peculiar to this industry, but to all studies of this kind. One is the sheer 
I Good but limited studies include Bekerneyer (1993), Bernstein (1965), and Miyabayashi 
(1963). 
2 Art books take up industrial development only to a very limited extent (cf. Gernsheim, 1986; 
Dower, 1971; and Putzar, 1987). Rosenblum (1984), who presents a 'world history, ' devotes 
one six-page section to technological developments after 1910 (both in cameras and film). Fuji 
Photo Film is only mentioned in passing and innovative Japanese products in both cameras 
and film are completely ignored. 
3 The addition of German-language sources might make an interesting future research project. 
Overview 3 
number of companies operating in this industry which fluctuated widely over 
the period studied and the other is the impact on the industry of technological 
change over time. Because technological change directly affects the present 
and future prospects of the photography firms and because the firm's products 
and profits often directly affected the technological level of the company, these 
two issues are discussed together. Technological contributions to the 
advancement of industry are often divided between 'research' and 
'development' (cf. R. R. Nelson, 1984; Florida and Kenney, 1990). In the US, 
technological 'breakthroughs' are what count, according to Richard Florida 
and Martin Kenney (1990) but this has come at the expense of the 'follow 
through, ' i. e. the development aspect of the research. They say that true basic 
research is what counts in the US, not small innovations or the development of 
breakthrough technologies into money-making consumer goods. The 
contributions of Japanese photography firms to the advancement of cameras, 
lenses and film are commonly placed in the 'follow through' category. It is not 
a strategic industry, so it is technologically unimportant. The myth that 
Japanese firms did not contribute technological innovations to the 
photography industry is explored below and throughout the thesis. 
The photography industry is composed of firms that are comprehensive 
photographic goods producers and those that specialize in goods based on 
optics technology. Fuji Photo Film and Konica are in the former group, and 
they both look very much like their two global competitors, Kodak and Agfa. 
(Agfa, a member of the Bayer Group, is currently stressing the chemical rather 
than the mechanical side of its business. ) These companies are the leading and 
the largest manufacturers of photographic film in the world, what today is a 
hig ýly oligopolistic, global business. 
The other firms in the photography industry based their strengths on 
their core competence in optics. They currently are Asahi Optical (makers of 
the Pentax brand), Canon, Kyocera (which purchased Yashica in 1983), 
Minolta, Nikon and Olympus. All are leading manufacturers of 35 mm 
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cameras, but there are several smaller niche market firms which manufacture 
large-format (60 mm) cameras and lenses (e. g. Horseman, Mamiya OP and 
Zenza Bronica of Japan and Hasselblad of Sweden). This thesis concentrates 
on the mass market manufacturers although some references will be made to 
the niche firms which mainly supply professional photographers. 
Instead of joining the fray in photographic film manufacture, the 
Japanese 35 mm camera and lens makers chose to strengthen their positions 
by competing in a range of quite diverse products especially after 1970. They 
can generally be split into two groups: office equipment and medical-use 
cameras/lenses. Unlike the US firms (e. g. Kodak and Polaroid) which found 
their strength in photographic film, these Japanese firms were heavily 
influenced by German and Austrian optics technology in the early twentieth 
century (see chapter three). The influence is clear in the similar division of 
both the European and the Japanese industries between film manufacturers on 
the one hand and camera/lens makers on the other. 
Today, this similarity still exists despite the devastation among 
European firms caused by the invasion of Japanese 35 mm cameras in the 
1960s. Leica (the recently reorganized firm of Ernst Leitz) still produces 
cameras but has also branched out into other fields. Zeiss exited the consumer 
camera business (managed by its subsidiary Zeiss Ikon) in 1972 to concentrate 
on very high precision optics for medical and scientific use. Rollei was sold 
(primarily as a brand name) to Samsung of Korea and depends only on small- 
scale camera and lens production in Germany today. Sweden's Hasselblad, the 
world's leading large-format camera maker, continues to order its high-priced, 
high-quality custom lenses from German manufacturers, mainly Schneider 
and Zeiss. Manufacturers of comprehensive photographic goods (i. e. cameras, 
lenses and film) compete directly with manufacturers of cameras/lenses in 
Japan. The top seven camera makers have with few exceptions been the five 
leading camera firms plus the two comprehensive manufacturers. In recent 
years, American and European firms competed most successfully with the 
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Japanese photographic firms in photographic film and business machines, 
especially in photocopiers. 4 The introduction of digital imagery has brought a 
host of new competitors from the electronics industry; these companies have 
electronics rather than optics as their core technologies. 
Change over time in technology and industry structure has made this 
thesis difficult to organize and even to analyze and interpret. The defini tion of 
the photography industry varies from country to country. The leading firms 
have changed over time, and the goods in which they competed have changed 
as technology has progressed. If we look at the modern 35 mm compact 
camera with all of its electronic devices to help us take fool-proof pictures and 
compare it to the precision machinery of the first Leica, the 1925 prototype on 
which the modem 35 mm camera was based, the impact of technological 
advancement is clearly evident. Furthermore, if we consider the modern 
photographic lens produced entirely of light-weight plastic with lens clarity 
exacted by computer calculation and compare it to the hand-made optic glass 
and metal lenses of just 20 years ago, the impact of modern technology is 
starkly underlined. Additional examples abound. It is in this area of 
technological change that the central question of this thesis, whether it is 
photography firms or the bureaucracy that shaped the evolution of the 
Japanese photography industry, has been most sharply posed. 
Other important factors considered in this thesis are marketing, the rise 
of leisure time, the growth of disposable incomes in Japan, the US and Europe, 
the rise of a 'consumer' culture. Timing, which some might call luck, also 
played an important role in allowing Japanese firms access to the US market in 
the early postwar years and then increasing access to the European market as 
trade barriers fell and economies expanded (cf. Spero, 1990). Demand in the 
Japanese market was also important for stimulating sharp competition among 
the photography firms and forcing them to compete for market share in terms 
4 Xerox and Fuji Photo Film have a Japanese joint venture called Fuji Xerox. Ricoh, a 
photographic goods manufacturer dating back to its prewar origins in the Riken Group, leads 
in photocopiers. 
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of new, innovative products. That competitive spirit was first developed in 
overseas markets (in the US in the 1950s and in Europe in the 1960s) where the 
main rivals were the West German firms, not their fellow Japanese exporters. 
Rather than competing with each other, the leading exporters more or less 
cooperated on a strategy to overtake the West German firms. The threat of the 
West German firms galvanized the Japanese firms to work together (cf. 
Fransman, 1990; Fruin, 1992). 
Very quick expansion in the Japanese industry had a crippling effect in 
the early 1960s which had to be managed through a year-long recession cartel 
(see chapter four). The leading exporting firms agreed to minimum prices and 
to cut back production temporarily. Fortunately for the exporters their 
cameras/lenses - and their prices thanks to a favorable exchange rate - 
appealed to a growing population of US and European consumers. Due to the 
postwar expansion, the market for photography grew as people in 
industrialized countries enjoyed more leisure time, rising levels of disposable 
income and later a boon-dng holiday/tourist trade. Photography became a 
popular medium of communication (professional as well as amateur) and 
demand was stimulated by a constant stream of new products for 
photographers of all skill levels. 
However, as traditional markets became saturated, firms came to rely 
more on marketing to 'create' demand for new products boasting new film 
formats or new automated gadgets. And rivalry among firms for market 
shares increased. This was true for both the camera/lens makers and for the 
film makers even though the latter supplied the highly profitable means for 
making pictures (i. e. the film) and were therefore somewhat freer frorn'the 
stiff competition that goes with consumer goods manufacturing. 
Preferences in the US, Europe and Japan for photographic goods 
differed and have changed over time in each country/region (see chapters 
four and five). American consumers, for example, traditionally preferred less 
expensive, easy-to-use cameras in a variety of film formats which were 
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supplied by Kodak and Polaroid. Europeans tended to purchase more 
complex cameras and precision lenses for producing high-quality photographs 
from 35 mm and larger (i. e. 6x6 cm and above) film. These types of products 
were made by, among others, Zeiss, Leitz, Rollei and Hasselblad. Like 
Europeans, Japanese consumers were inclined to purchase complex cameras, 
but they showed a preference for standardized, 35 mm mass market goods 
which over time became compact and very high tech. These were supplied by 
Canon, Nikon, and Minolta, among others. 
Today, consumer preferences appear to have converged, and markets 
offer goods in all of these segments. Specialists and enthusiasts choose very 
expensive, hand-crafted photographic equipment, however, most consumers 
opt for less expensive, but high quality, mass produced photograptuic goods. 
Japanese firms looked for the mass market, and were able to fill the demand 
fortuitously created by the postwar economic expansion. Competition among 
Japanese firms was intense, so they offered a large variety of photographic 
goods, squeezing the low-end of the market as prices fell. Manufacturers were 
keen to adopt new technologies, manufacturing processes and materials, and 
to expand their profits by manufacturing high volumes at low cost. 
Myth: No government involvement occurred here 
The photography industry has a long history, one that dates back much 
further than the postwar period which is the focus of this thesis. Konica 
(established in 1876 as Konishi Honten) acted as a sales agent for imported 
photographic products, mainly from Eastman Kodak (Camerart, 1987). 
Modeling itself after Kodak, Konica became Japan's first comprehensive 
photographic goods manufacturer, producing the Cherry Hand Camera (box 
type for dry plates) in 1903 and introducing their Sakura brand film 25 years 
later. In response to a shortage of imported optics (mainly from Germany) 
during World War 1, the goverrunent supported private efforts to build up the 
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country's capability in optics research and manufacture (Lewis, 1991, pp. 17; 
28-30; 38). Companies established at that time include: Asahi Optical (then 
Asahi Kogaku Goshi Kaisha, later known for its Pentax brand name), Nikon 
(then Nippon Kogaku), Olympus (then Takachiho Seisakusho) and Topcon 
(then Tokyo Kogaku or Tokyo Optical; a subsidiary of Toshiba since 1964). 
From the early years of the industry, the gover=ent, influenced by the 
military, played a strong role (see chapter three). In the first decades of the 
twentieth century when so many industries were growing quickly and so 
much technology was being imported from abroad, this was not unusual 
(Fruin, 1992, p. 38). Many other photographic companies were established 
during the interwar period; the 1930s was a particularly entrepreneurial 
decade. By the early 1940s, however, all civilian production was converted to 
military use and civilian consumption of photographic goods was restricted. 
As in other industries in Japan (and as in the photography industries in every 
other country involved in WWII), military demand was crucial to each firm's 
survival. 
During the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945-1952), all industrial 
production was re-converted back again from military to civilian production. 
US policy was based on the idea that Japan should never again have the 
capacity to wage war. The camera/lens and film companies were encouraged 
to recover quickly as 'peace industries, ' and formed part of the backbone of 
industries on which Japan's postwar recovery was based. Designated as an 
'important commodity' industry by the Japanese government in 1950 
(Management and Coordination Agency, 1950, pp. 150-151), manufacturers of 
photographic goods enjoyed the dual benefits of export promotion and import 
protection before these policies became standard features of the so-called '1955 
system. ' Chalmers Johnson (1982, p. 240) identified "an elaborate trade 
promotion apparatus" as one of the institutions of high-speed growth (the 
1955 to 1961 period) in his seminal book on Japan's industrial policy and 
"developmental state. " 
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Despite being on the receiving end of the obvious benefits of 
promotional policies, the photography industry has nevertheless been 
consistently overlooked as a beneficiary of government policy. The most likely 
reason for this oversight is that it was such an early case of government 
involvement that it did not seem to belong in the category of what is usually 
called "Japanese industrial policy! The main problem is that 'government' in 
those days was not the Japanese government so much as the US government. 
It was the General Headquarters (GHQ) under the leadership of General 
George MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). 
Immediately after the war, GHQ concentrated on democratizing Japan and 
allowing economic performance to return to prewar (1930-31) levels (Vestal, 
1993; Yamamura, 1967). However, the depth of the challenge facing Japanese 
economic recovery was not fully recognized until the late 1940s when the 
magnitude of Japan's future econon-dc dependence on the US and the potential 
drain to the US economy that would result was acknowledged (Tsuru, 1996). 
Japan had to raise export volumes to balance its vital US imports of 
food, fertilizer, petroleum and medical supplies (Cohen, 1949, pp. 495; 498). 
But the main problem, according to Jerome Cohen, was that Japan's main 
prewar trading partners in Asia did not want to have anything to do with 
Japan's postwar economic recovery if it was to be at their own expense. First, 
many Asian countries were in the throes of becoming sovereign nations, after 
the departure of their European colonizers and the defeat of Japan. Second, the 
situation was far from stable econon-dcally or politically and due to the legacy 
of the war, Japanese goods were unlikely to be welcomed there. Third, there 
was a desire in many Asian countries to concentrate on their own economic 
development. Finally, they were suspicious that Japanese goods would once 
again flood their markets as had happened in the interwar period. 
It was not only Japan's prewar trading partners in Asia who were 
concerned. Japanese trade patterns in the interwar years had given an 
impression in the US and Europe that Japanese firms tended to flood markets 
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with goods, often selling them at prices below cost in order to gain market 
shares. 5 This was especially true in the case of japan's textile industry which 
competed directly with India, Pakistan, and Australia. 6 Britain was especially 
vocal in its complaints during the 1920s and 1930s about how Japanese 
companies bought raw cotton from India, and then turned around and sold 
fine-quality textiles at very low prices back to India, that is, to British 
Commonwealth markets (cf. Fletcher, 1989). Later in the 1960s, it was the US 
that complained of "floods of 'unfairly competitive' cheap Japanese textiles" 
(Dore, 1986, p. 11). During the postwar period, the same pattern was repeated. 
Export markets were flooded by Japanese consumer goods, e. g. 
cameras/lenses and sewing machines, due to Japanýs export promotion 
policies and an advantageous exchange rate until the early 1970s (cf. Tsuru, 
1996) (see chapters three and four). 
Japan was heavily dependent on Asian countries for its balance of 
trade during the prewar years. In 1936, according to Cohen (1949, p. 503), they 
"supplied nearly 60 percent of Japan's imports and were markets for nearly 70 
percent of her exports, while dollar countries (the US, Canada, etc. ) received 
17 percent of Japan's exports and supplied Japan with 25 percent of her 
imports. " In the vacuum of colonial withdrawal it became clear that many of 
these newly independent Asian countries were not unified as 'nations) and 
many had suffered under Japanese rule. In postwar Europe, the situation was 
quite different. The European Allies under US leadership and with US aid 
5 Fruin (1992, p. 314) noted that this postwar characteristic was "... a 'torrential downpour' 
(shuchu go-u) of products often seen abroad as'dumping. "' 
6 In February 1948, the editors of the Melbourne Age wrote: "It was determined by the Great 
Powers at Yalta, and later in the British Commonwealth discussions at Canberra, that in a 
military sense, Japan should not be allowed to menace the peace of the world again. 
Corresponding safeguards will now be necessary to insure against a revival of Japanese export 
trade of a kind that could again threaten the soundly conducted industries of Britain by 
ruinous competition from inferior Japanese manufacturers dumped at a fraction of cost of 
production under improper standards. To this extent military and economic security are 
interrelated and Australia, no less than Britain, must continue to exercise strict vigilance 
against the dangers inherent in the resumption of large-scale trade with Japan. " See "Need for 
Vigilance in Trade with Japan, " Age, February 24,1948 as cited in Cohen, 1949, p. 496, footnote 
187. 
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actively sought economic integration especially between France and Germany 
as a way to prevent future world wars. In Asia in 1945 to 1947, there was no 
equivalent of France to balance Japan's Germany. 
Therefore, in the late 1940s, Japan's trading partners had changed. No 
longer did imports come from traditional sources in Asia, and the prospects 
for export growth to the new (dollar) areas were not good. Economic recovery 
was needed throughout Asia, but many countries, such as China, Malaya and 
Indochina, faced political turmoil. In 1947, Asia supplied only 6 percent of 
Japan's imports but purchased 66 percent of her exports, while 92 percent of 
Japan's imports originated in the US and only 12 percent of total exports went 
to the US (Cohen, 1949, p. 494). Recovery of Asian markets was crucial to 
Japan's own economic recovery, otherwise Japan would remain dependent on 
US appropriations to cover the shortfall of dollars needed to pay for imports. 
However, for the reasons given above, it was unlikely that Asian recovery 
would occur quickly enough to satisfy the United States' domestic and 
international political agenda, i. e. containing Communism in Asia. 
As the situation in China deteriorated and the Soviets built up their east 
European wall of defense, the US shifted its economic policy toward Japan 
from sustainability at 1930-31 levels to economic recovery. By 1949, it was 
clear that Japan was to become the 'workshop of Asia' and the front line of the 
Western alliance against the encroaching Communist threat in China and 
other parts of Asia (cf. Nakamura, 1981). The solution to Japan's foreign 
exchange and foreign trade problems was to promote and expand Japan's 
exports to the US as quickly as possible. The US market was opened wide to 
Japanese imports; export promotion of Japanese goods became a matter of 
mutual economic and political benefit. A single exchange rate for the Japanese 
yen was set the same year to bring in much needed dollars to pay for imports. 
As the Japanese economy stabilized (although not until 1951/52), US 
taxpayers were progressively relieved of the burden of subsidizing exports to 
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Japan and the US government gained a solid ally in the Pacific. 7 With the 
outbreak of the Korean War the following year, this policy became all the 
more imperative (cf. Spero, 1990). 8 
By 1955, the year that is generally pinpointed as the beginning of high- 
speed growth and the 'Japanese model' of economic development, more than 
five years had passed since the defacto establishment of economic and military 
interdependence of the US and Japan. Many scholars of postwar Japan do not 
analyze what happened before 1955, choosing instead to ignore the 1939 to 
1955 period as an aberration in Japan's history for statistical convenience as if 
to say that the policies of GHQ had been irrelevant. 9 Were they? How 
important was the two-year adjustment period between the end of the 
Occupation and the start of the so-called '1955 systemT The argument that the 
Japanese goverrun'ent was involved in promoting industries (e. g. 
cameras/ lenses/film, transistor radios, sewing machines and bicycles) that 
supported Japan's postwar economic recovery cannot be understood without 
addressing the whole postwar period (see chapter two). 
The early recovery of the photography industry was promoted through 
exports to an open US market and protected by import barriers. They were 
further aided by a complex exchange regime in place until 1949 when the 
single exchange rate was set (Nakamura, 1981, p. 36). Each item traded had a 
7 Chalmers Johnson (1978; 1982) discusses economic problems with US subsidies and 
shortages of credit needed for entrepreneurial investment and recovery of the Japanese 
economy. Subsidies supplied through the Reconstruction Development Bank were seen as 
fueling inflation, which was then brought under control by Joseph Dodge's draconian 
measures (the most important of which was setting the exchange rate) called the Dodge Line 
(cf. Nakamura, 1981; Tsuru, 1996). 
8A similar situation arose in Western Europe under GATT in order to foster economic 
recovery. Although the US market was open to Western European goods, these countries were 
allowed to tin-dt the import of US goods and investments in exchange for going along with 
trade discrimination against China and the Soviet bloc (Strange, 1994, p. 187). 
9 Takafusa Nakamura (1981, p. 3; note 1), who stresses the importance of wartime controls 
after 1937 and the Occupation policies up to 1952, notes that others do not agree with this 
approach. Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky (1973), for example, statistically linked 
prewar and postwar Japanese economic development from 1935-36 to 1952-53, skipping over 
the 1937-1952 period. They made the numbers fit the story they wanted to tell. I believe this is 
insufficient reason to ignore this very important period. Tyson and Zysman (1989, pp. 62-63) 
also conveniently ignore the period to stress their 'Japan as neomercantilisf argument. 
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different rate of exchange, and since the government controlled all trade, 
exporting firms received a price from the government that was often much 
higher than the price at which it was exported (the exchange for which was 
usually set at 500 to 600 yen to the dollar). Imports were usually priced at 100 
yen to the dollar and sold (by the government) cheaply on the Japanese 
market. The resulting trade deficit was made up in the Japanese government 
budget, which was subsidized by the US Treasury. To solve this problem, 
trade subsidies were given to Japanese industry to promote exports. 10 
Data on the 'recovery industries' (e. g. cameras, clocks and watches, 
radios, sewing machines, electric fans and bicycles) indicate that they began to 
flourish as export industries in the early 1950s (see chapters three and four). 
According to table 1.1, production of electric fans recovered most quickly of 
the items listed, from a prewar high of 64,780 fans produced in 1940 to 66,282 
produced in 1946. Radios and sewing machines also recovered quickly (by 
1946 or 1948) to levels near or higher than their prewar peaks of 1940 and 
1941. 
Cameras by comparison showed slower but steady recovery, with 
production in 1951 at 213,840 cameras just below the prewar peak in 1940. 
Clocks and watches and bicycles indicate that the pattern of postwar 
production was quite similar. " As we shall see in chapter four, exports of 
cameras grew quickly throughout the 1950s to capture large shares of the 
world market mainly due to the Japanese government's policy of export 
promotion. Because these industries were the fundamental building blocks on 
10 Dodge called these "invisible subsidies, " according to Nakamura (1981). Some calculations 
place the subsidies at 176 billion yen over the 1946 to March 1949 (after which the single 
exchange rate went into effect) period. 
11 Ezra Vogel (1985) notes that bicycles and motorbikes were promoted because the proceeds 
from bicycle racing were used to subsidize targeted industries, i. e. industries that the 
government selected to benefit from industrial policy. Another fund that was set up to channel 
money into targeted industries was the banana fund (Johnson, 1982). Since the government 
controlled all trade in the early postwar years, the banana funds came from the difference 
between the price of imported bananas and their domestic sales prices. This was possible 
because of a healthy demand for bananas, which do not grow in Japan. For how the bicycle 
racing funds and the banana funds were used to promote the photography industry, see 
chapter three. 
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which the Japanese economy grew, they must be studied if we aim to 
understand the nuances of Japan's government-industry relationship. 
As discussed in chapter two, some scholars (e. g. Kon-dya, 1988; Trezise, 
1976) argue that consumer goods industries, including the photography 
industry (particularly cameras), were demand driven and therefore did not 
need industrial policies. There may be some truth to this argument in terms of 
overseas demand, especially initially in the US market which was then and is 
still the largest market for photographic goods in the world. However, 
demand in the Japanese market was stifled until the early 1960s in the case of 
cameras/lenses and the 1970s in the case of color film by high excise taxes and 
initially rather low levels of disposable income. (Sales of black and white film 
had been overtaken by color film in the mid-1960s. ) Domestic demand for 
photographic goods was satisfied in the 1950s mainly by cheap, shoddy 
cameras made by up-start firms, not by the high-class cameras/lenses sold 
overseas. Only when average real incomes started to rise, in part due to the 
1960 policy called the 'Income-Doubling Plan, " did the exporters really begin 
to make their mark as domestic suppliers. Notably, many of the small firms 
also were forced into bankruptcy. 
Chapter three outlines the key roles of intermediary organizations 
including the industry associations and other quasi-governmental institutions. 
In the 1950s they were important in establishing a marketing and distribution 
foothold for the largest manufacturers of cameras/lenses in the US through 
the establishment of the Camera Information and Service Center in New York. 
By 1960, Japanese firms held nearly 40 percent (in value terms) of the US 
market and were looking to repeat this performance in Europe which was 
known for its diverse and comparatively closed markets. In 1963, MITI 
stepped in to organize the camera/lens exporters in four regional Light 
Machinery Centers with the other Japanese exporters of light machinery. A 
year later, MITI repeated this performance when the problems of domestic 
market oversaturation and excess capacity in the run up to the 1964 Tokyo 
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Olympics, and the downturn thereafter, touched off a price war. 'Excess 
competitioný was quickly brought under control by a recession cartel and 
encouragement to redirect surplus production overseas, that is to Europe. 12 
Goverru-nent involvement and support for the industry (e. g. helping to 
set up overseas distribution and building brand recognition) were important 
for the industry's success during these early years. Export promotion was far 
more important to the early success of the industry than was domestic 
demand because it was restrained by high excise taxes. But once the excise 
taxes (and thereby domestic prices) dropped to reasonable levels in the early 
1960s, the Japanese market became just as crucial to the success of the 
photographic firms as the export market. Also important was the availability 
of long- and short-term financing through the government (e. g. the Japan 
Development Bank) and commercial banks. Without adequate financing and 
tax breaks on export earnings and capital investment, the industry might 
never have taken off. The process of export promotion and the growth of 
domestic market from 1950 to 1973 is the focus of chapter four. 
In chapter five, it is argued that after the first oil shock of 1973-74, the 
government's influence in the industry waned as firms grew in size and 
relative wealth and as bureaucratic tools to control the economy and firms all 
but disappeared. 13After the early 1970s, some firms were more reluctant to go 
along with government policy while others were more willing to cooperate. 
One indication of the growing independence of the photographic firms was 
their decreased dependence on bank loans. The photography industry is said 
to be unusual in Japan because it is relatively less dependent on horizontal 
keiretsu groupings than other industries. Certainly, there are many firms in this 
industry, and not all of them have strong ties to one horizontal keiretsu group, 
but these relationships can change over time and are difficult to measure (cf. 
12 Excess competition is cut-throat pricing and other pricing strategies by firms that make an 
industry 'unstable! See chapter two. 
13 Laura D'Andrea Tyson and John Zysman (1989, pp. 183-184) went so far as to write: "MITI's 
historic task of protecting and nurturing Japanese industries until they could compete in any 
market in the world is over. Japan's big businesses no longer need MM. " 
Overview 17 
Gerlach, 1992; Dore, 1986). During the 1990s, Canon and Fuji Photo Film, two 
firms with comparatively close keiretsu ties, have increased their levels of 
foreign ownership to as much as 40 percent. 14 Traditional ownership and 
borrowing structures are clearly less important now than in the past. 
In short, there is wide variation across the industry. The photography 
firms in general have grown relatively wealthy over the period studied, and in 
some cases, the capital-rich companies have acted quite independently from 
the other firms in the industry and have given little heed to government or 
industry association wishes. 'S Much of the expansion since the 1970s can be 
attributed to firms which based their growth more on market strategy than on 
government influence. Canon, the largest firm (consolidated net sales in 1996 
Gan. -Dec. ) of V2,558 billion) and the largest producer of cameras (loosely 
affiliated with the Fuyo group), is an example of a firm which has relied on 
corporate strategy above all else. Nikon, a much smaller firm dedicated to the 
professional and semi-professional markets (consolidated net sales of Y379 
billion in FY 1997), is an example of a firm that has been less dependent on its 
own corporate strategy because of its close ties to the Mitsubishi group (see 
chapters four and five). 16 
Certain firms in the photography industry diversified their product 
lines by pumping profits into research and development (R&D). Relatively, 
however, Japanese firms have not diversified to the same extent as American 
ones (Fruin, 1992). Instead, they pursued product-line diversification, i. e. 
diversification within the firmýs core competence. Some photography firms 
have been able to retain independence from government control while 
participating in joint government-industry research projects, e. g. the Very 
14 Given the current instability of the Japanese banks, their strategies appear quite prudent. 
15 Ronald Dore (1996, p. 131) stresses the point that each firm is seen as belonging to one 
'industry' and therefore one industry association. This works to facilitate communication to 
and from the industry and the government through the industry associations. See also chapter 
three. 
16 Johnson (1982, p. 287) comments, in reference to the automobile industry, that the 
Mitsubishi group is generally less dependent on the government since few retired bureaucrats 
are employed within the group's member companies. 
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Large-Scale Integration (VLSI) Project and optoelectronics, even as minor 
players (cf. Flamm, 1996). 17 
Government was active in promoting the orderly distribution of 
photographic goods in Japan which kept retail prices high. According to 
several studies (e. g. Bernstein, 1965; Miyabayashi, 1963; and Seki et al, 1961), it 
was recognized within the industry in the early 1960s that reliable wholesale 
and retail channels (linked to the vertical keiretsu) were needed to prevent 
distribution problems from arising. Later the same phenomenon occurred 
overseas after 'gray markets' had developed (Wiechmann, 1976). The 
pervasiveness of 'keiretsu-ization' (keiretsuka) in Japan's distribution system 
today is testimony to its effectiveness (cf. Dewey Ballantine, 1995a). However, 
because distribution in Japan is very costly and effectively closed to 
newcomers (because it is hard to change these relationships), the system has 
come under attack as inefficient and partly to blame for the economy's 
lackluster performance throughout much of the 1990s (cf. Katz, 1997). 
The story of the photography industry is not limited to a discussion of 
government guidance (e. g. cartels, protectionism or the coddling of industry). 
Instead, it is one of how the government helped certain firms at certain times 
and how firms succeeded either because of government policy or in spite of it. 
The analysis stresses the role of the industry associations and other 
intermediaries working in between government and industry. Especially in 
the early postwar period, before firms had become financially strong, these 
intermediaries played an important role in cornmunicating the needs of the 
industry to government and vice versa (cf. Dore, 1986; Tilton, 1996; and 
Yonekura, 1996). This thesis shows that the industry's postwar growth and 
success has been affected both positively and negatively by goverru-nent 
intervention. 
17 Kenneth Flamm (1996) notes that Canon and Nikon were able to gain the know-how to 
produce steppers, the optics-based technology which imprints patterns onto semiconductor 
materials. They both currently are world market leaders. 
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Myth: No technological innovation occurred here 
19 
It is still widely believed that Japanese companies have been so successful 
mainly because they have borrowed, licensed and copied technology from 
others rather than developed technology themselves. And when they have 
developed new technologies, many see the advancements as innovations to 
increase sales not to advance basic science. The artificial division between 
basic research and development may have served to reinforce the stereotype 
that Japanese innovations, for example, are somehow inferior to the grand, 
basic research being conducted elsewhere, mainly in the Europe and the US 
(cf. Florida and Kenney, 1990; R. R. Nelson, 1984). If, however, the distinction 
between R and V is truly artificial, then Japanese photography companies 
have made major contributions to the advancement of the technology and 
through these advancements have influenced technological development in 
other related industries, notably not as manufacturers of munitions (cf. 
Samuels, 1994). A very rough outline of major technological contributions to 
the photography industry from 1925folloWS. 18 
The first 35 mm camera to be widely accepted was the Leica 1 (Model 
A). 19 It was developed as a prototype by Oskar Barnack in 1924 and 
introduced a year later by Ernst Leitz at the Leipzig Fair (Morgan and Lester, 
1953, pp. 5-6). The camera was a success because it used 35 nun cine film 
which was in plentiful supply, because the new cinematographic film industry 
(dependqnt on 35 mm film, or the 24 x 36 mm format) was boon-dng. 
Following the Leica design, Canon (then Seiki Kogaku Kenshusho or Precision 
Optical Instruments Laboratory) produced its first prototype 35 mm camera, 
the Kwanon, for the Japanese market in 1935 (Canon, 1994, pp. 4-5). Despite 
Is Detailed sources of Japanese firmýs contributions to the photography industry include 
Condax, et al (1984); JCIA (1971,1987 and 1994); JCII Camera Museum (1989); Lewis, ed. 
(1991). 
19 There were at least 27 cameras for 35 mm still photography before April 1925, when the 
Leica was introduced (Naylor, 1980). 
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the fact that the modern Japanese photography industry had taken off by the 
mid-1930s, the most expansive growth did not occur until after 1945.20 
According to the editors of Camerart (1990), a Japanese periodical for the 
photography industry, the main technological contributions of Japanese 
companies to the industry came after a period of copying which lasted until 
about 1960. Most of the early technology came from the German firms Ernst 
Leitz and Zeiss Ikon (maker of the Contax camera) which led in rangefinder 
camera technology. 21 Rangefinder cameras have two lenses, one through 
which the photographer sees the subject to be photographed and one through 
which the camera exposes the film to light when the shutter is opened. The 
lenses are placed in the camera to limit the amount of distortion between what 
the eye sees and what is actually photographed. Nonetheless, there is still 
some discrepancy between what you see and what you get. 
The Rolleiflex, a camera made by Franke and Heidecke of Germany, 
was a popular twin lens reflex camera of 1928. On a twin lens reflex, the lenses 
are placed vertically on the camera, one directly above the other, and unlike 
the rangefinder which is held up to the eye, the twin lens reflex is held at waist 
height. The top lens is used for focusing as the photographer looks down 
through a hood 6-nto a ground glass focusing screen. The lower lens is used for 
exposing the object to be photographed to the film when the shutter is opened. 
Like the rangefinder camera, what you see is not the same as what you get. 
The Rolleiflex used a highly-sophisticated Compur shutter which proved very 
difficult to in-dtate. Nonetheless, twin lens reflex cameras were very popular in 
Japan, especially in the 1950s (very few were exported), but demand for them 
dwindled as other more advanced cameras came on the market. 22 
20 The Japan Camera and Optical Instruments Inspection and Testing Institute (1984, pp. 25- 
26) goes so far as to say that the industry's take off was a postwar phenomenon. 
21 The term rangefinder camera means that there is a rangefinder coupled to the focusing 
mechanism (Naylor, 1980). 
22 The most popular model according to the editors of Camerart (February 1990) was the 
Ricohflex III of 1950. All camera manufacturers, most notably Mamiya and Yashica, made twin 
lens reflexes except Nikon, Canon and Asahi Optical/ Pentax. 
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The most important innovations to cameras by Japanese companies 
came with the single-lens reflex (SLR) camera. The earliest SLR equipped with 
a pentaprism was the Contax S of 1949 produced by the East German firm 
Zeiss Ikon. The pentaprism allows for eye-level viewing, like the rangefinder 
camera. With an SLR, the photographer looks through the same lens that the 
camera uses to expose the film to the image being photographed. Thus, unlike 
the rangefinder and the twin lens reflex, there is no distortion between what 
you see and what you get. The problem that made the SLR system less 
popular than the rangefinder system was with the mechanism that moved 
inside the camera to open the shutter and expose the film to the image. While 
this happened, the photographer lost sight of the image. After the photograph 
was taken, the mechanism had to be moved back manually, so the 
photographer could once again see the photographed image. The 
photographer had to remember to re-set the mirror to see the image, and this 
detracted from the popularity of the SLR system. 
The problem was solved when Asahi Optical/Pentax pioneered the 
instant-return mirror for the SLR in their Asahiflex IIB announced in 1954. The 
mirror moved only when the shutter opened and then returned to the viewing 
position after the shutter had been released. Now, you really did see what you 
would get. Asahi Optical introduced its first Pentax brand camera (the Asahi 
Pentax) in 1957. It was the first SLR with both a pentaprism finder and the 
instant-return mirror. In 1959, Nikon introduced its own first SLR camera, the 
legendary Nikon F, with nearly the exact mirror system as the Asahiflex IIB, 
and with an interchangeable pentaprism-hood finder system, and a stainless 
steel mount. 23 
- Also in 1959, 
Olympus introduced the Olympus Pen, a half-frame 
camera which took the Japanese market by storm. Half-frame means that that 
the camera used only half (18 x 24 mm frame) of a standard 35 mm negative 
23 Asahi Optical claimed patent infringement by Nikon in August of that year, and according 
to the editors of Camerart (March 1990, p. 38), the dispute was not concluded until March 1961 
and only with the help of mediators from the industry and MITI. 
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and could therefore take twice as many photographs with the same amount of 
film. The standard, (24 x 36 mm frame) 35 mm camera used two 'full" cine 
frames to make one photograph. The half-frame camera is in fact a misnomer 
since it employed one frame while standard 35 nun cameras employed double 
frames. In Japan (and in many other countries), the price of photographic film 
made picture taking an expensive profession or hobby. Thus, the half-frame 
camera was a major contribution to expanding the market for cameras but not 
so much for film. 
The 1960s was a period of "developmenf for the camera makers, 
according to the Camerart (1990) editors. The editors of Amateur Photography 
(1960) agreed; the general trend was "automatic. ' Copal, a shutter maker, 
developed the first modularized metal-bladed shutter the Copal Square in 
1960 which became one of the most popular shutters ever. The Canonet, 
introduced the same year by Canon, was a small, affordable camera with a 
very fast (from 1 to 1/500 seconds) between-the-lens shutter. There are two 
types of shutter mechanisms in rangefinder cameras, the focal plane (FP) type, 
of which the Leica is the most noted example, and the lens shutter (I-S) type. 
The latter type was very inexpensive to produce and gave Japanese camera 
manufacturers a name for cheap goods (Camerart, April 1990). SLR cameras 
were more complex and therefore higher cost cameras than the LS cameras; 
they earned more foreign exchange as exports. 
The next Japanese innovations came in automatic exposure (AE) control 
with the first in 1960 being the Olympus Auto Eye, a 35 mm LS camera. 
Automatic exposure meant that the camera contained a light meter or sensor 
which could determine how much light would reach the film. This was an 
improvement because even with the SLR system, the human eye cannot see 
how much light will hit the film loaded inside the camera in order to 
determine the exposure of the image. The first SLR with a built-in metering 
system was Tokyo Optical's Topcon RE Super of 1963 which had a through- 
the-lens (TTL) exposure meter. Konica introduced the first AE SLR, the 
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Autorex, two years later, but it was not a TTL system. Asahi Optical's Pentax 
ES (electronic shutter) introduced in 1971 solved that problem using a focal- 
plane shutter. The first camera with a metering system that read how much 
light fell on the film surface was the Olympus OM-2 of 1974. 
The Japanese government and the industry associations encouraged the 
development of automatic light metering systems to advance the state of 
Japanese camera/lens technology (see chapter three). Much of the research 
into AE systems in the 1950s was undertaken through joint research organized 
by the Japan Camera Industry Association OCIA). Light metering systems 
continued to be developed independently by firms and in later years firm- 
based R&D became the norm for technological advancements in 
cameras/lenses (see chapter five). Minolta and Nikon, in particular developed 
a variety of systems and exposure meters from the research originally begun 
through the JCIA. The first camera to apply the matrix metering system was 
the Nikon FA of 1983. Matrix metering means that the viewing screen of an 
SLR is broken into a matrix from which a more exact measurement of light 
exposure can be made. 
The electronic controls that went into the inventive metering systems 
set the stage for the next stage of automation using integrated circuit (IC) 
chips. The Pentax ES II (Asahi Optical) of 1973 was the first camera to use "a 
single board mounted with three IC chips and only a few discrete 
components ... plugged into a socket that was fixed to the inside bottom of the 
camera chassis" (Camerart, May 1990, p. 30). The year before, Polaroid had 
introduced the SX-70 which employed integrated injection logic (IIL) chips 
which could handle both analog and digital signals. 24 Innovation in 
production processes from that point onward became an important factor in 
achieving economies of scale in camera production since firms would have to 
mass purchase ICs if they were to advance the automation trend already 
underway. The Canon AE-1 introduced in 1976 revolutionized the industry; it 
24 The III, chips were developed jointly with Texas Instruments (Camerart, May 1990). 
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was the first IC camera and it could be produced at a very low cost (see 
chapter five). The firms that engaged in competition now were those that do 
not count cameras as their main line of business, e. g. Canon, Konica, Minolta 
and Ricoh. Competition among the market leaders took a new dimension in 
the mid-1980s in autofocus SLRs with Minolta's Alpha-7000 and its competitor 
Canon's EOS system. 25 
In 1981, Sony, not one of the traditional camera makers, introduced the 
Mavica, a still video camera that employed a charge-coupled device (CCD), 
i. e. a light sensor that creates the digital images. 26 The problem with early 
digital images was their poor picture quality as prints. In the early 1990s, 
Casio, Sanyo, Canon and a few others came out with digital still cameras with 
improved image quality, but they are not suited to professional use. To fill 
that niche, Nikon markets cameras that work with Kodak digital backs, and 
Olympus recently introduced a more advanced, high-end digital camera. 
Digital images are limited to a fixed number of pixels (i. e. squares of digital 
information). The more data (i. e. detail) in a digital image, the more computer 
memory is required. Digital images are becoming increasingly practical for 
marketing, e. g. catalogues and brochures, and the picture quality rivals 
traditional silver-halide photographs as long as they are small. Once a digital 
image is blown up, the definition is lost, because the pixels are easily detected 
by the human eye. 
A brief history of the pre-1945 developments in photographic film 
manufacturing is given in chapter three. Here, the most important postwar 
contributions of Japanese firms in photographic film are presented. 
Photographic film is a high-level fine chemical industry with very high 
barriers to entry for new firms (Haruki, 1959). According to Sakae Haruki 
25 In 1985, Minolta introduced its new camera simultaneously in Japan, the US and Europe as 
Alpha 7000 (Japan), Maxxum (US) and Minolta 7000 AF (Europe) (Lewis, 1991, p. 178). 
26 Japanese firms were very active in developing cine cameras, especially during the 1960s. 
Cine cameras used a variety of different films including 8 mm. and 16 mm, but they were 
overtaken in the 1980s by the introduction of video cameras developed by among others Sony. 
The cine and video camera story, while important, does not contribute significantly to the 
story told in this thesis. 
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(1959), president of Fuji Photo Film and of the PSMA in 1959, the industry 
requires extensive raw materials, continuous injections of capital for research 
and development and investment in high-volume, comprehensive 
manufacturing facilities. The key to success in photographic film 
manufacturing is to be able to manage the complex manufacturing techniques 
to produce reliable photographic film consistently (cf. Jenkins, 1975). Because 
the barriers to entry for new firms are so high, there are only a few 
photographic film makers in the world, and the manufacturers tend to hold 
oligopolistic positions in their home markets. 
Photographic film is composed of a base film coated with a 
photosensitive silver-halide emulsion. 27 Each major manufacturer has its own 
emulsion formulae which differentiates their products from one another. 
Many firms (e. g. Konica and Fuji Photo Film in Japan, DuPont, Kodak and 3M 
in the US, Agfa in Germany and Ferrania in Italy which was acquired by 3M in 
1964) manufacture base film since it has numerous industrial uses other than 
photographic film (cf. Kobayashi, 1970). There are two types of photographic 
film, negative and positive (or reversal) film. Negative film used in still 
cameras is developed and generally printed on paper. Positive movie film is 
projected onto movie theater screens, and can be used in still cameras to make 
slides. 
Econon-dc stability is a necessary condition for photographic film 
manufacturing which is a complex, fine chemical industry to grow and 
prosper (Haruki, 1959). Because Japan's chemical industry lagged behind 
world leaders, the technological level of photographic film remained 
comparatively low. Prior to WWII, photographic film was targeted as an 
industry that Japan should develop so as not to be dependent on overseas 
suppliers (Fuji Photo Film, 1984, pp. 12-13,16-17). This is the background to 
the establishment of Fuji Photo Film. Konica, established in 1873 as a 
pharmaceutical store, began to sell imported photographic goods in 1876 and 
27Wormation based on interviews with industrialists, Spring 1996. 
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from 1903 began to manufacture cameras, lenses and film (Lewis, 1991, pp. 4, 
17). After WWII, the industry was protected by import quotas, restrictions and 
tariffs until the early 1970s (cf. Itoh and Kiyono, 1988). Although photographic 
film was targeted for export (cf. Seki et al, 1961), the industry recovered 
relatively slowly throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Only four Japanese firms manufactured of photographic film and paper 
in Japan in 1959 (Haruki, 1959). Fuji Photo Film and Konica manufactured 
film, photosensitized paper and dry plates. Photosensitized paper was also 
manufactured by Mitsubishi Paper and Oriental, and Oriental manufactured 
certain types of film until the late 1950s. As noted in chapter three, Konica 
introduced its first black and white photographic film in 1929 and the first 
Japanese color film in 1940. Fuji Photo Film followed with black and white 
film in 1936, and introduced their first natural color film in 1948. Konica re- 
introduced their Sakura natural color film the same year (Lewis, 1991, pp. 38, 
52,64-65). 
As noted above, demand for photographic film far exceeds the demand 
for cameras and/or lenses. Throughout most of the postwar period, the 
majority of innovations in photographic film formats have come from the US. 
Kodak periodically developed new film systems (e. g. the smaller than 35 mm 
110 cartridge, 126 cartridge and disc formats) to inject new cash flows into the 
firm (see chapter three). Polaroid was founded by Edwin Land, a highly 
inventive scientist who developed, among others, the Polaroid Land cameras 
which printed black and white (1948) and color (1963) photographs 
immediately, and the 1972 SX-70 instant photography system. 
Unlike their US competitors, the two Japanese film makers Konica and 
- FujLPhoto Film concentrated their efforts on the 35 mm format. Given the 
popularity of 35 mm photography in Japan, this is hardly surprising. The 
postwar industry was led by Kodak, but Fuji Photo Film successfully 
introduced new, faster film in both black and white and color during the 
1980s. Konica which had traditionally led in photographic film making had 
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fallen behind Fuji by the 1970s. Fuji, in addition to launching fast films (with 
ISO speeds of 400,800 and 1000) during the 1980s, developed the "throw- 
away' (or the more environmentally-friendly 'one-time use') camera launched 
in 1986. It is essentially a box of film with a very small plastic lens and often a 
flash attached. 28 After all the film has been exposed, the photographer takes 
the whole camera to be developed. The film is naturally used, but the plastic 
parts are recycled into 'new' one-time use cameras. All the market leaders in 
film now offer their own one-time use cameras. 
One of the main reasons that the Japanese camera/lens and film 
companies have been so successful since 1950 is their active engagement in 
technological development. The early postwar years were a time of catch-up 
for the firms, and the Japanese government encouraged the firms (mainly 
through the industry associations) to raise their technological levels so their 
exports would earn foreign exchange through sales in the US and Europe. One 
of the best ways to combat the image of shoddy Japanese goods which was so 
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s was to raise the technological level of 
camera/lens (and later film) exports (see chapters four and five). In the 1970s 
and 1980s, photography firms conducted their R&D in house because 
competition for market shares had grown. One way to increase market share 
was to launch new, revolutionary products, such as the Canon AE-1, the 
Minolta Alpha-7000, and the Fuji throw-away cameras, and to support them 
with marketing. The leading Japanese photography firms utilized technology 
to expand their product lines and to apply innovations to older products. This 
is what allowed them to stay competitive throughout the postwar period. 
Methodology 
There is no standard methodology for analyzing industrial sectors, national or 
global, or for researching a thesis in this neglected field. Literature on Japanese 
28 In Japan, these cameras are literally called'film with lens attached' (renzu tsukefuirumu). 
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industrial policy, industrial organization, business and international political 
economy is used to highlight what is missing from most sectoral analyses (see 
chapter two). Additional detailed case studies on specific sectors in Japan are 
needed if we are to develop a more thorough understanding of industrial 
policy in Japan and of Japanese economic development in general. The case 
presented in this thesis is not, it should be stressed, a business school type case 
study. It is a detailed analysis of the evolution of a whole industry and as such 
is highly dependent on the available historical materials and recollections of 
those who were interviewed. 
As discussed above, the photography industry in Japan has largely 
been ignored in terms of government-industry relations for many reasons. The 
lack of literature on the technological and industrial development of the 
industry made it a perfect case study of international political economy. State 
and market variables mattered greatly, both nationally and internationally. 
Questions that arose immediately were: why are there so many Japanese 
companies leading the industry on a global scale, and how has the industry so 
long avoided a bilateral trade dispute with the US? Because there are few US 
competitors in this industry, it became clear that this case would require a 
multilateral, indeed global, analysis rather than a bilateral US-Japan analysis, 
the latter of which is so pervasive in US studies of japanýs government- 
industry relationship (e. g. Encarnation, 1992; Gerlach, 1992; Mason, 1992; 
Okimoto, et al, 1984; Prestowitz, 1988; Tyson, 1992; and Vogel, 1985). 
The Japanese photography industry is composed of many firms which 
produce many products. Statistically speaking, their products have been 
variously classified in Japanese government publications as precision 
machinery (or sometimes simply as machinery), as optical equipment, as 
sensitized materials (or sometimes simply as chemicals), or as photographic 
film and photographic paper. The thesis is limited to firms which began as 
photography firms, in either sensitized materials (photographic film and 
paper) or optics (photographic lenses) and cameras and are today the market 
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leaders. The failed companies are also worthy of study, but for practical 
reasons it was necessary to highlight the (many) successful Japanese 
photography firms in order to say something meaningful about the evolution 
of the industry. 
An important aspect of this thesis was to develop an understanding of 
conditions in the countries which were Japan's main competitors (i. e. the US 
and Europe) over the postwar period. Taking a long view of history, that is, 
learning how the industry developed from its earliest beginnings (from the 
camera obscura) to the present was helpful for understanding more recent 
history. To tease out the government-industry relationship in Japan, postwar 
economic development, international economic relations and international 
political relations were taken into consideration. Finally, it was necessary to 
learn about technological change in the photography industry relative to 
overall technological change in Japan, the US and Europe. 
This thesis takes an eclectic approach, that is, it considers literature on 
industrial policy, industrial organization and political economy to see what 
can best explain what happened in the Japanese photography industry over 
time (cf. Strange, 1994, pp. 10-12). Unfortunately, much of the literature is very 
general and it was often impossible to find references to specific industries, 
much less to the photography industry. In the end, no single, comprehensive 
theoretical explanation can completely satisfy all aspects of the industry's 
evolution. Dynamic change over the postwar period made this impossible. As 
a compromise, applicable aspects of the available literature were combined to 
help formulate and analyze the postwar evolution of the Japanese 
photography industry (cf. Dunning, 1993). 
Much of the literature on industrial policy suffers from focusing solely 
on economic and/or political issues, downplaying such factors as security, 
technological change, and knowledge creation and transmission. Analyses 
driven by political science theory, for example, place strong emphasis on the 
role of the state and elite bureaucrats in Japan (cf. Johnson, 1982; van 
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Wolferen, 1990). In contrast, economists often interpret industrial policy as a 
response to 'market failure' and concentrate on explaining how Japan's 
postwar economic 'miracle' can be understood through conventional 
economic theory (cf. Kon-dya, 1988; Trezise, 1976). A few have stressed the role 
of firms in Japan's postwar economy and predictably found that both 
bureaucrats and politicians were less important than the firms themselves (cf. 
Callon, 1995). None of these approaches is satisfactory because they stress one 
variable over another rather than analyzing how the relative importance of 
many variables change over time. The study of market-state behavior, for 
example, is not complete without the analysis of firms and firm behavior (cf. 
Stopford and Strange, 1991). Furthermore, this thesis shows how important 
technological change is to a nation's economic development and that it must 
never be ignored in dynamic analyses (Lazonick, 1991; Vestal, 1993). 
Unfortunately, too many studies take an insufficiently long view of history 
and end up ignoring the fact that government policy, the relative power of the 
state and the firms, and general economic conditions change over time (cf. 
Strange, 1996). 
The longer our view of history, the more difficult it becomes to draw 
sweeping general7izations. And although generalizations are needed in social 
science research, they should not be so broad as to obscure important details. 
While there may be similarities across certain industries, for example, it is 
virtually impossible to generalize across all industries. It is likewise impossible 
to generalize about the behavior of all firms within one industry. This is an 
important theoretical challenge to a much of the current literature in 
management and industrial organization (cf. Aoki, 1990; Williamson, 1985). In 
the early postwar years, the industries in Japan, the US and Europe differed 
and were influenced by local preferences. By the end of the period studied (i. e. 
1995), this had completely changed. Mass production, mass marketing and 
convergence of consumer preferences had made the industry a global one. 
These finding contrast sharply with some recent scholarship which suggests 
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that nationality is the dominant variable of firm behavior in the global 
economy today (cf. Pauly and Reich, 1997; Porter, 1990). 
The methodology adopted in this thesis amounts to telling a story about 
how the photography industry developed in Japan. The industry's evolution 
and the respective roles of key players is best considered by a straightforward 
historical account and judicious use of qualitative data. While this story cannot 
be told without quantitative references, it is not dependent on game theory or 
regression analysis which would only obscure the messages this story holds. 
Stories are subject to interpretation. One of the challenges of this project has 
been to decide exactly which of the many messages the story of the 
photography industry contains, that is, which are most important and which 
are most relevant to the study of international political economy. Firms are 
important, particularly how they have alternately worked with and against 
government policies, with and against each other and how they worked to 
shape policies specifically directed toward them. 
Therefore, while MITI and other government ministries played a 
pivotal role in formulating and carrying out Japanýs postwar economic 
policies, they did not do it alone. Firms played a very important role in both 
policy formulation and execution. As Encarnation and Mason (1990) and 
Mason (1992) have shown firms have played an active role in the 
policyrnaking process in Japan. Contrary to prevailing beliefs, Jerome Cohen 
(1949, p. 60, note 26) suggests that historically 'jit] was quite customary in 
Japan for ... a de facto situation to exist well in advance of legalization" by the 
government. The facts as presented in this thesis lend support to Cohen's 
findings, that policy often followed what was already occurring in the 
economy, and that the job of policyrnakers was to try and control events 
through measures some of which helped but some of which actually hindered 
the expansion of the photography industry. 
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Rivalry and Cooperation 
The words 'rivalry' and 'cooperation' were chosen for the title of this thesis 
because they most aptly describe the government-industry relationships in the 
photography industry. These were: (1) rivalry as well as cooperation among 
government officials (particularly between bureaucrats and politicians but also 
among bureaucrats); (2) rivalry and cooperation between the government 
(mainly bureaucrats) and the industry; and (3) rivalry and cooperation among 
the photography firms. What is notable is that while the degree of rivalry and 
cooperation changed over the postwar period, it appears that there was more 
I cooperation! during the period of economic recovery and more 'rivalry' 
during the period after the first oil crisis (rougl-dy after 1974). 
The terms cooperation and rivalry are not new in the vast literature on 
Japarýs postwar economic 'miracle. " Scott Callon (1995) identified the 
'cooperative-functional' thesis in which he includes the 'revisionist' 
interpretation of Japan's industrial policy (cf. Johnson, 1982; Prestowitz, 1988; 
and van Wolferen, 1990). Most of the literature on Japan's joint government- 
industry high-tech research consortia (e. g. Anchordoguy, 1989; Fransman, 
1990; and Sigurdson, 1986) typifies this school of thought, according to Callon. 
It is 'cooperative' because of the collaborative nature of the government- 
industry research consortia in carrying out its goals and 'functionalist' because 
many scholars see it as a model that could be used by other advanced 
economies. 
In Head to Head, Lester Thurow (1992) referred to "competition and 
cooperation" as a strategy that nations might successfully pursue in the future. 
Laura DAndrea Tyson and John Zysman (1989, pp. 70-71) discussed Japan's 
neomercantilist practices, referring to 'controlled competition' (as used by 
Yasusuke Murakami (1982) and later by Martin Fransman (1995)) which they 
defined as "cooperation amid competition. " Chalmers Johnson (1989) and 
Clyde Prestowitz (1988), among others, have described the in-fighting, i. e. the 
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rivalry, between the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and 
MITI in decisions over Japan's high-technology policy particularly when 
telecommunications firms were involved. Recent literature on foreign direct 
investment and the changing role of multinationals in the global system (e. g. 
Encarnation, 1992; and Stopford and Strange, 1991) have played on the word 
'rival' to describe firm-firm, state-state as well as state-firm competition. 
In the Japanese photography industry, there was a subtle but real shift 
from more cooperative govemment-industry relationships before the early 
1970s to less cooperative relationships after that time. Pinpointing exactly 
when the shift occurred is impossible, but the tendency was toward rivalry 
after the early 1970s, when the international trading system set up after WWII 
was also undergoing change. Each of the three relationships identified above, 
i. e. bureaucrat-politician, government-industry and firm-firm, is characterized 
by both cooperation and rivalry throughout the postwar period. 29 Both 
cooperation and rivalry always existed, but they were rarely in balance; one 
often took precedence over the other. 
First, the bureaucrat-politician relationship was generally more 
cooperative in the early recovery years, but this cooperation was harder to 
achieve as consensus over Japan's national goals began to break down. The 
early years were, however, not free from discord. This is particularly obvious 
in the case of the establishment of the inspection institute for cameras and 
lenses. An LDP politician, Kinji Moriyama, worked to found the institute 
which, as it turned out, became central to raising product quality standards 
and promoting the industry overseas (see chapters three and four). While the 
relationship was mostly cooperative until the early 1970s, politicians and 
bureaucrats also behaved as rivals. Generally, however, before the 1970s, 
politicians tended to let the bureaucrats handle industrial policy. 
29 By politicians, I refer to the members of the Liberal Democratic Party who almost without 
exception ruled Japan from 1955, when the party was formed, until 1991. 
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Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, Japanese 
bureaucrats faced increased criticism at home for putting firms before people 
(e. g. pollution problems and poor living conditions) and abroad for Japan's 
industrial policy (e. g. the protected domestic market and large export 
surpluses). This translated into disagreement on national economic goals. 
Pressure for change came from the United States through a string of bi-lateral 
trade disputes (cf. Prestowitz, 1988). This finally affected the photographic 
film makers - in particular Fuji Photo Film - when they were charged in 
1995 with unfair trading practices (Dewey Ballantine, 1995a and 1995b). While 
it is not clear that bureaucrats and politicians have been rivals in recent years 
over issues affecting the photography industry, their relationship does appear 
to have been less cooperative than in the early recovery years (see chapter 
five). 
Second, the goverrunent-industry relationship was cooperative in the 
early recovery years when both sides strove after the common goal of 
economic growth. Firms were constrained at first by the heavy bureaucratic 
controls placed on their activities, from international trade to bank financing. 
However, as these controls relaxed and the economy was well on its way to 
prosperity, industry and government cooperated less easily. It should be 
stressed that all firms were not equally as aggressive in de-linking themselves 
from government policies, but instead found it useful to cooperate with 
governrnent arrangements when they were perceived to be beneficial. 
Finally, the firm-firm relationship was plainly one of cooperation 
among exporters in the early recovery years. Exporters complied with a 
government scheme to set up camera repair centers in New York and 
Okinawa that allowed their competitors - as well as their own employees - 
to repair and spread information about all Japanese cameras. This is a clear 
example of firm-firm cooperation and goverrunent-industry cooperation. The 
camera/lens exporters never would have joined such a plan if they had not 
realized that their best road to success was through cooperation. Of course 
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they were rivals, especially in the domestic market, but they chose to 
cooperate closely for a short time for the benefit of all (see chapter four). 
Rivalry among the firms became more and more pronounced over time, 
especially after the 1970s when Japanese photographic firms competed for 
market shares in the largest markets in the US and Europe. With no other real 
competition left in cameras/lenses, rivalry among the Japanese firms in those 
products intensified on a global scale (see chapter five). 
Because the photography industry is composed of many firms whose 
behavior varied throughout the period studied in this thesis, it is impossible to 
conclude that all firms cooperated (or were rivals) at any one particular time. 
The same goes for the Japanese government. It is impossible to draw vast 
generalizations- about all the firms or all parts of the government. It is possible 
to say, however, that cooperation and rivalry describe the government- 
industry relationships over time and that the level of cooperation decreased 
(while the degree of rivalry increased) as the economy - and the firms within 
it - grew and prospered. 
2. Literature Review 
Introduction 
Why has the photography industry been so generally ignored? One reason is 
to be found in the literature concerning Japan's government-industry relations 
over the postwar years. This literature has generated some powerful myths 
about the reason for japanýs postwar economic success. For instance, it is 
commonly believed that the photography industry was not on the receiving 
end of beneficial government policies, i. e. industrial policies, unlike certain 
strategic industries, e. g. steel, automobiles, electronics, petrochemicals, 
computers and semiconductors. Evidence from the photography industry flies 
in the face of this myth. We cannot advance our understanding of Japan's 
government-industry relationship through analyses of the strategic industries 
alone. All industries are not the same and they did not develop in the same 
manner over the postwar period. Therefore, we need evidence from all 
industries - including consumer goods industries - to develop a clearer 
picture of Japan's government-industry relationship over the postwar period. 
Industrial policy is the most commonly analyzed aspect of Japan's 
government-industry relationship. As it has been applied to Japan, industrial 
policy centers on the relationship of the Japanese goverru-nent (mainly the 
bureaucratic elite in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
and the Ministry of Finance (MoF)) to Japanese industries (mainly the so-called 
strategic industries). The obvious drawback of this approach is that it runs the 
risk of depending on highly generalized accounts of states and markets (i. e. 
bureaucrats, politicians, industries and firms). As a consequence, several 
popular myths have developed and generally have gone unquestioned. 
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One goes like this: an 'omniscient' bureaucracy skillfully guided Japan's 
econon-dc development, but that in recent years their ability to divine the 
future course of the Japanese economy has foundered due to the fact that 
Japan has 'caught up' technologically with the 'West' (cf. van Wolferen, 1990). 
Another says that the Japanese economy developed successfully because of 
classical market forces and the existence of a large, intensely competitive 
domestic market which allowed firms to hone skills that were then 
successfully employed overseas to gain impressive market shares (cf. Eads and 
Yamamura, 1987; Komiya, 1988). Other myths have emerged that are 
elaborations upon or combinations of these two (cf. Spero, 1990). 
A purpose of this thesis is to dispel a number of mysteries that shroud 
our understanding- of how Japanýs economy works and how the economy 
recovered so quickly after the second world war. This is done via the 
photography industry. International political economy, it is argued, offers a 
higher level of explanatory power because it forces us to account for factors 
that might be excluded by doctrinal interpretations, e. g. the roles of 'the state' 
in political theory and 'the market' in economic theory. The historical context 
is critical, although too often it is dismissed through reliance on generalization 
rather than on solid, empirical evidence. This premise is the core around which 
the story of the photography industry is told. 
The topics discussed in this chapter are: the basic discourse on Japan's 
industrial policies; what (little) has been said about industrial policy and the 
photography industry; why industrial policy explanations are inadequate for 
the analysis of japanýs economic growth and prosperity during the postwar 
period; and how international political economy is a more effective and 
powerful tool to analyze complex, empirical studies such as the postwar 
evolution of the photography industry in Japan. As in chapter one, it was 
argued that the photography industry was one of Japan's backbone recovery 
industries (i. e. cameras/lenses, sewing machines, clocks/watches and bicycles) 
which, during the early postwar period, was supported by both the US and 
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Japanese governments and firms. This argument is at odds with conventional 
explanations which claim that in Japan, industries driven by domestic demand 
needed no extra help from the bureaucracy, i. e. they did not benefit from 
industrial policy. Deciding whether an industry or specific firms benefited (or 
not) from industrial policy largely depends on how the terms are defined. 
Therefore, what is meant by the term industrial policy and how it has been 
applied (or not applied) to the photography industry is discussed next. 
Industfial policy in Japan 
The term 'industrial policy' did not come into common use in Japan until the 
early 1970s, but it is probably the most frequently used tool of analysis of 
government-industry relations in Japan (Komiya, 1988 and 1990; Okuno- 
Fujiwara, 1991; Suzumura and Okuno, 1986). 1 Industrial policy is not unique to 
Japan. According to Ira Magaziner and Thomas Hout (1980), industrial policy 
cannot be discussed without taking economic and noneconon-tic factors into 
account or without acknowledging that there is considerable variability among 
industries. They give a simple definition of industrial policy saying (p. 1): 
It is our view that industrial policy --which is defined here as the 
application of government resources and influence to industrial 
affairs -- cannot be properly studied or prescribed without a 
thorough understanding of how competition varies by industry and 
how the economics of businesses change over time. Industrial policy 
must be informed by more than national priorities and where the 
fast growth markets are. Industrial policy is an integral part of the 
international competitive business system and must be highly 
responsive to it. 
The debate over industrial policy is not confined to the study of Japan's 
goverm-nent-industry relationship. The truth is that every country - including 
the US - has an industrial policy. To some extent, the denial or 
1 Somewhat jokingly, some have said industrial policy is simply 'what MITI does' (cf 
Suzumura and Okuno, 1986, pp. 2-3). 
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acknowledgment of the existence of industrial policy (in Japan or elsewhere) 
depends on the doctrine to which a particular pundit subscribes. 
Scholars who heartily recognize the existence of industrial policy in 
Japan analyze it from a state-centered perspective, arguing that it is an integral 
part of Japan's "developmental state' (e. g. Fallows, 1989; Johnson, 1982 and 
1995; Prestowitz, 1988; and van Wolferen, 1990). This 'revisionist' view on 
industrial policy in which a highly-educated bureaucratic elite (in the MoF and 
MITI) guided Japan's economic 'miracle' through effective planning and 
politics has been put forward most forcefully by Chalmers Johnson in his MITI 
and the Japanese Miracle (1982) and more recently in his collection of essays on 
the 'developmental state' entitled Japan: Mo Governs? (1995). 2 The importance 
he attributes to the bureaucracy and the state is quite close to the realist view 
in political theory, represented by Alexander Hamilton. and Friedrich List who 
believed that state intervention and trade protection were crucial for 
latecomers to the process of industrialization (cf. Strange, 1994, pp. 180-181). 
Liberal economists - if they recognize the existence of industrial policy 
at all - often view it as an inefficient response to 'market failure) i. e. problems 
in resource allocation due to the ineffectiveness of the market mechanism (e. g. 
Eads and Yamamura, 1987; Kon-dya, 1988; and Trezise, 1976). Yet there is little 
agreement among economists on what are appropriate responses by 
government to situations of market failure. The view that Japan's bureaucracy 
was in any way responsible for planning the resurgence of the economy after 
WWII, is generally eschewed. As early as 1976, Phillip Trezise wrote (pp. 756- 
757): 
2 Johnson's lead has been followed by, among others, van Wolferen, Prestowitz; and Fallows 
who are considered to be the main writers of 'the revisionist school! They are called 
revisionists because they stressed the importance of the bureaucracy rather than neoclassical 
economics as a factor in Japan's postwar economic 'miracle. ' Until that time, Japan's economic 
performance had largely been interpreted through economic theory. Managed trade became 
the buzz word of the late 1980s and early 1990s for how the US could counter Japan's effective 
bureaucratic leadership (i. e. industrial policy). Specific government policies directed at 
promoting American businesses, rather than simply promoting free trade and a capitalist 
spirit, should be pursued, they said, and the traditional animosity between government and 
business (i. e. not on the military side) would be dampened (cf. Tyson and Zysman, 1989). 
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There is no question ... that, as 
in all modern states, the political 
enviroru-nent and the economic policies that were among its 
products have influenced economic events pervasively and in some 
respects crucially. To suppose, however, that politicians and officials 
in league with businessmen were able to plan and guide japarýs 
explosive economic growth in detail is neither credible in the abstract 
nor ... supported 
by the realities. 
Trezise's words represent an extreme statement - but not an unusual one - 
of the liberal position. Thus, economists tend to see industrial policy as 
economic policy formulated as a response to market failure, whereas 
revisionists give all the credit to Japan's powerful bureaucrats. Both 
viewpoints are heavily biased by their ideologies. 
A number of scholars, who are often called 'pluralists' (e. g. Aoki, et 
1996; Calder, 1993; Okimoto, 1989; and Vestal, 1993), place the discussion 
somewhere in between these ideological extremes, i. e. the fuzzy middle 
ground somewhere between the revisionists and the liberal economists. But 
they tend to stick to the idea that it is a bureaucrat-industry discourse, 
overlooking other important factors such as firms, technology and information 
flows. Daniel Okimoto (1989, p. 1), for example, notes in Japan that " [a]lthough 
capitalism is oonsidered the best economic system yet devised, its 
imperfections are clearly understood. " In his interpretation, bureaucrats in 
Japan recognize that the invisible hand of the market (i. e. industry) at times 
needs the visible hand of government (i. e. the bureaucracy) to keep things on 
the right track. Takafusa Nakamura (1981) called this form of goverru-nent 
intervention "shelter from the storm. "3 
Many scholars recognize the importance of sectoral. analysis for 
inforn-ting the debate on Japan's industrial policy. Moreover, analyzing Japan's 
econon-dc success in terms of the role of the firm has grown in popularity (e. g. 
Ab6,1997; Aoki, 1990; Aoki and Dore, 1994; Callon, 1995; Dore, 1986; Fruin, 
3 Itoh, et al (1988a, p. 249) describe this view as opposite to Ryutaro Komiya's interpretation of 
industrial policy (presented in the same volume) in their discussion of the formation of cartels 
and the existence of so-called 'excess competition! This is elaborated upon below. 
4k 
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1992; and Magaziner and Hout, 1980). However, with few exceptions, the 
debate still tends to be very general drawing conclusions about all firms or 
industries. Many studies focus on one or more industries, but they seldom 
analyze a large number of firms within the industries and most are 
preoccupied with the industries' relationships with specific bureaucracies. 
Furthermore, only a few scholars (e. g. Mason, 1992; and Encarnation 
and Mason, 1990) have concerned themselves with the impact of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) on Japan's government-industry relationship and 
policyrnaking process. As Stopford and Strange (1991) and more recently 
Strange (1996) have shown, MNCs and other non-state actors have changed 
the terms of global competition by taking an active role in national, regional 
and international policymaking, especially when policy has the potential to 
affect them financially or to affect their relative power. japanýs export-oriented 
consumer goods industries are particularly good examples of the growth of 
Japan's MNCs on the world stage. However, they have attracted very little 
scholarly attention (except for the electronics industry, although it is debatable 
if the industry is in fact a consumer goods industry) and the emphasis there 
has been steered by the traditional preoccupation with industrial policy. 
A great deal of attention has instead gone into the study of the so-called 
'strategic' industries (e. g. steel, shipbuilding, petrochen-ticals, automobiles, 
semiconductors and computers) and it is the evidence from these studies 
which has informed the theoretical discussion of industrial policy in Japan. 4 
Unfortunately, empirical data on most other Japanese industries is lacking, 
especially in English. This has prompted leading scholars to call for in-depth 
case study analyses from which it is hoped lessons could be drawn for other 
countries and contributions to developing the debate over the role of -- and the 
importance of -- industrial policy in Japan's postwar econon-tic history could be 
4 These industries are called strategic because they are seen as the basic industries needed by 
all modern, advanced industrial economies. 
Literature Review 
made (cf. Yonekura, 1996). 5 
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There are three points that should be stressed regarding the broader 
interpretations of industrial policy, such as the one given above by Magaziner 
and Hout (1980). First, it is generally agreed among scholars that in Japan 
industrial policy's heyday was prior to the early 1970s. 6 However, many 
studies ignore the dynamic of change over time and therefore offer little or no 
perspective of how industrial policies in, for example, 1960 differ from 
industrial policies in the 1980s. James Vestal (1993, p. 2) notes: 
Industrial policy advocates and critics rarely differentiate between 
industrial policy in Japanýs early stages of development and 
industrial policy after Japan had achieved advanced nation status. 
[ ... I Equally important, this lack of differentiation fails to 
acknowledge the differing degrees of intervention that have 
characterized Japanese industrial policy over time. 
The consensus needed for making effective industrial policy began to break 
down in the early 1970s, and the tools to carry it out became more limited over 
time as Japan's successful economy came into the international, and especially 
the American, spotlight. 7 Before the 1970s, much of Japan's industrial policy 
was focused on promoting exports and protecting the domestic market from 
imports which might prevent industries from recovering to prewar levels of 
5 Takatoshi Ito stated at a 1996 conference on market-state relations that the most important 
thing that remains to be done on this subject is to produce more empirical evidence through 
case study analyses of those industries which have yet to be studied. Only in this way can the 
theoretical discussion of market-state relations in Japan move forward. Author's notes, 'Market 
and Government: Friends or Foes?, An International Conference on the World Economy, ' 
sponsored by the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, February 
1996. 
6 There were many external shocks to the Japanese economy in the early 1970s, among them 
the 1973-74 oil crisis, Nixon's 1971 visit to the People's Republic of China (without prior 
consultation with Tokyo), the levying of a 10 percent surcharge on imports into the US, and the 
first postwar revaluation of the yen in 1971 (float began in 1973). The last was especially 
important for Japan's export industries. At roughly this same time, the public dissatisfaction 
grew over the degradation of the environment and poor quality of life due which many 
thought had been compromised for the benefit of industry. General dissatisfaction with Liberal 
Democratic Party corporatist policies allowed the opposition parties to use Japan's 
environmental problems to their advantage. The general mood of the early 1970s also 
prompted the restructuring of MITI in July 1973. See, among others, Johnson, 1982; Lincoln, 
1988; Nakamura, 1981; and Tsuru, 1996. 
7 As Tyson and Zysman (1989, p. 59) put it, "In the late 1970s, America discovered Japan. " 
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output and beyond. Capital flows were controlled by bureaucratic initiative 
and much of the financing to make recovery possible came from government 
(mostly long-term lending) and commercial (mainly short-term lending) 
banks. Foreign direct investment was difficult to arrange at best (cf. Mason, 
1992) and most imports were regulated via quotas. In general, the Japanese 
government kept close watch on how the economy was recovering in its effort 
to put the economy back on its feet. 
Once recovery was no longer in question, bureaucrats only gradually 
gave up their control. After the mid-1970s industrial policy was largely aimed 
at stimulating basic research in the so-called 'sunrise' industries through 
goverranent-industry research projects (e. g. the very large-scale integration 
(VLSI) project and the fifth generation computer project) and by winding 
down the so-called 'sunset' industries through various rationalization 
measures (cf. Okimoto, 1989; and Tyson and Zysman, 1989). Visionary high 
technology investment was urged (and at times partially funded) by the 
government, but three ingredients were important for making them work: 
support among the general public for government policies; financial support 
by the firms involved (to complement the bureaucratic financing, however 
minimal); and coordination. Depending on how well these three factors were 
managed, some projects succeeded while others failed. 8 The relationship 
between government and industry had changed dramatically. 
Second, many analyses do not consider the military strategic 
motivations which shaped Japan's early economic recovery based on export 
promotion. Even though Vestal (1993), for example, considers noneconomic 
factors, security policy is not among them. Industrial policy explanations often 
neglect the important role of the US in the formulation of Japan's economic 
recovery policies usually because liberal ideology (particularly as it is 
8 Three recent studies include Callon (1995) on high technology (mainly computer-related), 
Flamm (1996) on semiconductors and Fransman (1990) on computers. 
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interpreted by Americans) insists that the US has no industrial policy. 9 
Military security in terms of US foreign policy was a critical factor that 
effectively supported Japan's postwar economic 'miracle' right up until the 
1970s. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Japanese government was 
responsible for planning Japan's economic recovery in the late 1940s, the real 
power (until April 1952) was the Allied Occupation, or GHQý run more or less 
by the US government. Japan's strategic geographic position and role as a 
strong American (political, economic and military) ally must be taken into 
account in any analysis of japanýs postwar history. 
Third, liberal economic theory has blinded observers to such US policies 
in Japan as export promotion and import protection. In recent years, import 
substitution (i. e. export promotion and import protection) have gone out of 
favor with liberal economists who claim that such policies simply do not work. 
However, this is exactly what worked in early postwar Japan. The need to 
generate US dollars through exports to pay for imports was a primary 
motivating force behind Japan's industrial policy and overall economic growth 
strategy. General MacArthur is quoted as saying that he had "never seen a 
more tangled financial mess that that into which the Japanese government had 
fallen by the end of the war" (Manchester, 1978, p. 598). Without the flow of 
foreign exchange (in US dollars) into Japan to pay for the imports that the 
economy needed for survival, recovery might never have taken place. 
The obvious method for earning US dollars was to export goods that 
American consumers wanted to buy and to recycle some of those dollar 
earnings into up-grading the industrial structure so that over time higher 
value-added goods could be exported. The higher the value of Japan's exports, 
the greater the earnings in US dollars, and the more quickly the economy 
would recover. Getting Japan - and Western Europe -- back on its economic 
feet was a central objective of US foreign policy in the late 1940s. 
9 This is, however, recognized by, for example, Cohen (1949) and ltoh and Kiyono (1988). See 
also chapter one. 
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Among those who support the argument that Japanýs industrial 
structure has been shaped by export-oriented industries (and vice versa) are 
Motoshige Itoh and Kazuharu Kiyono (1988, pp. 156-157) who wrote: 
The magnitude of gains from trade accruing to a country is 
intricately related to its industrial structure. The higher the 
proportion of goods with high overseas demand entering the 
Japanese export menu and the higher the propensity in foreign 
countries to import these goods, the higher would be the levels of 
income and welfare in Japan. In order to be able to offer such an 
export menu, a matching industrial structure is a necessity. The 
advancement of the industrial structure in postwar Japan can be 
therefore interpreted, in a long-term perspective, as the process of 
change that enabled Japan to acquire an industrial structure 
conducive to such exports. Conversely, one may argue that it is these 
shifts in the industrial structure that have been responsible for the 
high rate of growth in the postwar Japanese economy. 
According to Itoh and Kiyono, many sectors benefited from export promotion 
policies and import protection, both of which were vital to the growth of the 
Japanese economy. Their analysis, like that of many others, is unfortunately 
rather general. 
This study of the photography industry indicates, however, that Itoh 
and Kiyono are correct in saying that it was necessary to build up export 
industries that required relatively few imports to generate US dollars so that 
higher value-added manufacturing industries could be (re-)established 
through the import of, among others, technology and raw materials. 10 The 
backbone recovery industries (including cameras/lenses and film) were the 
beneficiaries of export promotion and import protection and helped lay the 
foundation for the later development of higher value-added industries (what 
Johnson (1982, p. 228) referred to as 'heavy and chemical industrialization). 
Increasing the value of exported goods was a key facet of Japan's industrial 
history (cf. Ab6,1997; Hidaka, 1997). It is also a key to understanding how 
10 Others too have argued this thesis, notably Johnson (1982), but again the analyses are 
generalized to the whole economy. 
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economic recovery took hold and how Japan's economic growth came to be 
dependent on export sector expansion (cf. Calder, 1993). But, because it has not 
been fashionable to analyze export promotion and import protection (i. e. 
import substitution), little heed has been given in economic analyses to the 
success of this strategy in Japan's economic 'miracle. ' 
Part of the problem is that so many industries, particularly the non- 
strategic ones) have yet to be studied in any depth. This is why the industrial 
policy literature barely mentions japanýs photography industry. The degree to 
which cameras/lenses and film have been addressed in the literature is 
discussed next. 
Industrial policy in the photography industry 
Ryutaro Komiya (1988), one of the most prolific writers on japanýs industrial 
policy, explains in his introductory chapter to the volume Industrial Policy of 
Japan what were the circumstances in which industries could benefit from 
industrial policy. During the high growth era, he writes (pp. 2-6), two criteria 
had to be met by the prospective industry: 1) there would be a rapid increase 
in productivity; and 2) the goods produced would have a high income 
elasticity of demand. He then goes on to discount his own definition of 
industrial policy saying (p. 7), 
... if goods are produced by an industry in which rapid productivity increases are occurring and for which the income elasticity of 
demand is high, then the industry will grow on its own. Hence there 
is no reason why, due to these two criteria, such an industry should 
be made a particular object for promotion. 
Ag"discussed above, industries with high income elasticities of demand were 
high value-added and usually high technology industries. So if Japan was to 
move toward an advanced industrial economy, it was imperative that these 
industries be encouraged (cf. Itoh et al, 1988b). 
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Figures from a study by Itoh and Kiyono (1988) indicate just how 
effectively exports with high income elasticities were promoted by the mid- 
1960s (see table 2.1). The income elasticity of Japan's exports, measured in 
terms of growth rates over the 1956/57 to 1964/65 period, was the highest at 
3.55 of all 11 industrialized countries. For Japan's imports, the same figure 
ranked the lowest at 1.23, but the discrepancy between Japan's low figure and 
highest figure (Italy: 2.19) was not as great as in the category of income 
elasticity of exports (where the UK at 0.86 had the lowest figure). This 
indicates that it is Japan's exports, not imports, that are most out of line with 
other industrialized countries in terms of income elasticity. This is confirmed 
in the figures for the income elasticities of exports minus imports (D-E), where 
Japan at 2.32 was by far the highest of the 11 countries as compared to the US 
(at -0.52), and the UK (at -0.80) at the opposite end of the scale. Therefore, in 
terms of income elasticity of demand, Komiya's argument sounds rather 
hollow next to the evidence presented by Itoh and Kiyono. 
Komiya also claimed in his 1988 piece that he has changed his definition 
of industrial policy over time to include two additional criteria (note 16, p. 22): 
there would be "a strong linkage effect to other industries; " and employment 
would be generated by the industries targeted by industrial policy. No doubt 
the evolution in his definition is linked to the practical application of policies 
to Japanese industry over the postwar period, discussed above. But it most 
surely must be colored by his own transformation from a professor at the 
University of Tokyo (opposed to MITI's central role in the Yawata-Fuji merger 
in the steel industry) to his post until 1997 as Director General of MITI's 
Research Institute of International Trade and Industry. 11 
Komiya (1988) defined two types of industrial policies: (a) those which 
affect the allocation of resources to industry including industrial infrastructure 
projects and measures affecting how resources are allocated between 
11 Komiya is also professor of economics at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo. He was 
succeeded at MITI's Research Institute by Masahiko Aoki. 
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Table 2.1 International Comparison of Growth Rates in GNP, Exports & 
Imports and Income Elasticity of Exports and Imports 
(1956/57 av. '-- 1964/65) 
------- ----- --------- -- -- - -- - ------------- - -- ----------------- -- ---------------------- - 
Rate of Growth 
------ -- 
Income Elasticity 
-- ---- -- --------- - 
Real GNP Exports Imports Exports Imports 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) D-E 
--------------- --- --------------------- 
Japan 
------------------------------------------- 
9.8 14.2 11.5 
--------------------- 
3.55 1.23 2.32 
West Germany 6.2 7.0 10.7 2.08 1.80 0.28 
Italy 5.5 14.7 12.8 2.95 2.19 0.76 
Denmark 5.2 7.7 9.6 1.69 1.31 0.38 
France 5.1 7.9 6.3 1.53 1.66 -0.13 
Netherlands 4.7 8.4 8.5 1.88 1.89 -0.01 
Sweden 4.4 6.8 7.1 1.76 1.42 0.34 
Norway 4.2 7.6 7.2 1.59 1.40 0.19 
Belgium 3.9 7.2 7.2 1.83 1.94 -0.11 
United States 3.6 4.9 5.2 0.99 1.51 -0.52 
United Kingdom 3.3 3.3 4.2 0.86 1.66 
--- 
-0.80 
------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: A-C calculated from Keizai Kikakucho Chosakyoku (1972), p. 331. For Japan, 
1956/57 - 1965/66. (13) exports of goods and services; (C) i mports of goods and services. 
(D) and (E) from H outhakker and Magee (1969); Belgium is for Belgium and Luxembourg. 
For (D) income is world income. 
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Source: M. Itoh and K. Kiyono (1988) "Foreign Trade and Direct Investment" in R. Komiya 
et al, eds., Industrial Policy ofJapan, London, Academic Press, p. 157. 
Literature Review 49 
industries; and (b) those which affect industrial organization including the 
internal organization of industries (e. g. consolidation of firms and investment 
and output adjustment) and cross-industry organization (e. g. measures toward 
small and medium-sized enterprises, protective tariffs and excise taxes on 
luxuries). The former type represents what was identified above as the liberal 
economists' view; it is a policy response to market failure. The latter type are 
noneconomic policies, so Komiya does not include them in his analysis. 
Industrial policy, he says (p. 7), was aimed at the industries "that government 
officials -- with the backing of public opinion - felt Japan should have. " These 
originally were "iron and steel, shipbuilding, a merchant marine, machine 
industries in general, heavy electrical equipment, and chemicals" and later 
included automobiles, petrochemicals, nuclear power, computers and 
semiconductors. 
All other industries, if they were affected by industrial policies, were 
only influenced by what KomiYa says are noneconomic policies. Thus, he 
states (pp. 7-8), 
... during the period of rapid growth and into the next period, quite a few new industries developed, many of which achieved remarkable 
success in exporting. Early on were the industries that produced 
such goods as sewing machines, cameras, bicycles, motorcycles, 
pianos, zippers, and transistor radios. From the middle of the 1960s 
on, the list included the manufacturers of color televisions, tape 
recorders, magnetic recording tape, audio equipment, fishing gear, 
watches and clocks, calculators, electric wire, machine tools, 
numerically controlled machine tools, textile machinery, agricultural 
machinery, insulators, communications equipment, ceramics, and 
robots. 7hese industries developed without any dependence on industrial 
protection and promotion policies. The majority of the firms in these 
growth industries started from nothing after the war or at most were 
very small firms. They developed under their own power without 
any particular benefits from industrial policy measures. [italics 
added] 
Komiya would have us believe that his very narrow definition of industrial 
policy is all we need to understand Japanýs postwar government-industry 
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relationshiP. This flies in the face of what many scholars have found and what 
happened in the photography industry. Noneconomic factors cannot simply 
be ignored if we are to understand japan's postwar economic 'miracle. ' 
Komiya's comments raise many more questions than they answer. First, 
it would be difficult to substantiate his claim that sewing machines; cameras, 
and watches/clocks are 'new' industries in the postwar period (Uchida, 1985; 
Uchida, 1994). 12 Second, if one industry is promoted, such as "machine 
industries in general, " then we must take into account the spillover effects to 
industries and/or firms outside of that particular industry (cf. Flamm, 1996; 
Tyson, 1991; and Uchida, 1994). 13 It is also unclear if "machine industries in 
general"' include 'precision machinery, ' which is one of the many 
classifications used for the photography industry. Machine tools and 
watches/clocks are also included in that group. 14Komiya states that "machine 
industries in general" were promoted, but does not recognize the importance 
of spillover effects to other industries. 
Third, exporters were helped by what became a very favorable 
exchange rate. According to Tsuru (1996, pp. 77-78), 
12 Uchida (1985, pp. 179-196) notes in his history of the watch industry that Seiko was founded 
in 1893 but that the earliest manufacture of time pieces in Japan dates even earlier. By 1894, 
there were eight firms making time pieces. By the early 1930s, Japan! s production of, among 
others, cameras, sewing machines, looms, knitting machines and telephone and telegraph 
apparatus exceeded imports (Uchida, 1994, p. 56). W. Mark Fruin (1992) seconds Uchida's 
view of the extent to which technology was imported in Japan in the prewar period to establish 
modern industries. 
13 Flamm (1996, p. 110) notes the spillover effect of the VILSI research in the government- 
industry joint laboratory saying; "The work carried out ... seems to have been productive. [ ... I The companies associated with developing and testing [the] equipment [that was developed] 
are a veritable who's who of today's semiconductor equipment and materials industry in 
Japan... " Two of the companies involved were Canon and Nikon (see chapter five). Uchida 
(1994) notes the spillover from numerically-controlled machine tools to the manufacturing 
processes of many industries and seconds Flamm's findings of spillover effects from 
semiconductors to cameras and other industries. Tyson (1991) notes the spillover effects from 
optoelectronics (optics + electronics) to many Japanese industries. 
14 Studies of the machine tool industry based on different points of departure have come to 
very different conclusions. Tilton (1996) found that industry associations, and thereby 
industrial policy, played a vital role in spreading information within the machine tool 
industry. However, Friedman (1988) using the assumptions of liberal economic analysis found 
no evidence of industrial policy in that industry. 
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... it appeared clear enough, during the early Occupation years, that a 
major reliance had to be placed on export demand if the economy 
was to continue on the growth path. ... [T]he dramatically yen-cheap 
exchange rate must have greatly helped the expansion of Japan's 
exports. 
I When Joseph Dodge set the exchange rate at 360 yen to the US dollar in April 
1949, it was hoped that it would help mitigate the problems that his draconian 
measures to halt hyperinflation had caused (cf. Johnson, 1982; Tsuru, 1996). By 
the mid-1950s and until the first postwar revaluation of the yen in 1971, 
Japanese exports came to have a substantial price advantage in the US market 
and then in the European market. 
Additionalfactors that have shaped the photography industry 
Japan's international trade, domestic consumption, corporate competition, 
keiretsu structures and so forth have helped shape the government-industry 
relationship in Japan. First, the domestic market played an important role in 
the recovery of consumer goods industries, including the photography 
industry, as Komiya (1988) states, but it was not the only factor at work; export 
promotion and import protection played equally vital roles. Johnson (1982, p. 
929), giving the credit for efficient economic planning to MITI minister Tanzan 
Ishibashi in 1954, writes, 
... the key to exports was, of course, the lowering of costs, and the key 
to that was enlarging production to effect economies of scale. But to 
enlarge production, Japanese manufacturers needed more 
customers. And where were they to be found? In the huge potential 
market of Japan itself. [ ... I Ishibashi's idea was that MITI should 
promote both exports and domestic sales. 
Export promotion and domestic demand would be used to off-set the 
fluctuations of the business cycle and ideally keep factories at full capacity at 
all times. According to Tomisaburo Hirai of MITI (quoted in Johnson, 1982, p. 
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229), Ishibashi "combined export promotion and high-speed growth into a 
coherent theory. " 
The editors of The Economist (1963, p. 56) found in 1962 that a typical 
Japanese economist would have replied in the following way to the question of 
whether the only sound type of growth was that "based on and led by 
exports: " 
I think the only industries in which we have seen export increases 
induce a production increment -- instead of the other way round - 
are transistor radios and perhaps cameras. We do not all regard these 
industries as very soundly based because demand for them, 
especially transistors, may be saturated too soon. Export increases of 
all our other products have been induced mainly by expansion for 
the domestic market. [italics added] 
Second, it is argued that the photography industry is important precisely 
because it was targeted very early (prior to the end of the Occupation) as an 
export industry, sustained growth over the postwar period could not have 
been achieved without healthy domestic sales. But domestic demand was 
stifled in the early postwar years by very high excise taxes, therefore exports 
(through the US military post exchanges at first, see chapter three) were 
induced. As the industry matured, the excise taxes were lowered, thanks more 
to political pressure than to bureaucratic initiative. Quickly thereafter, the 
domestic market became saturated as predicted and the largest, most able 
firms redoubled their efforts to create profits by developing new products to 
attract ever more customers and by building export sales and later overseas 
production (see chapters four and five). 
Third, competition among the Japanese photography firms in the 
domestic market has been fierce due to what has been called the 'one-set 
principle! In other words, each horizontal keiretsu group sustains one (or 
more) firm(s) in a particular industry through cross shareholding, i. e. one firm 
holds the shares of another firm which in turn holds its shares (cf. Gerlach, 
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1992; Tsuru, 1996). 15 The existence of tough competition among the 
photography firms in the Japanese market as well as overseas reduced the 
number of competitors in the industry from a list of more than 100 makers in 
1950 to the handful of global leaders we see today. What is remarkable is that 
the firms leading the industry today are those which first made their marks as 
exporters; none of those that were solely dependent on the domestic market 
survives today. 
Fourth, Shigeto Tsuru (1996, p. 29) wrote, the "cunning strategy [that] 
actually worked in the early postwar years" of relying on US military security 
while mobilizing Japan's meager resources for econon-Lic recovery "pav[ed] the 
way for the later economic resurgence. " In other words, policies sanctioned by 
the Occupation authorities (and taken advantage of by the Japanese 
government) to promote Japan's economic recovery helped lay the 
foundations on which later successful economic growth could take hold. 16 
Interestingly, this pre-dates what is commonly called the '1955 systern, ' i. e. the 
system which is usually credited with nurturing Japan's economic 'miracle. '17 
15 In the Japanese photography industry, this is only true for the camera/lens makers; the 
photographic film makers are too few. Notably, several camera/lens makers are affiliated to 
one or more groups which indicates a certain level of independence. 'Excess competition' (or 
cut-throat competition) which can result from over-capacity and lead to the formation of 
recession cartels (to control prices and sales volumes while selling out surplus stock) has been 
a concern in the photography industry (see chapter four). For a discussion of excess 
competition and cartels see Itoh, et al (1988a). 
16 This reasoning is underscored by Tsuru (1996, pp. 78-81) in his discussion of the dual 
pricing system (i. e. export prices were lower than domestic prices) which allowed the sewing 
machine industry an early advantage in exports. A similar arrangement existed in the steel 
industry (Abe, 1997). The stories indicate that the recovery industries (including cameras and 
film) would make interesting comparative research projects. 
17 The '1955 system' comprises the following features of the postwar Japanese economy: 
lifetime employment, seniority system of wages, enterprise unions, the pervasiveness of 
horizontal keiretsu groupings and vertical distribution/supplier keiretsu networks and their 
interlocking shareholding system, large debt-equity ratios in firms, easy credit through the 
main bank system, Ministry of Finance 'window guidance' and Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry 'administrative guidance' which indicated the desired direction of industrial 
investment. The year 1955 is taken as the starting point because that was the year that the LDP 
consolidated its power and it was the start of the 'high growth' period. See, among others, 
Komiya, 1988 and Tsuru, 1996. Dissenting viewpoints to the effect that the 'system' pre-dates 
1955 are represented by Noguchi (1995) and Okazaki (1994). On industrial policy in support of 
a pre-1955 system, Johnson (1982, p. 147) wrote: "... MCI [Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
the precursor to MITI] after 1939 was much closer in form and orientation to the industrial 
policy apparatus of the high speed growth era than was MCI from 1925 to 1939. " 
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Gradual liberalization of Japan's trade and investment policies based on 
Tsuru's principle of "being not too soon and not too late" (1996, pp. 112-115) 
appears to have occurred in the photography industry, first with 
cameras/lenses and then color film. Itoh and Kiyono (1988, pp. 155-156) 
second Tsuru's argument in terms of Japan's foreign trade and direct 
investment record saying: 
For better or worse, trade policies have contributed extensively to 
the rapid growth achieved by Japan. Broadly speaking, these policies 
were initially intended to deal with the foreign exchange constraint 
in the immediate postwar period but gradually came to serve as 
instruments for the protection of indigenous industry. The 
formulation of these policies during the 1970s was influenced to a 
large extent by the measures taken by Japan in order to stem the 
aggravating trade friction with its trading partners. 
As explained in subsequent chapters, evidence from the photography industry 
resoundingly supports this observation. Export promotion and import 
protection policies were vital in the early years for japanýs economic recovery, 
but as the economy prospered and as international economic and political 
conditions changed, Japan came under increasing pressure to open markets 
and lower barriers to trade. 
Fifth, generalizations for the whole 1945 to 1995 period simply do not 
hold. As Itoh and Kiyono, (1988, p. 158) note, "Import quotas formed the core 
of the protection policy until the early 1960s" after which time "[t]he 
quantitative barriers came down sharply ... raising the relative 
importance of 
tariffs, the pecuniary import control measures. " During the 1960s and early 
1970s, heavier tariffs were imposed on imports of higher value added goods 
and were in fact higher than those levied either by the US or the EEC. They 
continue saying (p. 162), "'[t]he tariffs on major machinery imports were 
relaxed only after this sector became internationally competitive and its 
export/ production ratio rose. " Their findings do not cover the photography 
industry however they indicate the same trend. The international economic 
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climate in the early 1970s was particularly important for the photographic film 
companies which unsuccessfully attempted to pursue export promotion and 
import protection at that time. One solution to the threat of international 
competition was to seize control domestic distribution through buying into 
most of the major wholesalers, i. e. gaining control through ownership. But this 
policy was not pursued by all firms (see chapter five). 
Sixth, as outlined above, the security provided by the US military 
allowed Japan to recover using the meager resources available (cf. Tsuru, 
1996). The industries that were the first to recover, the backbone recovery 
industries, required few imported inputs but supplied needed foreign 
exchange which in turn was used to purchase raw materials, energy and 
technology. These were utilized in order to create an industrial structure built 
on up-graded technology which was then used to produce export goods with 
high income elasticities of demand (i. e. high-technology consumer goods). 
Finance was provided through long and short-term lending from commercial 
banks (i. e. the city banks) and several government lending institutions, notably 
the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ) and the Japan Development Bank ODB). 18 
During the high growth period, industries that received loans from the JDB 
could more easily receive commercial bank financing because government (i. e. 
JDB) lending indicated which industries had been targeted for expansion (cf. 
Calder, 1993). 
Seventh, cross-shareholding and ownership-control relationships 
developed over time, and are seen today as significant barriers to market entry 
by firms not currently operating in Japan (and even as a hindrance to 
commercial success by many firms that currently operate there). Finally, the 
most important aspect of industrial policy - and most difficult to analyze - is dk 
information and the flow of information among and between firms, industries, 
18 The precursor to the JDB was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, founded in January 
1947 to supply "funds to industry, mainly for capital investment, and [to play] an important 
role in the priority production programme" (Hidaka, 1997, p. 143). Because of this the RFC 
concentrated on lending to basic industries. The IBJ, a prewar institution, was reconstructed to 
provide long-term industrial finance. See also Johnson (1978 and 1982). 
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quasi-government organizations and government agencies (cf. Dore, 1986; 
Fruin, 1992; Yonekura, 1996). This last factor has perhaps been the most crucial 
to sustaining the growth of the photography industry since the postwar 
period. These aspects of the evolution of the Japanese photography industry 
will be elaborated upon in the chapters that follow. 
Thus, we see that industrial policy seen in strictly liberal economic 
terms (cf. Kon-dya, 1988) is inadequate for this analysis of the photography 
industry in Japan. Economic as well as noneconomic policies are essential to 
this story. In response to the narrow, liberal interpretation, scholars who 
consider noneconomic factors argue quite effectively -- but tbo generally - 
about trends that appear to have great explanatory power for the photography 
industry (cf. Ab6,1997; Aoki et al, 1996; Itoh and Kiyono, 1988). But because 
they rely on the liberal view, their tendency is to dwell too heavily on market 
forces above all else. Conversely, Johnsonýs (1982) comparatively inclusive 
interpretation of the Japanese 'miracle' concentrates too heavily on bureaucrats 
as the main personalities in Japan's economic recovery. How would his story 
change if Japan's postwar recovery were told from the businessmen's (and 
they were surely all men in the 1950s and 1960s) point of view (cf. Callon, 
1995)? 
One analysis by Mark Ramseyer and Francis McCall Rosenbluth (1993) 
based on rational choice theory finds the politician's role in the Japanese 
economy as the most important. Any account whether dependent on 
bureaucrat, businessman or politician is skewed by personal experience, 
interpretation and/or ideology. What is missing is balance; an account that 
draws on the experiences and perspectives of all who were involved in Japanýs 
econon-dc recovery, not only bureaucrats, businessmen, and politicians. The 
pr'oblem is how toachieve this goal. 
Instead of relying on the government-industry framework of industrial 
policy, a broader perspective such as that offered by international political 
economy is employed in this thesis. We need to move beyond the constraints 
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of traditional political and economic analysis and take a more eclectic 
approach by considering often neglected factors, e. g. firms, technology, 
security, human interaction and information exchange, different types of 
power and how all these factors change over time. Strange (1994) stresses the 
importance of using a broad framework within which a large variety of factors 
can be accounted for without emphasizing the importance of one over another 
but while stressing their interlinkages. And by asking the central question, 
"who benefits?, ' the path to de-mystifying how the Japanese economy 
recovered and prospered in the postwar period, using the photography 
industry as the case analyzed, becomes clearer. 
What is missing? 
Because ideologically-driven industrial policy approaches to Japan's 
government-industry relationship present difficulties for the analysis of the 
Japanese photography industry, neither the state-centered 'revisionist' view 
nor the liberal economic interpretation is stressed in this thesis. Instead, an 
eclectic, interdisciplinary approach steers the story of Japan's photography 
industry. This thesis is very dependent on history. The evidence from the 
historical record renders it difficult to fit the story of the photography industry 
easily into any one theory. This literature review concentrates on Japan's 
industrial policy because it addresses a central feature of any nation's 
econon-tic history, the goverm-nent-industry relationship. 
However, several issues are not addressed in much of the industrial 
policy literature and if they were ignored this story of the Japanese 
photography industry would be significantly less rich. First, many analyses of 
Japan's government-industry relationship are general and because they do not 
examine industries in detail, highly generalized conclusions are drawn (e. g. 
Eads and Yamamura, 1987; Magaziner and Hout, 1980). False assumptions, for 
example, that industries (and firms) behave in the same fashion regardless of 
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what they produce are often made. Second, many scholars concentrate on the 
post-1970s period, overlooking the fact that Japarýs industrial policy changed 
dramatically over the postwar period, particularly after the early 1970s (e. g. 
Callon, 1995; Fransman, 1990). Others have recognized the importance of 
historical perspective and the degree to which Japanese government policy has 
changed throughout the postwar years (e. g. Dore, 1986; Fruin, 1992; Vestal, 
1993). 
Third, the US is more the exception than the rule when it comes to 
goverm-nent-industry relations and attitudes toward industrial policy. Every 
country has its own history and its own type of industrial policy. Two-country 
comparisons (as is often the case with US-Japan comparisons, e. g. Gerlach, 
1992; Okimoto, 1989) might be enhanced with a broader view of the world. 
Fourth, interest in the differences as well as the similarities among industries 
and among firms has plummeted in recent years. Likewise, the tendency to "fit' 
data to a particular ideological model or theory has grown (cf. Ramseyer and 
Rosenbluth, 1993). Fifth, many academic disciplines have strict boundaries 
(e. g. between business and economics, economics and politics) which should 
be crossed through, for example, the eclectic approach. If, for example, this 
thesis had ignored the roles played by firms, technology or information flows 
in the evolution of the Japanese photography industry, the conclusions would 
have been very different and may have compromised the usefulness of this 
research. Finally, the photography industry and the rise of multinationals in 
the industry tells a universal story of the globalization of business. This is 
where there appears to be a certain degree of convergence among industries 
and firms; certain similarities (i. e. among industries and among firms) appear 
to have developed that cross national borders. 
What is clear is that many of the popular myths about Japan's economic 
miracle are simply wrong or at best are incomplete. Firms were not left to 
recover in the postwar period at the whim of market forces or the invisible 
hand. Likewise, omniscient bureaucrats did not simply agree to set forth 
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policies that organized the Japanese market and the firms within it to respond 
in predictable ways and in isolation from the rest of the world. The 
photography firms made decisions based on political, economic, social and 
historical factors that may or may not have involved cooperating with 
Japanese government policies. If (and when) firms had the power to affect 
their own profitability and survival, their actions may at times have looked 
like coordination with government policy and at other times not. But does 
policy follow firm behavior or the other way around? There does not seem to 
be a simple answer to that question. Each reacts with the other; they are 
interdependent. Policy may create a more competitive environment for firms 
or it may be formulated to support (or legitimize) events that are already 
occurring. The evidence presented in the following chapters indicates that 
government policy was at times beneficial and at times problematic for the 
firms in the Japanese photography industry. And despite popular beliefs, 
government intervention did occur. 
3. The Road to Export Promotion 
Introduction: A global industry 
In February 1996, an 'international' consortium of one American and four 
Japanese photography companies (i. e. Canon, Fuji Photo Film, Kodak, Minolta 
and Nikon) introduced a new photographic standard, the Advanced Photo 
System (APS). The consortium was formed in the mid-1980s to set product 
standards for photographic film and cameras based on a new 24 mm high- 
resolution negative that integrates the traditional silver-halide process with 
digital technology. The film is easy to load into the cameras and allows for 
three finished image sizes. Because the new film is smaller than the old 35 mm 
standard, the new APS system allows for smaller, more compact cameras. 
What is striking about APS is not the technology, but that it is a US- 
Japan venture, a case of 'coop-etition, ' i. e. cooperation among competitors. It is 
particularly interesting that Kodak and Fuji Photo Film cooperated to develop 
APS over roughly- the same period that Kodak brought a case against Fuji of 
market access in Japan. The case ended up at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1997, but two years earlier Kodak took it to the US government 
claiming that Fuji had violated Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. 
Second, the consortium includes no German or European firms. How were 
world leaders such as Agfa, Ernst Leitz (maker of the Leica cameras), Franke 
and Heidecke (maker of Rollei cameras) and Zeiss (maker of Contax cameras) 
overtaken by their competitors? This important question will be addressed in 
chapter four. 
Third, the APS consortium was formed under the general leadership of 
Kodak. In the US, film makers are also the camera and lens makers; they are 
comprehensive photographic goods manufacturers. Film is where money has 
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traditionally been made in the photography industry. ' To some extend, the 
availability, format and international standards of film determine what types 
of cameras, photofinishing equipment and photographic paper is sold in the 
market. Until the early 1980s, Kodak's strategy was to control (as far as was 
possible) the format of the global photographic film industry. 
As a world-leading photographic film manufacturer, Kodak exercised 
its control over film formats at least as far back as 1925 when Franke and 
Heidecke introduced a reflex camera called the Rolleidoscop (Lewis, 1991, pp. 
38-41). The camera used 117 film for its 6x6 cm square format, but by 1930, 
the 117 film was in such short supply that the company was forced to replace 
the camera with a new model using the more popular 120 format (also 6x6 
cm) or go out of business. Because Kodak was a key supplier of film at that 
time, the firm could exercise considerable control over which camera formats 
became successful in the market. 
Recent Kodak film standards have included the 126 Instamatic drop-in 
cartridge (introduced in 1963), and the 110 Pocket Instarnatic format (1972). In 
1969, Minolta faced the problem of Kodak's dominance of world film 
standards when they introduced their 16 MG-S the first 16 mm (12 x 17 mm) 
cartridge film cameras. The problem this time was that 16 mrn film processing 
was scarce in Japan, so when Kodak introduced its new 110 (13 x 17 mm) 
cartridge film, Minolta was forced to replace the camera with one that used the 
new Kodak standard (Lewis, 1991, pp. 130-131; 139). Both the Rollei and 
Minolta experiences show that camera firms did not drive the choice of 
popular camera and film formats, the photography firms - most notably 
Kodak - did. 
But Kodak's don-tinance did not go unchallenged. In 1973, for example, 
K6dak faced two US lawsuits on chargeg of uhfairly'restraining competition. 
Bell and Howell brought charges against Kodak's Super-8 cine cameras and 
film (of 1972) and Berkey Photo brought them against Kodak's 126 and 110 
Photofinishing is also a lucrative part of the industry. 
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cartridge film formats. In both cases, the American firms claimed that Kodak 
obstructed the market through "its marketing practice of coupling new 
cameras with films especially designed for them" (Lewis, 1991, p. 140). 
Problems continued for Kodak when in 1976 Polaroid brought a patent 
infringement case against the company for manufacturing and selling instant 
cameras. Edwin Land, founder of Polaroid, invented the SX-70 Land cameras 
and instant film and introduced them in 1972. The case was finally settled (in a 
multi-million dollar settlement) in 1986 in Polaroid's favor for costs incurred 
and loss of market share. Kodak was forced to stop manufacturing instant 
cameras and recall and then destroy all of its instant cameras already sold in 
the world market (cf. Sieg, 1994; Wurman, 1989). 
Kodak's ultimate disaster was the Disc camera and film launched in 
1982. Within two years, the Disc system was recognized as a failure (Lewis, 
1991, pp. 169-170). The negative was so small (8.2 x 10.6 mm) and the prints it 
produced so poor that the public simply rejected it. 2 The timing of the 
introduction of the Disc system was also a factor in its failure. Compact 35 mm 
cameras were growing in popularity and Kodak and Fuji Photo Film were 
beginning to compete in making very fast, high resolution 35 nun film. 
Kodak had until that time been the photographic film leader. The firm 
could no longer risk introducing new film and camera formats on the world 
market all alone, i. e. not without the cooperation of other leading photography 
firms. By the 1980s, the photography market had become global and the costs 
associated with new product introductions had grown too high for one firm to 
bear, especially if they turned out to be failures. The nature of global 
competition had changed and competitors were forced to collaborate on new 
technology development. 
In Japan, the APS consortium created conflict not only between the two 
film makers (i. e. Fuji Photo Film and Konica) but also among the 'big five' 
2 Few camera manufacturers in Japan chose to manufacture Disc cameras, believing that the 
system would not appeal to Japanese consumers. Neither the 110 nor the 126 formats were 
particularly successful in Japan either. 
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camera firms (i. e. Asahi Optical/Pentax, Canon, Minolta, Nikon and 
Olympus). Of the seven leading firms in Japan, only four joined the 
consortium. This upset the power balance among the leading Japanese 
manufacturers and caused communication problems within the two 
photography industry associations, the Photo-Sensitive Materials Industry 
Association (PSMA) controlled by Fuji and Konica, and the Japan Camera 
Industry Association OCIA) controlled by the 'big five! Industry associations 
in Japan are important information channels for the member firms and they act 
as liaisons between the industry and its relevant government agency. Since 
three firms (i. e. two of the JCIA 'big five' firms, Asahi Optical and Olympus, 
and one main PSMA firm, Konica) were left out of the new consortium, the 
flow of information among the seven leading Japanese photography firms was 
disrupted. The impact of the APS consortium on the PSMA and the JCIA both 
of which played crucial roles in the evolution of the photography industry in 
Japan will be clarified in this chapter. 
Historical foundations 
Kodak was a 'first mover' (Chandler, 1988) in photographic film manufacture 
and effectively exploited its patents to establish a near monopoly in the 
industry in the United States by roughly 1920. The Kodak system was a box 
camera fitted with roll film (ca. 1888) based on the company's motto 'You push 
the button, we do the rest! Pure amateurs could snap photographs and simply 
send the camera with the film still inside to Kodak for film processing. The 
prints, negatives and camera loaded with a fresh roll of film were returned to 
the photographer. Playing on the theme 'we do the rest', Brayer (1996, p. 67) 
writes, ""We" had done more than invent a camera; "we" had a vision and were 
developing a whole system that included the machinery and standardized 
parts to deliver it. " 
George Eastman, Kodak's founder, realized that "it would be the sale of 
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film, not cameras, that was the key to the success of the system" (Brayer, 1996, 
p. 68). This observation proved to be highly lucrative for the company and; as 
shown above, provides a key to understanding later developments in the 
industry. When Kodak began to manufacture film in the "endless strips needed 
for motion pictures" (Brayer, 1996, p. 111), it was primarily to lower 
production costs, not due to demand from Thomas Edison's new motion 
picture industry. Kodak's success in manufacturing cine film (i. e. motion 
picture film stock), despite competition from a number of mainly European 
firms, is attributed to Kodak's exceptionally high standards of quality Genkins, 
1975, p. 278). It was the first time that quality drove supply rather than it being 
managed by the fierce defense of patents, as had characterized the early years 
of the industry (i. e. the late 1800s). Nonetheless, Eastman assured his 
company's financial position in 1908 by joining a monopoly, the Motion 
Picture Patents Company, with the other leading motion picture firms in the 
US and France. As the only manufacturer of motion picture film stock, 
Eastman sold only to the trust for a three-year period after which the 
monopoly went sour (Brayer, 1996, esp. ch. 7; Jenkins, 1975, pp. 282-292). 
Most of the company's profits and human resources went into making 
cine film. To gain greater control of the industry, George Eastmarýs strategy 
was to integrate horizontally by purchasing competing firms (e. g. Artura, 
Graflex (then Century-Folmer), Hawkeye and Premo) and gaining control of 
all of their major patents. US antitrust laws, especially after the passage of the 
1914 Clayton Act, put an end to this practice, but it was already too late. 
Kodak controlled the film industry. A 1915 US goverru-nent ruling stated that 
Kodak was intent on monopolizing the industry, and the company was forced 
to spin off several corporate divisions and trade names, including Graflex 
(which later became part of Singer). At this time, Kodak's main competitor was 
Agfa of Germany (Brayer, 1996, pp. 389-401; Jenkins, 1975, pp. 318-324). 
To raise the firm's technological level, the Eastman Kodak Research 
Laboratory was established in 1913. Because Kodak maintained the policy of 
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prioritizing film manufacturing over cameras, the lab concentrated on 
developing photographic chemical processes, particularly non-flammable 
"safety' film and color photography. Many of Kodak's cameras and lenses 
were supplied by firms in the US and Germany. Lenses and shutters came 
primarily from Bausch and Lomb (also based in Rochester, NY) for the 
majority of the Kodak line while high-quality optics for the most expensive 
cameras were supplied by German firms Genkins, 1975, pp. 214; 323). In 1910, 
Kodak began to develop its own optics line which eventually replaced those 
supplied by Bausch and Lomb. A decade later, Kenneth Mees, head of the 
Research Laboratory, began to take "a more systematic approach to product 
innovation in the apparatus sector" by establishing the Mechanical 
Development Laboratory Genkins, 1975, p. 313). Despite Mees" recognition of 
Kodak's need to develop cameras and lenses, advances in photographic film 
continued to drive the development of Kodaks products. 
Kodak established an overseas presence first in Britain in 1885 and 
eleven years later opened an office in Japan (Brayer, 1996, pp. 73; 164). The 
photographic chemical industry was strong in Europe; one company in 
Germany even had a world monopoly in the production of the very pure 
paper which was- needed for photographic prints in the late 1890s Genkins, 
1975, pp. 195-199). Nonetheless, superior management and marketing put 
Kodak in the forefront of the industry and international markets were an 
important part of the firrnýs strategy. 
Asahi Photo Industry Co. made the first Japanese roll film (called Kiku 
or chrysanthemum) in 1928, and the following year Konica introduced Sakura 
(or cherry) film (Lewis, 1991, p. 38). Close ties between the Japanese 
goverrunent (i. e. Ministry of Commerce and Industry) and Dai-Nippon 
Celluloid (part of the Mitsui zaibatsu) were behind kokusanka, i. e. domestic 
manufacture, of photographic film (Fuji Photo Film, 1984, pp. 2-5; 16-18; 22-24; 
28). This led to the establishment in 1934 of Fuji Photo Film and the 
introduction of Fuji brand sheet film, dry plates and sensitized paper within 
4k 
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that year; roll film was introduced in 1936. The aim of kokusanka was to reduce 
Japanýs reliance on imported German and American film OCIA, 1987, p. 174). 
Close ties between Fuji and the Japanese government continued in the postwar 
period (see chapter five). Today, Eastman Kodak and Agfa as well as Fuji 
Photo Film and Konica offer a broad spectrum of photographic products 
across international markets .3 
By 1925, Oskar Barnack of Germany had developed a small rangefinder 
camera, the Leica A, which took advantage of the easily available 35 mm 
movie film. Until that time cameras had been quite a bit simpler. Most were 
box cameras, like the Kodak system cameras, that were outfitted either with 
glass plates or roll film, usually 4.5 x6 cm or 6x6 cm in size. The Leica was 
important because it employed a smaller film negative which directly affected 
the size of the camera. In addition, it came equipped with a highly- 
sophisticated lens which allowed the photographer to adjust the aperture and 
the focal length. Although certainly not small by today's standards, it was the 
first in a long line of popular 'n-dniature' 35 mm cameras. Two copies of the 
Leica A, the Hansa Canon produced by Canon (then Seiki Kogaku Kenkyusho) 
and the Super Olympic marketed by Asahi Bussan, appeared in Japan by 
1935.4 
The beginning of the modern photography industry in Japan is taken to 
be after the n-dd-1930s in this thesis. Over the course of the modern period, the 
Japanese makers have diversified their product lines within their core 
competence, that is, optics technology, to produce photocopiers, facsimiles, 
steppers (for manufacturing semiconductors) and medical equipment such as 
endoscopes. Over time, optics-based products became more complex, 
employing electronics and computer chips, and this knowledge was channeled 
back into the 'older technology' products including cameras. This pattern of 
3 Other competitors are in niche markets: Ilford (UK) specializes in black and white film, Path6 
(France) in cinematographic film. 
4 The Kwanon, the prototype of the Hansa Canon, was introduced in the same year (Condax, et 
al, 1984, p. 12). Lewis (1991, p. 53) does not provide the name of the manufacturer of the Super 
Olympic. 
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cross-fertilization of knowledge among products, or "organizational learning' 
(Fruin, 1992, pp. 5,22-23; 211-212) was crucial for this type of product 
development to occur. Mark Fruin (1992, p. 212) found that the Japanese 
enterprise system is organized in focal factories which are in turn organized 
"for functional integration and product/process innovation rather than mass 
production" and that this is a managerial decision connected closely to his 
concept of organizational learning. Managerial decisions regarding firm 
organization were surely important to the success of firms in the photography 
industry, but as this thesis shows organizational learning and mass production 
have both been crucial ingredients of success (see chapters four and five). 
Optics technology, the core technology of the photography industry, 
was transferred to Japan mainly by Germans who were brought to Japan or 
who set up joint ventures with Japanese entrepreneurs. 5 The firms known 
today as the "big five' camera manufacturers, i. e. Canon, Minolta, Nikon, Asahi 
Optical (makers of the Pentax brand) and Olympus Optical, were all 
established by the mid-1930s. On the film side, Konica and Fuji Photo Film, the 
two main companies, were also well established by that time. 6 During the 
decade 1935 to 1945, the industry was generally controlled by military 
regulations that limited production to optical weapons. Real growth and 
innovation in the industry as a market-oriented consumer industry did not 
begin until after the war. 
The photography industry during the pre-WWII period was formed by 
direct military support for technology transfer to the optics industry. As early 
as 1915, the Japanese Departments of Navy and Agriculture supported the 
development of an optical glass industry in response to the shortage of 
German imported optical goods during WWI. According to Fruin (1992, p. 38), 
5 Minolta was set up in 1928 as a German-Japanese joint venture called Nichi-Doku Shashinki 
Shokai and Nikon employed eight German engineers and scientists in the 1920s (Condax et al, 
1984, p. 13; Nikon, 1993, pp. 19-20; 32-47). 
6 The dates were: Canon: 1933, Minolta: 1928, Nikon: 1917, Asahi Optical: 1919, Olympus 
Optical: 1919, Konica: 1873, and Fuji Photo Film: 1934. Pentax is the brand name of Asahi 
Optical's cameras. 
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industries based mainly on imported technology were not unusual in Japan 
given that the economy was in the position of being a 'late developer' (cf. 
Fruin, 1992; Minami, 1994). 
The decade of 1935 to 1945 showed rapid growth in the world-wide 
photography industry (mainly in Europe but also in Japan) due to the military 
demand for weapons-related lenses and sights. Aerial surveillance required 
large, sturdy cameras and precision telescopic lenses; spy cameras required 
miniaturization. In Japan, the New Economic Structure ordinances restricted 
the production of civilian goods in 1940, and civilian production was 
completely banned in 1942 under the Industrial Conversion Ordinance. 
Japanese camera production therefore reached a peak in 1940 at 218,659 units 
(see chapter two, table 2.1). After 1942, all photographic goods were supplied 
to the military and commercial sales did not resume until after the war when 
all military industries were re-converted to civilian production (Lewis, 1991, 
pp. 55-57). 
During the war, the optical goods makers generally supplied military- 
use optical products either to the army or to the navy, each of which controlled 
its own air force units. The twin air forces were the primary sources of military 
demand (and rivalry) for optical products which had gained in strategic 
importance along with the new, important role played by the airplane in 
World War II. Rivalry between the army and the navy for money and materiel 
to build aircraft amounted to a wasteful one-upsmanship competition (Cohen, 
1949, pp. 208-212). Cohen (1949, pp. 58-66) discusses the general lack of 
centralized adn-dnistrative control which often led to either the oversupply or 
the undersupply of war materiel. Samuels (1994, pp. 126-129) also emphasizes 
the problems of the Japanese wartime aircraft industry, especially noting the 
army-navy rivalry. However, the problem was not limited to the Japanese 
military. Col. Roy Stanley, Il (1981, p. 65) of the US Air Force comments that 
during war in the Pacific theater, rivalry between the US army and navy at 
times constituted "the REAL war. " 
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Aerial photoreconnaissance and the interpretation of strategic 
photographs were important for gathering military and strategic intelligence 
including map making. General Claire Chennault is said to have written, "80 
percent of vital wartime [WWII] intelligence came from aerial photos" 
(Stanley, 1981, p. 3, note). The main elements of optical reconnaissance were 
aerial cameras, binoculars, sights, telescopes and powerful telephoto lenses. 
According to Stanley (1981, p. 11): 
Aerial photoreconnaissance ... was intentional coverage of enemy 
territory. [It] was ... different in 
form from movies or still 
photography - it lay somewhere in between them mechanically. [ ... ] 
This imagery was neither aesthetic nor entertaining; it was work 
photography. [ ... 
I The flight requirements of mapping missions were 
very different from those of reconnaissance missions. In both cases 
the flight profile, aircraft, and camera combinations had to be 
carefully tailored to cover the area targeted ... to best answer the 
intelligence or mapping collection problem. 
Demand for improvements in the quality of camera equipment, photographic 
lenses and other optics increased throughout the war years, and not only in 
Japan. 
During the war, most of the top Japanese manufacturers of 
photographic lenses received direct support from the navy and/or the army 
for the production of optical weapons. Among the photography firms, only 
Nikon, Fuji Photo Film and Minolta manufactured optical glass. Fuji Photo 
Film established an optical division in 1939 to manufacture optical glass and in 
March 1944, the division merged with a number of other companies to form 
Fuji Shashin Koki OCIA, 1987, p. 14). Nikon (then Nippon Kogaku or Nikko 
for short) was directly funded - and at times even run by - Imperial Navy 
officers and Tokyo Optical (Tokyo Kogaku or Toko4or short) was supported 
directly by the Imperial Army. They came to be known in Japan as "Nikko of 
the sea, Toko of the land" (kai no Nikko, riku no Toko) (Ogura, 1994, p. 114). 7 
7 See Nikon Corp. (1993, pp. 14-19) for details on the involvement of Mitsubishi Ltd., which 
worked very closely with the navy, in the establishment of Nikon. 
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Minolta, the only manufacturer in the Kansai area (the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe 
region), supplied primarily the army, but in 1942 was ordered by the navy to 
establish an optical glass factory at Itarni near Kobe. 8 
There seems to be some disagreement over which companies were 
affiliated with which parts of the military, but Olympus (then Takachiho 
Seisakusho) and Petri Camera (then Kuribayashi Seisakusho) appear to have 
been affiliated with the navy, while Konica, Canon, and Fuji Photo Film were 
more closely affiliated with the army. 9 In addition to producing goods falling 
into the general category 'optical weapons, ' Konica, Minolta, Olympus, Nikon, 
and Fuji Photo Film manufactured aerial cameras, Olympus, Minolta and 
Nikon manufactured binoculars, Canon made on-plane aerial enlargers, and 
Nikon made photographic lenses and precision telescopes GCIA, 1987, p. 14). 
Optics technology was crucial to the Axis powers during the war 
because unlike the Allies they did not develop radar. As a consequence, the 
photography industry grew in importance during the Pacific War both for sea 
and air operations, for weapon sights, binoculars and aerial 
photoreconnaissance. When Japanese industries were re-converted to heiwa 
sangyo, i. e. "peace industries, ' during the Occupation, both the camera/lens 
and film manufacturers were among those designated to become producers of 
civilian goods (Seki et al, 1961). Consequently, military-trained optics 
engineers found it easy to apply their skills in the photography industry (cf. 
Samuels, 1994). Later, export promotion and inter-firm rivalry helped boost 
profits and stimulate creativity in the industry. In combination with a 
favorable domestic and international climate, Japanese photographic firms was 
able capture the postwar technological lead definitively in cameras and lenses, 
but somewhat less so in photographic film and paper (see chapters four and 
five). 
8 This information is based on Condax et al, 1984, pp. 12-13 and interviews with Canon and 
Minolta, 1994 and 1996 
9 Petri Camera Co. was founded in 1907. It declared bankruptcy in 1977, continuing limited 
production until 1979. See Condax et al, 1984, p. 14. 
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"Export or die" 
71 
Chalmers Johnson (1982, p. 241) observed that between 1945 and 1961, the 
Japanese economy was "in a war for national survival. " And to survive, there 
had to be enough foreign exchange to pay for necessary imports. So exports 
were promoted and imports were controlled through quotas and tariffs. In 
other words, the situation for the photography industry amounted to that of 
"export or die" (yushutsu ka shi ka) (Yayama and Ito, 1988, p. 331). 
Japan's post-1945 shift to a peaceful, democratic political system and a 
capitalist economy is usually divided into two periods with 1948 being the 
watershed year. That was when US policy toward Japan changed from 
allowing subsistence level recovery to promoting full economic recovery. 
Occupation policy after 1948 was based on a determined US foreign policy 
aimed at proving the superiority of the American capitalist system and was 
reinforced by two important events in East Asia: Chairman Mao's victory in 
China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War the following year. Japan 
quickly became one of the key outposts of American security policy in East 
Asia and a bulwark against the spread of Communism in the region (cf. 
Nakamura, 1981; Tsuru, 1996). 
In 1948, the Econon-dc Stabilization Board (ESB) of the Japanese 
government drafted two recovery plans, the "Five-Year Plan for Japan's 
Economic Rehabilitation" in January and the "Outline of Japanese Economic 
Stabilization Plan" of 17 May (Cohen, 1949, p. 501; note 197). The first gave "a 
detailed plan for the rehabilitation of major industries for each year, beginning 
fiscal 1948-49 (April 1-March 31) and ending in fiscal 1952-53. The 
sec""ond ... covers only the target year 1952-53, "-by which time it was estimated 
that Japan would just about be self-supporting. The aim was to get the 
economy on track (i. e. achieve 'stabilization') so that the Japanese government 
would no longer require US aid. To achieve that goal (p. 501), 
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... the plan contemplates more 
than a threefold increase (over 1947) in 
mining and manufacturing, a ninefold increase in exports, a threefold 
increase in imports, a twofold increase in labor productivity, and a 
twofold increase in the real national income in the target year. [ ... ] [I]t 
is further assumed that over two billion US dollars will be 
forthcoming during the interim period. 
The money would come from the US Treasury and would be used to pay for 
Japarýs imports of American goods and payments of licensing fees to US firms. 
The objectives of this plan could not be met unless inflation in Japan was 
controlled, the instability in East Asia was settled and the free exchange of 
currencies was reinstated. Furthermore, credit from private (non-Japanese) 
sources was to be used to modernize key industries and stimulate export 
industries, and crucial issues, e. g. energy supply and transportation, had to be 
solved. 10 According to the ESB, the very fragile Japanese economy of 1948 
would only begin to 'stabilize' after the plans were set in moti6n, but the 
process of recovery would not be complete until 1952, when the Occupation 
would end. 
A single, official exchange rate was set by Joseph Dodge in April 1949 at 
360 yen to the dollar as part of his 'Dodge Line' which recommended drastic 
measures to bring the economy under control. Prior to that date, there was no 
official rate at which the value of exports and imports could be calculated 
precisely (cf. Nakamura, 1981). Because Japan needed vast quantities of 
imports, it was not uncommon for exports to be calculated at a more favorable 
rate than imports so that more foreign exchange was generated through 
exports than was used on the imports (cf. Cohen, 1949). The fuzziness of the 
system before 1949 created a favorable climate for Japanese trade, because of 
the country's heavy reliance on US imports. Dodge's official rate was seen as 
10 The plans were well covered in the English and Japanese press (Cohen, 1949, pp. 501-502, 
note 198). One of the members of the Economic Stabilization Board (until February 1948) was 
Shigeto Tsuru (Tsuru, 1996, pp. 14-18; 44). Another was politician Kinji Moriyama who became 
an influential figure in the photography industry (see below). 
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slightly undervaluing the yen to allow the economy the favorable terms of 
trade it needed to recover, because originally, a rate of 330 yen to the dollar 
had been recommended by the US government (Tsuru, 1996). However, as 
Tsuru (1996) stresses, setting the exchange rate was at that time like trying to 
hit a moving target, because the Japanese economy was in tatters suffering 
from rampant inflation and persistent black markets. Most importantly for the 
photography industry, camera, lens and film exports to the US were 
promoted, and the favorable exchange rate help off-set the cost of imports and 
eventually eliminated Japan's dependence on US subsidies. 
Recall that in chapter one (table 1.1), production volumes of cameras 
were compared to other industries and that by 1951 camera production had 
nearly recovered to its prewar peak. Table 3.1 shows that exports (in value 
terms) took off right away; more than one third of production was exported in 
1947 and two years later fully 86 percent of production went to export 
markets. " Even though the export ratio dropped after 1952 to a low of 19 
percent in 1955, well over one-third of output was exported from 1956 to 
1960.12The industry showed an average annual growth rate of nearly nine 
percent over the 1949 to 1960 period both in terms of total value and value of 
exports. But from 1954 to 1960, export values grew, on an average annual 
basis, faster than total production at almost 14 as compared to 12 percent. How 
and why was the photography industry able to recover so quickly to become 
an export industry? In other words, how did the firms 'learn' to export so 
quickly? 
First, there was no shortage of silica to manufacture optical glass for 
photographic lenses and most of the raw materials needed to manufacture 
11 The figures for export values in 1947 and 1948 must be treated as indicative only since the 
single exchange rate was not set until 1949. Most of the data for wartime production (e. g. table 
1.1) is also not perfectly reliable (Cohen, 1949, pp. 68-69, footnote 39). 
12 Even before the end of WWII, more than 50 percent of camera output was exported to the 
yen bloc countries, i. e. China, Manchuria and Korea (Miyabayashi, 1963, p. 12). 
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Table 3.1 Japan's Camera Production and Export Ratios, 1947-1960 
(unit, millions of yen, percent) 
- -- ------------ -------------------------- 
Total 
-------- ------- 
Total 
---- -------------- 
Exports 
----------------- 
Export 
(Quantity) (Value) (Value) Ratio 
------------ 
1947 
-------------------------- 
51,772 
---------------- 
88.8 
-------------------- 
33.3 
----------------- 
37.5 
1948 53,016 359.4 175.6 48.9 
1949 83,243 911.7 785.2 86.1 
1950 117,481 1,212.3 831.7 68.6 
1951 213,840 2,957.1 1,596.2 54.0 
1952 416,779 4,684.6 2,087.5 44.6 
1953 632,616 7,347.8 2,004.6 27.3 
1954 883,600 9,371.9 2,156.7 23.0 
1955 1,064,902 13,686.1 2,623.3 19.2 
1956 1,306,600 13,462.9 4,370.8 32.5 
1957 1,545,245 16,973.6 6,170.8 36.4 
1958 1,459,302 16,956.0 5,591.5 33.0 
1959 2,011,785 27,756.0 9,449.3 34.0 
1960 
------------- 
2,031,849 
------------------------- 
34,099.9 
---------------- 
12,453.1 
----------------- 
36.5 
Note: Export ratios are calculated. 
--- ----------------- 
Sources: For 1947-54 unit production see A. Miyabayashi (1963) "Japanese Camera 
Exports to the United States: A Case Study in Development and Competition, " MBA 
Thesis, City University of New York, June, pp. 16,18; for other 1947-54 data see Tokyo 
Prefecture, Economics Agency (1956) Kamera Seizogyo no Jittai Bunseki (The Present 
Status of the Camera Manufacturing Industry) Tokyo, p. 12; for 1955-60 data see A. 
Miyabayashi (1963), p. 21 based on MITI statistics. 
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cameras (e. g. leather and metals) were readily available in Japan. Second, skills 
and know-how to make cameras and lenses were plentiful since optics 
technology had been developed to support the war effort. Third, as noted 
above, in the re-conversion to peacetime production, the camera/lens 
companies could easily hire highly-skilled engineers who had been trained by 
the military for optics work (cf. Samuels, 1994). 13 
This last point was true for most of the industry, although there were 
exceptions. Canon, one of the leading camera manufacturers during the 
prewar years, was forced to begin manufacturing its own optics in the late 
1940s. The problem was that Canon's prewar supplier, Nikon (one of japanýs 
leading optics makers), could not supply the quantity of lenses demanded due 
to irregularities in the supply of silica and temporary shortages of metals 
(Lewis, 1991). To get up to speed in making optics, Canon was forced to hire 
aggressively, paying more than its competitors to attract the best employees 
some of whom came from Nikon (Camerart, February 1990). Nikon then found 
itself in the position of having to recover from Canon's poaching tactics and 
the loss of a customer. 
Fourth, immediately after the war, all companies were required to ' 
apply for permits from GHQ to resume production and most photography 
firms received them between October 1945 and the early months of 1946 OCIA, 
1987, p. 14; Lewis, 1991, p. 59). The criteria to be satisfied included not 
producing military goods and not requiring large quantities of imported 
materials. The camera/lens firms were encouraged to recover by GHQ but the 
photographic film manufacturers were given lower priority. The zaibatsu 
dissolution policy (i. e. deconcentration of the family-owned holding 
companies organized as industrial groups that had collaborated with the war 
effort) meant that Fuji Photo Film was unable to restart postwar production 
qt 
13 Interview with Professor Hoshimi Uchida, Tokyo Keizai Daigaku, Spring 1996. Film was also 
designated as a 'peace' industry (Seki et al, 1961). 
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until 1949, because it had been established under the auspices of Dai-Nippon 
Celluloid, a member of the Mitsui zaibatsu (Fuji Photo Film, 1984, pp. 56-57). 
After 1948, Japan's econon-dc recovery took precedence and 
deconcentration lost favor (cf. West Germany). Policyrnakers in the US and 
Japan realized that some functioning economic enterprises had to be left intact 
if Japan's economy was to recover (cf. Tsuru, 1996). It was a practical measure 
to prevent Japan from becoming a drain on US taxpayers. The consequence 
was that photographic film makers were once again permitted to pursue 
civilian production. Film technology was not as advanced in Japan as 
elsewhere in the world (particularly the US and Germany), so firms were 
protected from film imports first through total bans and then through import 
quotas. These restrictions were not completely lifted until the early 1970s by 
which time the Japanese film manufacturers had achieved improvements in 
technology and production that prepared them to withstand international 
competition. 
Cameras and lenses, not film, played an important role in Japanýs early 
postwar recovery from roughly 1949 to 1973 which was the heyday of Japan's 
export promotion poliCy. 14 The occupation experience in Germany had shown 
that military forces stationed there bought significant numbers of German 
cameras and Swiss watches. It was reasoned that military personnel in Japan 
would behave in the same manner and purchase Japanese cameras and 
watches. The goods were 'exported' through the American military post 
exchanges (PXs) because all purchases there were made with US dollars. The 
sales would generate badly needed foreign exchange which through various 
controls would be used for imports of basic necessities and then reinvested in 
industry (e. g. by purchasing capital equipment and paying licensing fees). 
Both cameras and film required very few imports aýd had very high foreign 
exchange earning ratios (see table 3.2). 15 Cameras generated between 98 and 99 
14 The Japan Statistical Yearbook (Management and Coordination Agency, 1950) indicates that 
camera and lenses were included in the designation'important industries' as of the late 1940s. 
15 Foreign exchange earning ratio = (export price - import price of materials)/ export price. 
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percent foreign exchange (i. e. US dollars) while film earnings ranged between 
75 and 88 percent during the 1950s. Along with other backbone recovery 
industries (e. g. fountain pens, sewing machines, watches, binoculars, ships 
and bicycles), cameras were ideally suited for export promotion beginning 
with'domestic exports' to the PXs. 
At first, a '100 percent policy' went into force: all cameras produced in 
Japan were sold through the PXs as "exports. ' According to the editors of 
Camerart Ganuary 1988, p. 23), GHQ issued the following three instructions in 
October 1948: 
1) Licenses shall be granted to produce cameras either confirmed by 
record for actual export or which are clearly intended for export. 2) 
Licenses shall be granted for camera production for the domestic 
market [and] limit[ed] only [to] sale[s] to the Occupation Forces. 3) 
Licensed manufacturers shall be obliged to limit their production to 
the amounts for export and/or supplying the Occupation Forces. 
As described above, GHQ (and the Japanese government) enforced exchange 
controls between 1945 and early 1949, which made it impossible to export via 
other channels. Because of the 100 percent policy, the domestic market was 
closed to camera and lens (and film) sales, but the problem of pent up 
domestic demand (consumption had also been stifled throughout the war) 
meant that black markets developed. 16Consequently, the 100 percent policy 
was changed to 80-20, that is 80 percent of production went to the PXs and 20 
percent to the domestic market. The figures given in table 3.1 are therefore 
somewhat misleading because there was no single exchange rate before 1949 
and because it is unclear if PX sales are included in the export figures. They 
n-tight best be seen as indicators of a growth trend in camera production and 
exports. 
16 Tsuru (1996, pp. 16-17) notes that black markets were prevalent in many sectors of the 
economy. This problem was attacked in the First Economic White Paper prepared in 1947 by 
the Economic Stabilization Board under Tsuru's guidance. 
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Several manufacturing problems faced the camera industry in the late 
1940s. Many factories needed rebuilding, most needed retooling and many 
raw materials were temporarily in short supply due to wartime dislocations. 
Camera shutters were particularly scarce. But perhaps most importantly, the 
camera models being produced were old-fashioned 1930s models, because 
wartime production controls had prevented firms from up-dating their 
manufacturing facilities (Lewis, 1991, p. 60). However, capital was sorely 
needed to upgrade and replace machinery and equipment (cf. Cohen, 1949). 
One measure devised by GHQ to help the industry get back on its feet, secured 
money from the US government to allow four Japanese firms - the three 
camera makers Canon, Minolta, Nikon and one watch and camera shutter 
maker Seiko - to import precision machine tools from Switzerland 
(Kusumoto, 1989, pp. 67-68). Swiss machine tools were considered to be the 
best in the world at that time for the manufacture of precision machinery, e. g. 
cameras and watches. 
Nikon and Canon concentrated on developing the 35 mm format 
cameras mainly by copying and improving upon two German cameras, the 
Leica (made by Ernst Leitz) and Contax (made by Zeiss Ikon). Minolta also 
worked on the 35 mm format but was less keen on copying other firms' 
cameras. One improvement Minolta and Nikon came up with was to change 
the film format from 35 mm (24 x 36 mm frame) to 24 x 32 mm which was 
generally thought to be more suitable to graphic art and photographic printing 
(Camerart, February'1990). The 35 mm format, based on the readily available 
cine film of the 1920s that was mass produced by Kodak, had become the 
industry standard. Because GHQ thought the new format would not sell in the 
US market (dominated by Kodak), they did not approve of the new film size or 
the new cameras and prohibited their sale at the PXs. Japanese firms instead 
had to concentrate on improving existing 35 mm cameras., because as higher 
value-added goods they earned more US dollars than the old-fashioned 
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models (e. g. folding cameras and twin-reflex cameras), and as noted above, the 
firms had to supply 80 percent of their production to the PXs. 
GHQ's policy (in tune with by the objectives of the ESB) was important 
in that it immediately oriented the photography industry toward exports 
which helped build a market for Japanese goods the US, the largest market for 
photographic products, even before the Occupation had ended. This was the 
industry's first contact with export promotion. It was an effective way of 
encouraging consumer goods production by companies such as Nikon which 
had enjoyed strong military and zaibatsu connections as a member of the 
Mitsubishi concern and engaged exclusively in optical weaponry manufacture 
throughout the war. And it may have helped lay the foundation for the success 
of other industries that would develop out of Japan's own post-Occupation 
policy of export promotion (cf. Tsuru, 1996, pp. 77-87). 
On December 10,1950, Nikon received a letter from Major General W. 
F. Marquat congratulating it on its technological and commercial success in 
photographic lenses as reported in The New York Times (Nippon Kogaku KK, 
1957, pp. 289; 291). Marquat wrote (p. 291): 
It has been my contention that Japanese export industry should 
adjust itself-to compete in world markets on a basis of quality. It has 
been a firm conviction that Japanese industry is capable of doing this 
successfully and consequently it was most satisfying to learn that 
your company has justified this opinion. [ ... ] The employees of 
Nippon Kogaku may take pride in making a substantial contribution 
toward the rebuilding of the economy of their country. 
S 
The popularity of Japanese cameras among Americans serving in Japan helped 
companies build their reputations and their brand names (which they did not 
change once they began to sell directly to the US market). When American 
military personnel returned to the US with their cameras, they created new 4k 
demand for Japanese cameras, additional equipment and service. To take 
advantage of this new situation, in 1953, Nikon (followed by Canon and 
Minolta the following year) began exploring marketing and distribution 
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channels for their exports to the US OCIA, 1987). In the early years of the 
Occupation, the PXs acted as a direct link to the US market without the cost to 
the firms of setting up export distribution or shipping the goods overseas. An 
open and expanding US market was, in effect, handed to the camera/lens 
companies. There can be little doubt that the PX exports encouraged the 
Japanese firms to believe that their products could succeed in the US market. 
The impact of the Korean War 
When the Korean War broke out, US military expenditure grew and Japan, 
where there were already base installations for the Occupation forces, was 
important for the provision of military supplies as well as for rest and 
recuperation of the troops. Procurement levels for the Korean War over the 
1950-1954 period. were significant, beginning at $149 million in 1950 and 
reaching a peak in 1952 of $824 million (Yamamura, 1967, p. 39). This suggests 
that the amount of US economic aid sent to Japan was more than doubled by 
US military expenditure between 1945 and 1955. The temporary nature of the 
situation created a sudden tokujyu (special demand of war) boomlet in the 
Japanese econoMy. 17 Much of the spending helped the expansion of Japanese 
industries, and was in line with US policy of the 1950s to make America's ally, 
Japan, into the econon-dc and democratic showcase of Asia (cf. Tsuru, 1996). 
The Korean War did a great deal to raise the international reputation of 
Japanese camera and lenses, especially those produced by Nikon and Canon. 
A pivotal event came in 1950 when a Life magazine photographer, David 
Douglas Duncan, fitted his two Leica IlIf cameras with a Nikkor 50 mm f/1.5 
lens and a 135 mm f/3.5 lens (Lewis, 1991, p. 72). 18His well-received book 
entitled This is War! included photographs taken with the Nikkor lenses. When 
Duncan divulged the fact that he had used lenses manufactured by Nikon, 
17 Later, the Vietnam War had a similar effect (see chapter four). 
18 Nikkor is the brand name for Nikon's optical line. 
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photographers began to seek out Nikon factories and purchase lenses directly 
since they were scarce or simply not available in overseas markets. Not 
wanting to miss out on the opportunity, Canon began to invite 
photojournalists to test Canon's products in tough war circumstances, and 
they were equally well received. 
How had Nikon and Canon come so far in such a short time? Canon's 
production facilities in Tokyo and Yamanashi Prefecture were largely intact in 
1945 which allowed for a comparatively smooth re-entry into the market with 
civilian-use products (Canon, 1994). Nikon found themselves unable to 
provide optical goods to their customers (see above), but were able to recover 
after their supply problem was solved. Minolta suffered the loss of many of its 
production facilities and required more time to reorganize (Lewis, 1991). The 
vast numbers of skilled unemployed in the vacated textile region of Nagano 
Prefecture enticed camera companies to set up production there. This allowed 
them to take advantage of the highly dexterous textile workers (mostly female) 
who had lost their jobs to the changing economic conditions that had forced 
many textile companies abroad. The employees were valued for their ability to 
assemble quickly and carefully cameras and lenses, many of which contained 
thousands of parts. Still today, Nagano Prefecture is known for its strength in 
camera and lens production despite the fact that most camera manufacture 
and assembly has moved to East and Southeast Asia. 19 
One of the real problems of the Japanese domestic market was the lack 
of disposable income which could be spent on luxury items such as cameras 
and watches. Another was the excise taxes that were levied on luxury goods in 
order to control domestic demand and force most of the high-quality (and high 
value-added) goods overseas (see chapter four). However, the firms that 
exported cameras and lenses were few in number and generally large, and the 
demand for cameras was high. According to Miyabayashi (1963) and Lewis 
(1991), Japan went through a camera boom in the early 1950s attracting 
19 This information is based on interviews with industrialists, Spring 1996. 
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numerous entrepreneurs into camera making. The industry blossomed and 
increasingly was composed of two types of manufacturers, those which were 
"serious' and produced high-quality goods most of which were for export and 
those which sought to make a quick profit on domestic sales of shoddy goods. 
By 1950, the leading companies were Nikon (which targeted 
professional photographers), Canon and Minolta. They were challenged by, 
among others, Konica Ricoh, Olympus, Yashica, Petri, Mamiya and Bronica. 
Asahi Optical, which was a top quality optics manufacturer at that time, did 
not begin to produce cameras until 1952, after which it took the brand name 
Pentax (Condax et al, 1984, p. 12). It was important for the Japanese firms to 
build a domestic market for their up-scale (exported) products since they 
needed healthy domestic sales to support the expanding export market (cf. 
Linder, 1961; Vernon, 1966). But, there were many camera makers - most 
were simple assemblers - with brand names covering the alphabet from A-Z, 
and the Japanese market was still quite small due to low income levels OCII, 
1984, p. 26; Lewis, 1991). 
To compete, some companies offered innovative cameras with creative 
pricing (to minimize the effect of the excise tax) which proved to be very 
popular (Miyabayashi, 1963). One of the most successful cameras of this time 
was the Olympus Pen of 1959 which was reasonably priced at Y6,800 ($19) and 
used half-frames of 35 mm film. In effect, half-frame cameras allow the user to 
get twice as many photographs out of one roll of film (see chapter one). Film 
was very expensive at that time in Japan due to limited supply of both 
domestic and imported film and to heavy excise taxes. Many photographers in 
Japan purchased film in bulk, cut it into lengths and rolled it into special re- 
usable and re-fillable cartridges as a money-saving measure. Recall that 
imported photographic film was tightly controlled and the sector was 
protected from foreign competition until the early 1970s (see chapters four and 
five). 
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The institutions of export promotion 
84 
In addition to measures taken by GHQ to stimulate the industry, the 
camera/lens companies themselves began to reorganize as early as 1946 
reviving some prewar institutions, e. g. industry associations. In January of that 
year, 17 optical companies organized the Optical Instruments Conference 
which aimed to "improve cooperation among the manufacturers engaged in 
rebuilding the Japanese optical industry" (Lewis, 1991, p. 60). The name was 
then changed to Optical Instruments Manufacturers' Association (OIMA), and 
a camera division, established as part of the association, set up their office at 
Konica (then Konishiroku Photo Industry). The division members lobbied for 
reductions in excise taxes which they believed stifled domestic demand, and 
formed a technology committee to encourage technological development 
among the member companies. However, the OIMA was banned by GHQ on 
grounds the it encouraged anti-competitive behavior. It was reorganized as the 
Optical and Precision Instruments Manufacturers' Association in May 1948 
and again banned, but the six divisions within the association, of which 
cameras was one, continued to work together (Camerart, January 1988). 
In March 1949, the Export Product Control Act went into effect. All 
exported cameras, lenses and certain types of accessories were subject to 
inspection by designated officials from companies that had been members of 
the OIMA (Camerart, March 1990). Since the officials were OIMA members, 
export inspection worked as a self-regulation system. In April 1953,13 camera 
manufacturers joined together to form the Photographic Industry 
Development Association (PIDA: Shashinki Shinko Kogyokai) with Kinji 
Moriyama, a young politician in the Progressive Party Uiyu-to) and later a 
powerful member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as its managing 
director OCII, 1984). The PIDA's purpose was to promote the business of the 
member firms and solve problems that had arisen in the industry. This was 
done through committees on, e. g., distribution of cameras to the PXs, 
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reduction of the excise and other taxes, promotion activities, and market 
research OCIA, 1987). 
The following year the PIDA formed the Japan Camera Industry 
Association OCIA: Nihon Shashinki Kogyokai), with Takeshi Mitarai, one of the 
founders of Canon, as its first president. The JCIA was one of six industry 
associations serving the optical instruments manufacturers organized under 
the re-established umbrella group, the Japan Optical and Precision 
Instruments Manufacturers' Association (Nihon Kogaku Kogyo Kyokai) (Sugi, 
1971). 20 The specialized committees already established under PIDA's 
guidance became part of the JCIA. Industry associations, like the JCIA, are 
funded by membership dues. 
Also in 1954, the industry received the explicit support of the Keidanren 
(the Federation of Japanese Industries that acts as the voice of business to 
government) when they submitted a report to the Japanese government 
entitled "The Export Promotion of the Optics Industry" (Kogaku Mai no 
Yushutsu Shinko) OCII, 1984, p. 559). Not long after its submission, specific 
measures were taken by industry and goverm-nent to raise quality standards 
and promote exports of Japanese cameras and lenses. Rokuemon Sugiura 8th 
(1954), president-of Konica and one of the most prominent figures in the 
photography industry at that time, published an article in the Keidanren Geppo 
(the Keidanren's monthly bulletin) expressing the importance of promoting 
the optics industry. Following his piece, is an article written by Keidanren 
officials (1954) entitled "Demands Regarding the Export Promotion of Optical 
Instruments, " outlining why the industry was perfect for export promotion. 
Once the voices of the firms had been heard by the Japanese government, the 
PIDA, having fulfilled its mission, was dissolved in July 1955. 
Ok 
20 The others are Japan Motion Picture Equipment Industrial Association (Nihon Eiga Kikai 
Kogyokai), Japan Optical Measuring Instruments Manufacturers' Association (Nihon Kogaku 
Sokuteiki Kogyokai), Japan Surveying Instruments Manufacturers' Association (Nihon Sokuryo 
Kiki Kogyokai), Japan Telescope Manufacturers' Association (Nihon Boenkyo Kogyokai) and Japan 
Microscope Manufacturers' Association (Nihon Kenbikyo Kogyokai). 
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The photosensitive materials manufacturers (film and paper) were 
unable to act as quickly as the camera makers due to GHqs deconcentration 
policy and hesitation about allowing them to reorganize immediately as 
civilian businesses. But after the shift in GHQ policy toward recovery in 1948- 
49, the film firms did begin to organize by forming the Photo Industry 
Conference (Camerart, January 1988). In 1953 the conference changed its name 
to the Photo-Sensitive Materials Industry Association (PSMA: Shashin Kanko 
Zairyo Kogyokaz). Konica and Fuji Photo Film are members of both the JCIA and 
the PSMA since they manufacture cameras, lenses and film. 
The main reasons that the industry was organized into associations and 
export inspection was begun was that by the mid-1950s the quality of all 
cameras, lenses and film had to be raised and the manufacturers of high- 
quality goods (which by that time were mainly the exporting firms) needed to 
build their domestic market shares. 21 At that time, the camera industry was 
booming and domestic demand was generally met by numerous small upstart 
camera makers, pejoratively referred to as 'yojohan makers' (one-room 
apartment makers) (Camerart, April 1988). They were assemblers, not 
manufacturers, that bought up large quantities of cheap camera components 
and produced cheap cameras. They ran on such tight margins that they went 
into and out of business overnight. Generally, they did not possess the know- 
how to make optics and this distinguished them from the "serious' firms, many 
of which exported the majority of their cameras/ lenses (cf. Lewis, 1991). 
The economic slow-down in 1953-54 following the end of the Korean 
War and the Occupation caused a rash of bankruptcies; the number of camera 
manufacturers fell by nearly one-third from 100 to about 65 firms (Camerart, 
February 1988; JCIA, 1987). The surviving firms became concerned that there 
was too much 'chaos' in the industry and iherefore sought to strengthen their 
21 In the case of film, the level of Japanese technology was considered to be below international 
standards. Thus, export promotion would have to wait until the firms could successfully 
compete, and until that time the market would be protected from imports. 
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industry and promote their businesses with the help of the PIDA, Kinji 
Moriyama and Keidanren as described above. 
During the late 1940s and 1950s, the US and Japanese governments 
passed a number of laws regulating exports and industry standards with the 
aim of raising the quality of Japanese exports. The Export Regulation Act of 
1948 (enforced again in 1949) allowed only those Japanese products that 
passed inspection to be exported. It was replaced by the Export Inspection 
Law (Yushutsu Kensa ho) of 1957.22 In conjunction with the revised law, 
impartial third parties (i. e. not industry and not government) were created to 
carry out the inspections and to promote exports with the help of the 
respective industry associations (cf. JCII, 1984). The Japan Camera Inspection 
Institute OCII: Nihon Kogaku Kensa-kai), established in 1954, had as its mandate 
to uphold the Export Inspection Law, the Electric Appliances Regulation Law 
(Denki Yohin Torishimari ho) and the Industrial Standards Law (Kogyo Hyojunka 
ho). 23 Moriyama became the president of the JCII, a post he retained until his 
untimely death in 1987.24 At that time his wife, Mayumi Moriyama (a powerful 
LDP politician today) was named president OCIA, 1987, pp. 18-19). 
A cozy relationship developed very quickly between Kinji Moriyama, a 
politician who was also a camera enthusiast, and the leading photography 
companies in the early 1950s. Far too little research has been done on industry 
associations and export inspection bodies to be able to judge whether or not 
the photography industry was unusual in this regard. However, Yayama and 
Ito (1988, pp. 338-340) comment that while it is not unusual in Japan for an 
22 The sources are not clear about what happened to the Export Product Control Act of March 
1949, nor are they consistent regarding the names of specific laws (cf. Camerart, July 1988 and 
March 1990; JCIL 1984). 
23 The name changed to the Japan Camera and Optical Instruments Inspection and Testing 
Institute on May 1,1973 when the institute's inspection responsibilities were expanded to 
include surveying instruments and biological microscopes (Lewis, 1991, p. 77). The acronym 
JCII remained the same. 
24 The activities of the JCII were originally directed toward the optics manufacturers rather 
than the camera makers, evidence of which can be seen in the use of the word 'optics' (kogaku) 
in its Japanese name rather than the word 'camera' (shashinki, later kamera). The discrepancy in 
the original Japanese and English names could be related to the origins of the major companies 
in optics technology and the export promotion of cameras. 
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industry to have a policy zoku (i. e. a politician with a particular industry 
specialty), Moriyama was different because he was a camera enthusiast. He 
took a very personal interest in the photography industry and did much more 
for the whole industry than a typical policy zoku would have done. Gerald 
Curtis (1988, pp. 115-116) notes that zoku "play an autonomous role" vis-a-vis 
bureaucrats and interest groups (e. g. industry) "trying to find areas of 
compromise between what interest groups want and what the government is 
prepared to give. "25 
The JCII served as a watchdog over the Japanese photography industry 
OCII, 1984). In essence, it prevented companies that manufactured inferior 
goods from exporting and worked to establish a reputation for high-quality 
Japanese cameras and lenses overseas. The latter was what Nikon and Canon 
had already begun to do at the start of the decade. Over time, the JCII very 
effectively raised standards for all exports, and the inspection staff became 
expert on all technologies being developed in the industry. The JCII charged 
fees for the inspection and testing of each item exported, i. e. one percent of the 
iternýs value (cf. JCII, 1984). The proceeds financed the work of the JCII until 
1989 when it was made defunct as part of the Japanese government's 
deregulation policy. 26 As the volume of photographic goods exports grew, and 
because the cost of performing the tests was kept low, the JCII became wealthy 
enough to construct its own'JCII Building' in downtown Tokyo (Ichiban-cho) 
in 1960.27 
Setting industry standards came as an outgrowth of the original mission 
of the JCII, that is, to inspect exported goods and thereby raise the quality 
standards of exported goods OCII, 1984, pp. 233-251). The Institute began 
inspecting hand cameras in 1955 and quickly broadened its mandate all other 
photographic equipment. As camera and lens technology became more 
25 Curtis (1988, p. 115) also comments that the definition of the term zoku has changed over 
time, and that it was not commonly used until the 1970s. 
26 The inspection activities of the JCII had already been minimized by this time because the 
firms had achieved and continued to maintain high standards on their own. 
27 This information is based on interviews with government officials, Spring 1996. 
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advanced, the inspection process became more complex. The Institute 
developed specific testing equipment which could determine, for example, 
average shutter speeds, degree of focusing capability, and precision of light 
meters, but much of the actual testing took place at the companies themselves. 
JCII inspectors made rounds to the factories randomly testing single pieces of 
export lots. Acting as an impartial third party, the JCII determined standards 
to which the all Japanese exporters of cameras and lenses had to comply. If 
firms did not abide by JCII standards, they could not export. 28 The export 
inspection law and the activities of the JCII to promote high-quality exports 
constituted industrial policy. 
In the 1950s, the activities of the JCIA and the JCII were mainly directed 
toward promoting exports of Japanese cameras and lenses. In August 1955, 
Kinji and Mayumi Moriyama and three staff members of the JCIA traveled to 
New York City to set up the Japan Camera Information and Service Center 
which opened the following February OCII, 1984, pp. 3-10). 29 Prior to the 
arrival of the JCII-JCIA group, Canon, Minolta, Nikon and Ricoh had, with 
varying degrees of success, begun to distribute their products in the US 
through local dealers GCIA, 1987, pp. 19-20; JCII, 1984, pp. 14-22). The aim of 
the New York center was to assist the Whole industry with camera repairs and 
marketing, especially the smaller firms with less capital to spend on 
developing export markets (Yayama and Ito, 1988, p. 333). The center 
provided information and repair service for all cameras made by Japanese 
companies, many of which had originally been purchased in PXs and were in 
need of repair. Again, the services provided by the JCIA and the JCII 
amounted to indirect industrial policy. 
The New York center essentially allowed those companies which were 
exporting to the US (i. e. successfully passing the JCII inspections) to gain a 
28 This information is based on interviews with JCII officials, Spring 1996. 
29 The JCIA staff members were: Takateri Koakimoto of Nikon, Toshiro Shimoyama of 
Olympus and Kojiro Sugawara, at that time president of Mamiya and vice president of the 
JCIA (Camerart, May 1988; JCIL 1984). 
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foothold in the US without all of the expense of arranging local marketing and 
distribution. In a sense, the inspection fees were used to defray the cost to each 
company of setting up its own offices and distribution networks in the US. 
Without the center's help to all exporters, the companies which had already 
begun to set up distribution networks might have gained an oligopolistic 
control of the whole US market. The center was originally sponsored by the 
Japanese government and by the JCIA member companies (see chapter four), 
and its initial was in the Japan External Trade Organization's GETRO) offices. 
Five months after the New York center opened it moved to a separate location 
on New York City's prestigious Fifth Avenue. 30JETRO also sponsored the first 
Japan camera show, one of the center's primary public relations activities to 
introduce new Japanese cameras on the US market OCII, 1984). 
In addition to the Japan camera center in New York City, a similar 
center specifically for repairs was established in Okinawa in 1956 to serve the 
needs of the US military personnel stationed there who had purchased 
Japanese cameras and lenses tax-free through the PXs (Camerart, May 1988). 31 
The Okinawa PX comprised sizable sales to US n-dlitary personnel who were 
mainly stationed in the Ryukyu Islands after 1952. In 1959, JCIA and MITI put 
up funds to in'%&stigate the potential for export promotion of cameras to 
markets in Europe. OCIA, 1987; JCII, 1984, p. 133. ) The JCIA member 
companies contributed 5 million yen and MITI matched it. Thus, 10 n-dllion 
yen was allocated to market surveys and PR for Japanese cameras. In 1963, 
Europe was far from one single market, therefore one information center was 
established in London and a second one was set up in West Germany. 
30 JETRO is the export (and now import) arm of MITI, established by law (no. 95) as a public CA 
corporation on 26 April 1958. In 1954, MITI took over and expanded the operations of the 
predecessor of JETRO, or what had been export promotion bodies set up and financed by 
Kansai industrialists and prefectural chambers of commerce and local governments (Johnson, 
1982, pp. 230-231). In 1954-55, a Fifth Avenue address must have been terribly expensive. 
31 The Okinawa center was called the Japan Camera Branch Office at Ryukyu, and it was 
closed in 1961 after the November 1960 US government order to the Ryukyu PX to defend the 
dollar and stop buying Japanese cameras. 
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Industry groups, e. g. the industry associations, with the support of the 
government played a crucial role in the early years of the photography 
industry in Japan because they helped lay the foundation for the industry's 
later expansion. The success of cameras was necessary for the success of the 
film; without cameras, people will not buy film. Interest in photography 
among ordinary Japanese was encouraged through journals devoted to 
photography, photography societies and by photography competitions. The 
latter were often sponsored by various associations or by prominent journals 
such as Asahi Camera which has been published since 1926 by Asahi Shimbun 
(Lewis, 1991, p. 37). The rise of leisure time, disposable incomes and tourism 
within Japan (and later in other countries) created a strong domestic demand 
for cameras, lenses and film and encouraged Japan's "middle masses' to 
become avid photographers. 32 
The JCIA is always run by of one of presidents the "big five' camera 
companies, i. e. Asahi Optical, Canon, Nikon, Minolta and Olympus. In the 
case of the PSMA, leadership shifts between the two largest comprehensive 
photography firms which manufacture cameras, lenses and film, i. e. Konica 
and Fuji Photo Film. The associations are closely linked with the government 
bureaucracy through the permanent staff of the PSMA and the JCIA who are 
essentially members of the bureaucracy. (This does not include company 
employees on secondment. ) The job of the associations is to act as 
intermediaries between the government (primarily the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, MITI) and the companies. The government 
communicates its policy guidelines to firms through the associations and firms 
communicate their concerns to the bureaucracy through the same channel. The 
JCIA staff regularly report industry data to the appropriate section of MITI, 
cu. Frently the Machinery and Information -Indus6ies Bureau, Industrial 
Machinery Division. 
32 Yasusuke Murakami (1987) refers to the expansion of Japan's middle class (i. e. most 
Japanese people) as the rise of Japan's 'middle masses! 
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According to industry experts, this opportunity to exchange 
information was far more important in the early years than it is today. 33 One 
example is the production and engineering committee that was organized 
within the JCIA when it was founded (see above). In 1956, the committee 
transferred its activities to the Camera Engineering Research Association 
(CERA) which worked on developing camera lens performance and 
production technologies in cooperation with the Society of Applied Physics 
and a few other organizations (Camerart, May 1988: JCIA, 1987). The R&D was 
subsidized by MITI. Under a statute established in 1962 to encourage 
cooperative research among industries, CERA was reorganized as the Japan 
Optical Engineering Research Association. Most of the research centered on 
improving lens production and design, and working with national and 
international standards setting bodies, but its research agenda also included 
the "'optical performance and function of human eyes" (Camerart, May 1988, p. 
21). By 1981, research association's work was completed and it was dissolved. 
Firms no longer needed or wanted to exchange information through the 
research association. This is an example of how globalized the industry had 
become by the early 1980s. 
The president of the JCIA is the chairmen of one of the big five 
companies, on secondment for a two or three-year term and working out of his 
own company. The members of the president's council are invariably the 
chairmen of the leading camera/lens firms, and because they have been 
meeting on a regular basis (about once a month) for years to discuss 
developments in the industry, they are all on quite friendly terms. 34 The 
industry associations in effect offer industry leaders a chance to come together 
informally to exchange information regarding the present state of the industry. 
This is why the APS consortium is so important. It created a rift between the 
chairmen of the firms within the consortium and those who were left out. 
33 This information is based on interviews with JCIA officials, Fall 1994 and Spring 1996. 
34 This information is based on interviews with JCIA officials and industrialists, Spring 1996. 
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Until the APS consortium, Kodak dominated the global photography industry 
by controlling which film formats would become world standards. From the 
1920s until the 1980s, Kodak took advantage of its position as the largest 
photographic film maker, at times forcing camera makers to withdraw 
products if they did not suit Kodak film formats (e. g. cameras introduced by 
Franke and Heidecke, Minolta and Nikon discussed above). The profit 
margins on photographic film are higher than on cameras and lenses, partly 
due to the fact that only a handful of firms supply film worldwide. There have 
historically been more firms in camera/lens manufacturing than in film, so 
competition has been more fierce. 
Since the 1980s, Kodak's position as the world's leading photography 
firm has been eroded. It is still the leader, but several Japanese firms have 
grown in relative strength in international markets. The APS consortium 
means that film is no longer the only product that detern-dnes film formats. 
Now, the camera/lens makers also influence them. The three camera/lens 
firms, i. e. Canon, Nikon and Minolta, are therefore much stronger vis-a-vis 
Kodak than they have ever been in the past. The APS consortium also cuts 
across national borders. It is a sign that Fuji Photo Film is a necessary partner 
for Kodak and that they both now share the global market for photographic 
film. 
As described in this chapter, the Japanese economy was set on a course 
of export promotion during the latter half of the Allied Occupation, i. e. 1949- 
1952. Japan's economic recovery was based on promoting exports that 
generated foreign exchange (e. g. cameras, lenses and film) to correct Japan's 
balance of payments which until the Korean War boom relied on subsidies 
from the US government. At first the US market was opened up to Japanese 
goods such as cameras/ lenses to cut Japan's dependence on US subsidies, but 
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as the Cold War intensified, Japanýs economic recovery became part of 
America's foreign policy in East Asia. 
To support export promotion of cameras, lenses and film, the 
government and industry cooperated by setting up the JCIA, the PSMA, the 
JCII and research associations. The general atmosphere in Japan in the early 
1950s was either export or die; the seven leading Japanese photography firms 
today became successful as exporters. The leading firms cooperated with the 
government through the industry associations and they developed a cozy 
relationship with Kinji Moriyama, a zoku politician, who promoted the exports 
of Japanese cameras and lenses and helped set up the JCIL The industry 
associations played an important role in the photography industry as 
discussion fora for the chairmen of the top firms. However, when the APS 
consortium was formed, only four of the seven top Japanese firms were 
invited to participate. Consequently, discussions at industry association 
meetings became less frank, and rivalry among the firms intensified. 
Chapters four and five show that there was a substantial degree of 
government-industry cooperation from 1950 to the early 1970s, and that from 
1974, industry relationships was characterized more by rivalry. In the early 
period, many firms enjoyed the benefits of Japan's export promotion industrial 
policy, but this did not apply to all. Many firms were allowed to fail. Exporting 
firms cooperated with bureaucrats and with Moriyama to raise the whole 
industry to international levels of competition. By the 1980s, rivalry among the 
relatively few firms in the global photography industry rose. Firms were no 
longer 'Japanese' or 'American' or 'West German, ' but were known by the 
reputations of their products. Many Japanese photography firms changed their 
company names to their brand names because that is how they are recognized 
internationally. How the relationships among bureaucrats, politicians and 
firms in the Japanese photography industry shifted over time from more 
cooperation/ less rivalry to more rivalry/less cooperation is the subject of the 
next two chapters. 
4. The Heyday of Export Promotion 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes how growth in the photography industry was sustained 
and its international competitiveness was increased from 1950 to the first oil 
crisis. This period covers the rise of export promotion as a conscious economic 
policy in Japan and how US econon-dc and strategic policy worked to 
encourage its success. The photography industry, targeted as one of Japan's 
recovery industries, shows just how successful export promotion came to be 
by the early 1970s. The next chapter picks up the story from 1974 when 
protectionism in the Japanese market was being dismantled and export 
promotion became no longer viable because Japan was no longer a nation in 
economic recovery. The early 1970s was also when international competition 
among firms began to take on a new character as the postwar economic 
expansion wound down. The trend toward globalization was influenced by 
the international - 
financial system which entered a new phase in the early 
1970s, after the breakdown of the postwar system based on the gold standard. 
The 1950 to 1973 period is mainly characterized by cooperation rather 
than rivalry among the politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen involved in 
the postwar recovery of the Japanese photography industry. Rivalry existed as 
well, but cooperation tended to dominate. As described in chapter three, by 
the mid-1950s, the industry gained the sponsorship of a zoku politician, Kinji 
Moriyama, and several industry associations were established to help with 
export promotion. Many photography firms introduced successful but %Ik 
inexpensive cameras and lenses in their effort to challenge the West Germans 
who led the world in camera/ lens technology in 1950. 
95 
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The firms that were best able to develop new products and implement 
new manufacturing processes were those that began to export through the US 
military post exchanges (PXs). After 1949 when export promotion went into 
effect as an economic recovery policy, the photography industry began to 
expand very rapidly. The Japanese government controlled export revenues 
and allowed exporters to retain some earnings while the rest was channeled 
into other industries that had been targeted for export growth. The 
photography firms took advantage of tax incentives to invest in plant and 
equipment, and by the end of the 1960s held a very strong - perhaps the 
strongest - position in cameras and lenses in world markets. 
How did the Japanese photography firms pull ahead of their 
competitors particularly in West Germany, and why were their competitors 
unable to respond effectively? First, the United States became the most 
important export market for Japanese cameras and lenses, which were 
manufactured by a handful of leading photography firms (e. g. Asahi Optical, 
Canon, Mamiya, Minolta, Nikon, Olympus, Ricoh and Yashica) and the two 
makers of photographic film (i. e. Fuji Photo Film, Konica). As described in 
chapters two and three, not only was the US market open to Japanese exports 
because of Japan's balance of payments problems, but by the early 1950s 
Japanese cameras and lenses had also made considerable inroads into the US 
market through PX sales to the US armed forces stationed in Japan and East 
Asia. 
Second, domestic sales of photographic goods were discouraged 
throughout the 1950s by goverrunent controls on the supply of goods to the 
market and because of substantial excise taxes. This was partly to keep 
inflation under control but it was also partly due to Japan's export promotion 
policy. The Japanese government prio'ritizea export industries with high 
foreign exchange earning ratios, including the photography industry. The 
exporters that produced more expensive cameras and lenses benefited in 
terms of growing export sales, but their share of the domestic market was 
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small. Demand in the domestic market was mainly satisfied through sales of 
lower-cost cameras and lenses and domestically-made photographic film. 
Imports were kept at low levels due to quotas but these were gradually 
replaced by import tariffs. 
Although the domestic market was important in the 1950s, it did not 
really begin to expand until the excise taxes were lowered in the early 1960s. 
And it was only when prices were lowered that average Japanese consumers 
began to purchase higher priced cameras/lenses in greater quantities. The 
firms that made these cameras benefited at first from Japan's industrial policy 
for export promotion and later domestic market expansion. However, demand 
in Japan was quickly satisfied and by the mid-1960s, the industry faced 
problems of overcapacity and price gouging. The 12 leading member firms of 
the Japan Camera Industry Association OCIA), i. e. the main exporters, set up a 
recession cartel to mitigate the effects of 'excess competition. " Once again, the 
exporting firms in the photography industry benefited from Japan's industrial 
policy. 
Third, the exporters turned their attention to the overseas market with a 
new wave of exports directed at building the European market and expanding 
their dominance in the US market. Exports took off on a massive scale aided 
by innovations in mass production of cameras/ lenses and by a large variety of 
new products that emphasized automatic rather than mechanical controls. By 
the early 1960s, Japanese camera/lens exporters controlled a larger share of 
the US market than their German rivals. And by the end of the decade, they 
had repeated this performance in the European market, beating the West 
German firms in the battle for world market shares of cameras/lenses. 
Industrial policies that had encouraged firms to expand capacity and promote 
exports reached their heyday throughout the postwar period up to the early 
1970s. 
1 See chapter two for a discussion of 'excess competition. ' 
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Finally, while cameras and lenses were promoted as foreign exchange- 
earning exports, the production of photographic film in Japan was protected 
from international competition through import quotas, tariffs and various 
controls, e. g. on foreign direct investment. Konica and Fuji Photo Film, two of 
the photographic film manufacturers, were also top makers of cameras and 
lenses. Therefore, they benefited from Japan's industrial policies which 
promoted exports of cameras/ lenses and protected the market from imports of 
photographic film. Konica and Fuji Photo Film dominated the Japanese 
market because they are the only Japanese makers of photographic film to also 
export cameras/lenses. The two firms took part in an export promotion 
campaign similar to the industrial policy that had worked so well with 
cameras/lenses. By the early 1970s, their efforts had met with only limited 
success because international conditions (including access to the US market) 
had changed. Another factor is that the photographic film industry is 
characterized by high technological barriers to entry and high costs of 
production. Significant investment is required in technology, manufacturing 
equipment and manufacturing processes before economies of scale can be 
attained. 
Technological change and market access in the US and Europe helped 
shape the industry from 1950 to 1973. On the supply side, photography firms 
introduced hundreds of new camera and lens models and kept production 
costs down through mass production. Retail prices of exports remained low 
throughout the period due to a favorable exchange rate. Tax measures 
encouraged firms to invest in new manufacturing equipment which allowed 
firms to continue to raise production volumes and their technological levels. 
Also of particular relevance to this chapter is how cooperation - with rivalry at 
times - developed among bureaucrats, politicians and firms in the Japanese 
photography industry. Throughout the period, rivalry was also important. 
Firms responded to changing circumstances in the Japanese market and in 
overseas markets according to their profitability, overall strategies and their 
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performance relative to other leading firms. But government "guidance' and 
cooperation - especially with the help of the industry associations - were 
important to the success of the photography exporters during the 1950 to 1973 
period. 
Taking the US market 
In the early years of the Allied Occupation of Japan, sales of cameras and 
lenses through the post exchanges (PXs) were important for developing the 
United States as Japan's primary export market (see chapter three). 2 As 
previously mentioned, this was closely linked to the General Headquarters' 
(GHQ) (of the Occupation) policy of cutting Japan's dependence on US aid by 
bringing in foreign exchange to pay for needed imports. PX sales were very 
important for the exporting photography firms because they got their 
products - and their brand names - into the US market through US military 
personnel who returned home. When their cameras needed repair or when 
they wanted to purchase new Japanese cameras and lenses, the Japan Camera 
Information and Service Center in New York City (opened in February 1956) 
was there to help. Furthermore, cameras sold through the PXs were much 
cheaper than prices in the domestic market in the early 1950s. The Nikon M 
with an f/2 50 mm lens sold for $65 in the PXs but for twice that amount in 
Japanese retail stores (ca. Y50,000) due to a 60 percent excise tax on all cameras 
sold in Japan. Average monthly wages were roughly one-tenth of the price of 
a Nikon M (Camerart, March 1990). 
When PX sales fell off due at the end of the Occupation (in 1952) and 
after the conclusion of the Korean War (1953), 'regular' exports (i. e. not PX 
'exports') of Japanese cameras and lenses to the US took off. In 1954, PX sales 
to the US armed forces were roughly equal to 'regular' exports, but they 
2 During the Occupation, Japanese 'exports' were sold through the Central Post Office at the 
post exchanges (DoC, 1959; JCII, 1984, p. 26). 
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decreased thereafter (DoC, 1959, p. 6). Buoyed by the success of the Japan 
camera shows, as well as the information, service and market surveys 
sponsored by the New York center, exports of cameras to the US reached their 
first postwar peak in 1957 at 2.5 billion yen ($6.9 million) (Seki et A 1961, p. 
83). A similar center to that in New York was established in Okinawa in 1956 
to service all cameras used by the US forces, not only those made in Japan 
GCII, 1984, pp. 70-71). Other export markets (e. g. to Canada, Hong Kong, West 
Germany, Switzerland and the UK) grew as well, but not as quickly as the 
American one (Seki et al, 1961). 
Japanese photographic lenses, especially those produced by Nikon and 
Canon, achieved very early acclaim due to their high-quality workmanship 
and internationally-competitive technology. The New York Times reported in 
1950 that the best Japanese lenses were equal or superior to the top West 
German models in quality, and in some cases their focusing performance was 
better (Camerart, March 1990; Lewis, 1991, p. 72). Japanese cameras also began 
to gain a strong international reputation through innovations, such as the 
instant-return mirror developed by Asahi Optical (maker of the Pentax brand) 
for their Asahiflex IIB (see chapter one). Convenient, high quality and 
inexpensive cameras, such as the Canonet introduced by Canon in 1961, also 
helped combat the image that Japanese cameras were merely 'toys, ' i. e. not 
cameras for serious photographers, or were poorly made. The perception in 
the US and Europe of Japanese goods being inferior in quality, performance 
and design dogged the industry throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
The New York center's campaign to provide information and repairs for 
Japanese cameras and lenses to US customers and to supply market 
information to the exporting firms proved highly successful. In terms of 
export value, cameras trailed only radios and sewing machines over the 1950 
to 1959 period, from the total of eleven exported durable goods shown in table 
4.1. Looking at the same table, Japanese exports of cameras grew from 5.4 
percent of the world market (value) in 1950 to 37.2 percent by the end of the 
dk 
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decade. Japanese camera/lens exporters steadily increased their production 
and exports during the decade. 
At first, Japanese firms filled US demand for low-cost cameras, 
especially cameras valued at less than $10, while West German firms supplied 
the higher-cost categories. As table 4.2 shows, the volume of Japanese exports 
(not including PX sales) rose by more than 250 percent when the center was 
opened in New York from just over 330 thousand units in 1954 to slightly 
more than 868 thousand units in 1955. By the middle of the decade, Japanese 
firms were beginning to establish themselves as competitors to the West 
German manufacturers in the high end of the market. Leading Japanese 
exporters, e. g. Nikon. Minolta and Canon, exported more advanced cameras 
and lenses and they undercut the West German firms in price. 
A report for the US Department of Commerce Business and Defense 
Services Administration (DoC, 1959, p. 11) noted that during the 1950s, there 
was "'a very noticeable shift ... to cameras 
[imported from Japan] valued at 
more than $10 each. " The Department of Commerce data (1959, p. 30, Table 14; 
and 1964, p. 33, Table 23) indicates that the ratio of Japanese cameras 
(quantity) to total US imported cameras valued at more than $10 each rose 
from 4 percent in 1954 to 69 percent in 1963. The same ratios for West German 
imports to total US imports (in the same category, i. e. cameras valued at more 
than $10 each) show a drop from 80 to 29 percent over the same period. By the 
end of the 1950s, Japanese exporters of cameras/lenses were taking sales of 
higher-cost cameras away from their West German rivals in the US market. 
Japanese firms dominated the US market for cameras/lenses by 1962, 
selling about four times as many cameras there as the West German firms. 
One of their advantages was the very favorable yen-dollar exchange rate 
(unchanged since 1949). In 1962, for example, the total value of Japan's exports 
in US dollars was roughly equal to the total value West Germany's exports 
which represented only one quarter of Japan's volume (see table 4.2). Per unit 
price rose from roughly $1.30 to $13 per Japanese still camera imported into 
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the US and from approximately $28 to $55 per West German still camera 
imported into the US over the 1950 to 1962 period. 3 The rapid success of 
Japanese cameras and lenses in the US was challenged in Washington D. C. by 
a camera lobby, but it was unsuccessful because the imbalance of US-Japan 
trade was seen as more important (Yayama and Ito, 1988, p. 334). The secret to 
the industry's success, according to Yayama and Ito (1988), Kinji Moriyama's 
biographers, was the fact that the Americans encouraged Japanese camera 
imports into the US market because Japan's economic recovery took priority 
over all else. 
Despite their success in the US market, Japanese cameras/lenses 
suffered from a popular perception of poor quality and workmanship relative 
to comparable West German goods. In 1952, when Canon wanted to set up its 
US distribution through Bell & Howell Co., their response was, "Made-in- 
Japan' means cheap and shoddy goods heW (Miyabayashi, 1963, p. 115). 4 It 
took 10 years for the deal to finally go through. According to industry 
specialists, the long-term success of the industry depended on establishing a 
positive image in the US and Europe for Japanese cameras and lenses and on 
building trust among customers. 5 One of the urgent tasks of the New York 
center was to provide information that would satisfy the public's curiosity 
about the new Japanese cameras. Another was to reassure customers that 
should anything go wrong with their Japanese cameras, they could turn to the 
center for help and repairs. But even a decade after the Korean War (when 
professional photographers had scrambled to get their hands on Nikon lenses 
for their Leica cameras), the image of cheap Japanese products persisted. 
Eastman Kodak expressed concern about this problem because at this 
time the firm had a purchasing arrangement with Chinon (a Japanese firm in 
which Kodak purchased a majority share in 1997) (Yayama and Ito, 1988, p. 
337). Kodak wanted to be assured that Chinon's products were of consistently 
3 This is a straight calculation without reference to actual sales prices or still camera type. 
4 Miyabayashi (1963) quotes 77ze Japan Times, November 30,1961. 
5 Information based on interviews with industrialists and JCII officials, Spring 1996. 
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high quality. The Japan Camera Inspection Institute OCII), established in 1954, 
worked to insure that all exported Japanese cameras and lenses were of high 
quality. Although the quality standards of exported cameras/ lenses continued 
rise throughout the 1950s, perceptions were slow to change. Compounding the 
problem, were charges lodged by Franke and Heidecke that Yashica produced 
a camera (i. e. their Yashica. 44) that was a copy of their Rolleiflex 4x4 (Lewis, 
1991, p. 98). Yayama and Ito (1988) note that before WWII, the name Nikon 
(pronounced 'knee-con' in Japanese) was criticized by Zeiss Ikon of Germany 
for sounding too much like Ikon, part of the firm's name, and Ikonta, one of its 
camera brands. The problem of firms that copied famous brands was not 
confined to the Japanese photography industry. Therefore, in 1959, the 
Japanese government passed the Export Design Law and established the Japan 
Machinery Design Center GMDC) (Lewis, 1991). The JMDC's role was to 
encourage Japanese firms to come up with their own innovative product 
designs. 
In the photography industry, the JCII in cooperation with the JMDC 
decided to create a seal of approval that would be affixed to every exported 
camera and lens. On January 1,1960, they implemented the now famous oval- 
shaped, black and-gold 'Passed' sticker which carried the JCII and the JMDC 
logos OCIA, 1987, p. 31). The seal meant that every exported item was 
properly inspected and tested and was an independent Japanese design. The 
US government insisted at about the same time that all Japanese lenses 
imported into the US carry the words "Lens Made in Japan" to insure the 
country of origin was clear OCII, 1984, p. 131). 
Recall that the information and service center in New York City was 
established by the JCIA and the JCII to act as a 'bridgehead' in the US for 
Ck 
Japanese exporters of cameras/lenses and provide marketing and distribution 
functions. By 1960, these services were generally no longer needed. Each 
exporter had begun to build its own marketing and distribution, and it became 
clear that the purpose of the center would have to change. Until 1961, the 
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center's director was seconded from one of the exporting firms, but the fifth 
director sent that year to New York was a government official. Heightened 
competition among the Japanese exporters also meant that the practice of 
seconding company employees to work at the center as camera specialists and 
technicians able to handle all makes and models had to change GCII, 1984, pp. 
149-150). Instead of abolishing the New York center because exporting firms 
no longer depended as heavily on its services, the Japanese government took 
over the staffing responsibilities. Arguably, the government found it useful to 
do so because it increased their ability to exercise control in the US over the 
rapidly expanding Japanese camera/ lens exporters. 
In the US, the total budget (Y-43.7 million or $121 thousand) of the New 
York center was originally composed of both public and private sector funds 
OCII, 1984, p. 5). The public funds, both controlled by MITI, were the bicycle 
racing funds (keirin shikin) at Y20 million ($56 thousand) and the banana funds 
at Y10 million ($27 thousand). The latter came from the difference between the 
import price of bananas and the sales revenue. The MITI money was used 
specifically to foster industries considered important for the nation by 
covering, for example, export promotion expenses OCII, 1984, pp. 5-6; 
Johnson, 1978, pp. 47,156). The JCIA member companies contributed the 
remaining Y13.7 n-dllion ($38 thousand). The banana import funds were not 
supplied in fiscal year 1956, and the other two sources of funding were 
increased by roughly Y10 million each OCII, 1984, p. 79). From fiscal year 1957, 
the JCIA member companies began to provide twice the amount of MITI's 
bicycle racing funds, bringing the total budget to Y45 n-dllion ($125 thousand) 
OCII, 1984, p. 92). The photography industry received MITI's banana and 
bicycle racing funds because it was targeted as an export promotion industry. 
In 1962, the New York center faced a serious problem. Only about V12 
n-dllion ($33 thousand), or about enough to cover the annual salary of one 
employee, would be covered by JCIA member company contributions OCII, 
1984, p. 149). That was the equivalent of about one-quarter of the expected 
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budget, and the rest was to come from by MITI's bicycle racing funds as in 
previous years. However, that year, help from MITI was not forthcoming. 
MITI used the argument of the changing needs of the photography industry 
and the fact that civil servants were now staffing the New York center as a 
rationale for not supplying the needed funds. 
The real reason, according to the JCII, was MITI's plan - kept secret 
from the photography firms - to establish its own centers for Japan's light 
machinery exporters (e. g. electronic goods, cameras and sewing machines). In 
October 1963, MITI organized Japan's light machinery industry into three 
regions, i. e. Europe, North America and Southeast Asia, for export promotion 
OCIA, 1987; JCII, 1984, pp. 156-158). Four centers were established the 
following year in London, Dusseldorf, New York and Bangkok. 6The fact that 
MITI used the changed circumstances in the camera industry to its advantage 
and was not forthright about its plans indicated the relative weight of the 
camera industry in Japanýs industrial policy for export promotion. Akio 
Miyabayashi commented in 1963 (p. 6), "The Japanese camera industry is the 
prime example of success in turning out a precision, quality product for the 
world market. It remains for other industries to do likewise in order for Japan 
to meet her foreign exchange requirements. " MITI's new centers probably 
reflected its attempt to repeat what the camera industry had done so well, i. e. 
providing industry-wide information and service for export goods expressly 
for the purpose of expanding world market shares. 
From a financial viewpoint, it was surely more cost effective for MITI to 
finance four regional centers than to provide subsidies (through the banana 
and bicycle racing funds) to numerous, individual centers run by industry 
associations. Fewer centers also meant more control for MITI, and control was 
what MITI wanted in the early 1960s, when the government continued to lose 
6 The diversity of the European markets is illustrated by the establishment of two Light 
Machinery Centers there, one in London and the other in Dusseldorf. But it may have been 
influenced by the fact that the JCIA and MITI financed surveys of the European markets in 
1959 (costing them Y5 million or $14 thousand each) to investigate the prospects for export 
promotion of cameras and lenses based in those cities (JCII, 1984, p. 149). 
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power to e. g. allocate imports, approve technology imports and joint ventures 
with foreign firms due to the process of trade and capital liberalization 
(Tsuruta, 1988, pp. 54-55). Maintaining control over the exporters became 
more important than export promotion which was what had allowed firms, 
such as Canon and Ricoh, to expand so quickly (see appendix 4a). It can be 
surmised that MITI needed the camera industry's credibility more than the 
industry needed MITI's funds to continue the services provided by the New 
York center. According to Moriyama OCII, 1984, pp. 150-151), "there left 
absolutely no room for doubt about the true influence of the global Japanese 
camera industry. " 
By 1960, Japanese camera/lens manufacturers were dependent on the 
US market for over 40 percent of their total sales in value terms (see table 4.2). 
This meant that they were vulnerable to fluctuations in US demand and to US 
political moods. In the early 1960s, for example, domestic pressures in the US 
led to restrictions on the sale of foreign goods in PXs and caused a sharp 
decline from $3.9 million to $1.3 million between 1960 and 1961 in Japanese 
camera sales (DoC, 1962, p. 2). 7 The Vietnam War and the new influx of US 
troops however raised purchases at PXs again such that by 1966 over 10 
percent of total Japanese camera exports went to Vietnam OCII, 1984, table on 
p. 190). A peak was reached the following year at 19.4 percent. Like the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War had a positive effect on Japanese camera/lens 
sales to US forces stationed in East Asia. Concern among Japanese firms over 
excessive dependence on exports to the US market and on sales through US 
PXs was high. By 1959, many of them turned their attention to Europe OCII, 
1984, p. 133) as discussed in more detail below. First, however, Japan's 
domestic market situation is discussed. 
7 The figures quoted here (DoC, 1962, p. 2) do not match what is listed in Table 4 (p. 5) of the 
same document which shows $3.1 million and $1.5 million respectively. 
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Because camera and lens exports were an integral part of Japan's economic 
recovery based on export promotion, domestic demand was stifled 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s by relatively high excise taxes on cameras and 
sensitized materials (see table 4.3). Prior to the end of WWII, the excise taxes 
on these goods were raised to 120 percent to discourage all unnecessary 
civilian purchases. This message was echoed by GHQ policy until Japan's 
economic recovery became a priority after 1948. Excise taxes were lowered 
then to 80 percent for still and motion picture cameras and 50 percent for 
sensitized materials (i. e. film and paper). In 1950 and again in 1951, the excise 
on cameras was lowered but only to 60 and then 40 percent while the excise on 
sensitized materials dropped to 30 percent. 
Kinji Moriyama was a Japanese politician who took part in what was 
called 'camera mania' in the early 1950s, that is, the growing popularity 
among Japanese of cameras and photography in general. 8 He became aware 
that one of the problems causing sluggish sales of cameras/lenses - 
especially higher-quality cameras/lenses - in the Japanese market was high 
excise taxes. Six months after Moriyama began to look into the problem (in 
1953), the excise on cameras was lowered to 30 percent, bringing it to the same 
level as the excise on sensitized materials OCII, 1984, pp. 28-30). The next 
reduction did not come until 1962 when the excise tax on cameras was 
lowered to 20 percent. Domestic shipments of still cameras (i. e. all types of 
cameras except for motion picture cameras) rose quickly thereafter (see graph 
4.1). The excise on black and white sensitized materials dropped to 10 percent 
in 1962 while it remained at 20 percent on color film (see below). 
As described above, Japanese camera/lenses exporters became heavily 
dependent on the US market for a large portion of their sales. Domestic sales 
8 Moriyama was a member of the Progressive Party Uiyu-to) until 1955 when the party became 
part of the newly-formed Liberal Democratic Party. 
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Table 4.3 Japan`s Excise Taxes on Photographic Goods, 1937-1966' 
(percent) 
----------------------- 
Date ofReduction 
------------------------ 
Cameras b 
--------------------------------- 
B&W 
----------------- 
Color 
or Increase Film & Paper' Film & Paper d 
------------------- 
August 1937 
--------------------- 
20 
--------------------------------- 
20 
------------------- 
20 
March 1938 15 15 15 
March 1940 20 20 20 
November 1941 50 50 50 
January 1943 80 80 80 
February 1944 120 120 120 
September 1946 100 100 100 
January 1947 100 80 80 
September 1948 80 50 50 
January 1950 60 50 50 
January 1951 40 30 30 
June 1953 30 30 30 
April 1962 20 10 20 
April 1966 15 15 15 
------------- - ---- -- 
Notes: 
------ - --- - -- - ------------- --- --------- - --- - ---- 
'All cxcise taxes were abolished in February 1989. 
------ - ----------- 
b Includes still and motion picture cameras. 
'Includes cine film. 
d In 1962, includes all types of dry plates, sheet film and sensitized 
paper. Color print paper carried a 25 percent tax. 
Sources: JCII (1984) Sekai no Nihon Kamera, Tokyo, JCII, pp. 557-579; JCIA (1987) Nihon 
Kamera Kogyo-shi, Tokyo, JCIA, pp. 292-314; G. Lewis (199 1) The History ofthe Japanese 
Camera, Tokyo/Rochester, NY, JCII & IMP/GEH, p. 5 8; JCIA (1994) Nihon Kamera 
Kogyo 10-nen no Ayumi, 1984-1993, Tokyo, JCIA, p. 36. 
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remained somewhat limited due to the high excise taxes., and as discussed in 
chapter three, there were many small firms that did not export and filled the 
demand in Japan for inexpensive cameras. In the early 1950s, the most popular 
cameras were the folding camera and the twin-lens reflex camera. Folding 
cameras were popular in Japan because they were inexpensive; the expensive 
models, such as the rangefinder and single-lens reflex (SLR) models, were sold 
mainly in the PXs. At that time, the more expensive folding cameras with 
rangefinders cost roughly Y20,000 ($56) while 35 nun rangefinder cameras cost 
more than three times that amount, from roughly Y50,000 to Y70,000 ($139 to 
$194) (Camerart, February 1990). Most Japanese twin-lens reflex cameras were 
imitations of the popular German Rolleiflex, and very few were exported. 
Japanese camera/lens exporters worked hard to improve the quality and 
technological level of their products and to create original designs, but the 
higher-priced cameras (mostly 35mm cameras) did not sell well domestically 
until the excise taxes were lowered in the early 1960s. Cheaper cameras were 
widely available on the Japanese market throughout the 1950s and they 
satisfied local demand. 
Quantitative restrictions on the import of cameras, black and white 
film, sensitized paper and photographic plates also limited the selection of 
goods for amateur and professional photographers in Japan (DoC, 1962, p. 2). 
Some of the quantitative restrictions were lifted in 1961 (i. e. on cameras, 
projectors and other photographic equipment except 16 mm movie projectors), 
and sensitized materials (i. e. film and paper) quotas were lifted the following 
year. Color film remained under quota until 1971 (see chapter five for details). 
Once the excise tax was lifted, sales of imported cameras showed a marked 
increase (DoC, 1962). Fiscal year 1962 statistics indicate that the domestic 
market expanded faster than the export market (at 40 vs. 30 percent) during 
1961 and the trend continued until 1965 when exports grew faster than 
domestic sales OCII, 1984, p. 124) (see also graph 4.1). The lack of a thriving 
domestic market for 35 mm cameras prior to 1961 and the inherent danger of 
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the leading photography firms (i. e. the exporting photography firms) relying 
too heavily on export sales surely helped Moriyama in his efforts to lower 
excise taxes. 
Leading exporters (e. g. Canon, Konica, Minolta, Nikon and Olympus) 
produced cameras/lenses far more cheaply than their West German 
competitors, and expanded their world market shares throughout the 1960s by 
introducing new, innovative products at affordable prices. Olympus 
introduced their popular half-frame Pen camera in 1959 at price of V6,800 (ca. 
$19) which used half as much film as a regular 35mm camera (see chapter one) 
and enjoyed tremendous popularity in Japan throughout the 1960s. 
Canon introduced its mid-priced Canonet, produced at high volumes 
and low cost (sales price: 19,800 yen or $55), in 1961. Canon was criticized by 
the other 43 JCIA member firms because the Canonet's retail price "was in 
violation of the manufacturers' agreement to fix prices industry wide" which 
had gone in effect in October 1959 (Lewis, 1991, pp. 104-105,108). Competition 
among the JCIA member firms intensified throughout the 1950s such that 
between 1957 and 1961 ten firms declared bankruptcy. Part of the problem 
was an incessant proliferation of new camera models and aggressive retail 
price cuts. In addition to fixing prices, the 44 firms agreed to bi-annual 
product introductions at the Japan Camera Shows beginning in March 1960 
(Lewis, 1991, pp. 104-105). 
The Canonet was technologically superior to any other Japanese camera 
at that time, and Amateur Photographer (October 26,1960, p. 631) called it "one 
of the most ambitious" cameras introduced at the 1960 Photokina Show (i. e. it 
was not introduced at the Japan Camera Show). According to Miyabayashi 
(1963, p. 44), Canon agreed to cooperate with the other JCIA member 
companies by withholding the camera from the Japanese market for six 
months while the other firms caught up. On January 24,1961, the day the 
camera was introduced at Mitsukoshi Department Store in Tokyo, all 300 units 
sold within 30 minutes OCII, 1984, p. 123). 
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Domestic competition among the photography firms intensified again 
after 1960. In preparation for the Tokyo Olympics, every manufacturer 
increased capacity to its maximum limit encouraged by the government's high 
speed growth policy (Tsuruta, 1988). The volume and value of still camera 
production and sales reached a peak that year (see graphs 4.1 and 4.2). Firms 
aimed to satisfy domestic demand as well as tax-free sales to tourists during 
the Olympics, held near Yoyogi Park in Tokyo OCII, 1984). To promote 
Japanese camera and film sales and provide film processing and camera repair 
services, the JCIA set up a camera center in the Yoyogi Olympic Village 
(Camerart, Marclý 1989). To ensure that only top-quality (and high-priced) 
cameras and lenses were sold to the tourists who visited Japan for the 
Olympics, all tax-free photographic goods (i. e. cameras and lenses) had to pass 
JCII inspection as if they were regular exports. Due to the very high volumes 
sold, the JCII, which charged a one percent fee for every exported or tax-free 
item, was able to increase its financial base significantly from that year 
forward. 
After the Olympics, the Japanese economy entered a mild recession, 
and a price war among the camera manufacturers ensued. The top firms 
realized that they might soon lose market share to smaller firms, such as Asahi 
Optical manufacturer of the Pentax Spotmatic which was one of the most 
popular SLR cameras of the day (Lothrop and Schneider, 1994, p. 64). Asahi 
Optical did not enter camera manufacturing until 1952, but it is one of the 
oldest manufacturers of high quality optics and prior to making cameras was a 
long-time supplier to leading firms including Konica and Minolta (Condax, et 
al, 1984. p. 12). 
The solution to the problem of over-capacity in the photography 
industry was to form a recession cartel with the JCIA member companies. 
Since most industries had expanded rapidly in the early 1960s due to the 
government's high-speed growth policy, these cartels were not particularly 
unusual (Tashima, 1965). Yutaka Kosai (1988, p. 47, note 33) found that in 
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machinery industries, including the photography industry, 14 recession cartels 
were approved by MITI in 1963 and another 14 in 1964. This compares to only 
six cartels in 1962 and nine in 1965. Under the leadership of Canon's Mitarai, 
the heads of the top firms of the JCIA met over lunch to discuss the cartel issue 
OCII, 1984, pp. 165-167). Although the industry was rather large, in 1961, the 
top five firms (of a total of 37 JCIA member companies) controlled 52.5 percent 
of total production (Miyabayashi, 1963, pp. 43-44). The leading firms decided 
to apply for permission from MITI to set up a temporary recession cartel for 
six months at first beginning in April 1965. MITI decided that since the firms 
had engaged in tough price competition, or 'excess competition, ' a recession 
cartel was warranted for 35 nun camera production. The Japan Fair Trade 
Commission GFTC) approved a six-month extension of the cartel until March 
1966 when it folded (Camerart, March 1989; Tashima, 1965). 
The 12 members of the cartel (i. e. Asahi Optical, Canon, Fuji Photo Film, 
Konica, Mamiya, Minolta, Nikon, Olympus, Petri Camera, Ricoh, Tokyo 
Optical, and Yashica) controlled 80 percent of total Japanese camera 
production in 1965. They agreed to control retail prices and limit their 
production of 35 nun cameras to a total of 1,462,665 units which meant a 
reduction in total production by 20 percent OCII, 1984, p. 167; Miyabayashi, 
1963, p. 127). The production break down was as follows: focal plane shutter 
cameras (including SLRs): 273,607 units; lens shutter cameras: 549,048 units; 
and half-frame cameras: 640,010 units. Firms were protected from excessive 
price gouging and the meager demand that did exist in Japan was satisfied by 
warehouse stock rather than by popular, new products. Market leaders 
retained their places at the top while smaller firms suffered. Although the 
cartel hindered, for example, Asahi Optical's chances of gaining a larger share 
of the market and perhaps becoming one of Japan's largest volume 
camera/lens producers, the firm was still very successful and had already 
joined the top five firms (Focal Encyclopedia, 1978, p. 803). 9 
9 This information is also based on interviews with industry specialists, Spring 1996. 
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Other solutions to overcapacity were to expand export markets, 
particularly exports to the 'new' markets in Europe, to diversify production, 
cut production of unprofitable goods, reduce firm spending and cut the share 
of domestic market in total production. Many firms pursued all of these 
strategies. The general decline in dependence on domestic sales can be seen in 
graphs 4.1 and 4.2, and this trend has continued up to the present day (see 
chapter five). Exporting firms depended heavily on the US market, but with 
the help of the JCIA and the JCII they turned their attention toward European 
markets. 
Beating the West Germans in European Markets 
Japan's postwar export promotion of cameras and lenses began with indirect 
exports through the PXs and continued with direct exports to the US market. 
According to Kinji Moriyama, by 1960, the Japanese photography firms had 
essentially destroyed their competition (Yayama and Ito, 1988, p. 334). This 
was true in the US market in the 1950s, and the photography firms turned to 
Europe to do the same through export promotion during the 1960s. A report 
prepared for the US Department of Commerce Business and Defense Services 
Administration in 1962 (p. 1) commented that "[t]he [Japanese] camera 
industry, which has devoted the major proportion of its export sales 
promotional activities to the United States, now plans a considerable 
expansion elsewhere, particularly in Europe. " In 1964, Japan's camera and lens 
exports were nearly evenly divided among the US, Europe and the rest of the 
world (Tashima, 1965, p. 25), but by 1973, roughly 80 percent were exported to 
the US and. Europe OCII, 1984, p. 301) and the volume of total exports had 
grown substantially. 
Japanese camera/lens exporters faced three major problems in 
European markets throughout the 1960s: trade barriers, lack of brand 
recognition and the logistical challenge of distribution. The first was primarily 
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addressed via goverru-nent channels and the other two mainly by the firms 
with the help of the various industry associations. The JCII and the JCIA 
developed and expanded their international standards setting activities and 
public relations campaigns, and in so doing helped the photography firms 
develop a positive image for their products in Europe OCIA, 1987; JCII, 1984). 
Firms focused on building market share by establishing strong distribution 
networks, and over time raised consumer awareness of Japanese brands which 
in the early 1960s were seldom seen in European markets (Amateur 
Photographer, November 2,1960, p. 658). just as in the US in the 1950s, 
government-industry cooperation was essential in making export promotion 
work in Europe. 
Throughout most of the decade, opposition to imports of Japanese 
cameras and lenses was slow to relax in European markets, especially in the 
West German market (cf. JCIA, 1987; JCII, 1991). In the late 1950s, for example, 
Japanese goods sold for the same prices as other photographic goods in West 
Germany despite the disparities in quality and actual production cost. 
According to Seki, et al (1961, p. 89), a Leica I cost three times as much as a 
Canon Popular in Japan priced at about V150,000 or $417. But, a middle-range 
Canonet, priced at approximately Y20,000 or $56 in Japan, cost almost as much 
as a top-of-the-line Leica HIG in West Germany. Japanese goods were 
eventually successful as prices dropped and markets gradually opened. 
European markets were not as open to Japanese cameras and lenses as the US 
had been. 
Working in the Japanese industry's favor was the West German 
government's policy of full employment. Because the number of people 
employed in the photography business increased throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, the West German government showed little concern for the fact that 
only a very few manufacturers were able to survive the competition from the 
Japanese firms OCII, 1991, pp. 7-10). Most new West German jobs came in 
distribution (of Japanese cameras/lenses) and in photofinishing as 
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photography became more affordable to a larger proportion of the population. 
As long as people were employed, West German goverrunent officials showed 
little concern about the manufacturing side of the industry. 
Competition in cameras/lenses was not as keen between the US and 
Japan as they were between West Germany and Japan. West German-Japan 
bilateral trade was tense because Japanese companies concentrated their 
efforts on the 35 mm format, particularly on SLR cameras and interchangeable 
lenses which competed directly with West German goods. American and 
Japanese firms mainly competed in different goods and the US market was 
opened wide to Japanese camera/lens exporters (see above). Furthermore, in 
the early 1960s, Japan was the second largest market for US photographic 
products (DoC, 1964, p. 9, table 4). Kodak, the largest American photographic 
firm, dominated global film sales by periodically coming out with new film 
formats mainly to boost sales (see chapter three). The US government only 
became concerned with the Japanese photography industry on the issue of 
photographic film in the 1990s because American exports of photographic 
goods to Japan did not flourish from the 1970s onwards (see chapter five). This 
is why film, but not cameras/lenses, became a target of US-Japan trade talks. 
The Japanese photography industry was no exception to the common 
pattern pursued by Japanese exporters of flooding of international markets 
with goods (cf. Dore, 1986; Fruin, 1992). Targeting specific markets with a few 
particular export items has been called 'laser beam exporting' (cf. Lincoln, 
1990). In the 1960s, the flood of Japanese camera/lens imports was likened in 
the European press to the invasion of Ghenghis Khan (Lewis, 1991, p. 136). As 
noted above, Japanese cameras and lenses competed with West German 
production in the US market and then in European markets. In the early 1960s, 
Japanese photography firms expanded production capacity which caused 
problems at home (see above) and would have caused further headaches if 
export volumes to European markets had not risen. This allowed many 
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exporters to achieve econon-des of scale without making serious cut backs in 
production (see graphs 4.1 and 4.2). 
Reductions in import quotas and tariffs in the European markets came 
thanks to growing pressure from the US for 'free trade' among industrialized 
nations. This played a significant role in the success of Japan's export 
promotion to Europe OCIA, 1987). International trading arrangements 
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) brought 
pressure to bear on European nations as well as on Japan to open their 
markets to international trade, but Japan found it easier to delay opening its 
market because of US foreign policy. American military security objectives 
took priority over economic and trade issues from the end of WWII until 
roughly the 1980s. Since Japan was one of America's key allies in the Pacific, 
Japan's compliance with the GATT, among others, was allowed to move 
forward comparatively slowly (cf. Tsuru, 1996). 
In Europe, Japanese camera and lens makers sold high-quality goods at 
comparatively low prices due to a favorable exchange rate and to mass 
production techniques. This led to accusations of dumping in European 
markets OCII, 1984; Tashima, 1965). At the initiative of the Japanese 
government, a series of trilateral (US-West Germany-Japan) talks began in the 
late 1960s about the direction the global photography industry should take. 
Eventually, the talks led to reassurances from Japanese firms that they would 
not enter into cut-throat competition with the German firms and in exchange, 
the German market was gradually opened to imports of Japanese 
cameras/lenses OCIA, 1987). But, it was already too late for many of the West 
German firms; the price and consumption trends that had been set early in the 
decade continued unabated. According to the JCII, the talks did help break 
down some of the misperceptions that had grown on both the Japanese and 
the West German sides, and it helped build trust among the governments and 
the firms. 
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In developing closer relations, specific Japanese personalities began to 
emerge as leaders in what soon became the global photography industry. Kinji 
Moriyama, president of the JCII and member of the Japanese Diet, participated 
actively in the trilateral talks and subsequently became known in the US and 
Europe as 'Mr. Japanese Camera' (Yayama and Ito, 1988, pp. 335-336). In 
Japan, he was called 'camera Moriyama' (kamera no Moriyama) for his 
enthusiasm about the photography industry. Because of his active engagement 
in the industry, Moriyama received numerous commendations and awards 
including the prestigious Photokina pin in 1972 OCII, 1984, pp. 506-507,510). 10 
Four years later, he was named to the Photo Marketing Association's (PMA) 
Hall of Fame. Several Japanese industrialists also developed international 
reputations for their efforts to advance the photography industry. Dr. Takeshi 
Mitarai, the founder and president of Canon was awarded the Photokina pin 
in 1970. He was the first Japanese industrialist to be recognized by Photokina, 
a predominantly German institution, and this stood in sharp contrast to 
Mitarai's experience at the fourth Photokina Show in 1954. Then, Canon (with 
Mitarai at the helm) which was the first Japanese firm to participate in the 
trade show was forced to exhibit its cameras and lenses in a remote corner of 
the exhibition hall. " Kazuo Tashima, president of Minolta, was the second 
Japanese industrialist to receive the Photokina pin in 1974. Both Mitarai and 
Tashima were named to the PMA Hall of Fame in 1981 and 1983 respectively. 
Japanese cameras and lenses began to make an impact in the West 
German market in 1959 reaching 11 percent of total imports (from negligible 
levels earlier in the decade) and attaining more than a 22 percent share by 1967 
(see table 4.4). 12 The Swiss share of the West German market dropped over the 
1956 to 1968 period from 26.5 to 4.1 percent, most likely because of the overall 
expansion of the market, especially in sales of low-cost cameras/lenses rather 
10 Photokina is the bi-annual international photography exhibition held in Cologne since 1950. 
11 Information based on interviews with JCII officials, Spring 1996. 
12 The West German import and export figures for 1968 indicate total imports of photographic 
equipment and supplies. 
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than the higher-cost Swiss products. The rise of the UK's market share in West 
Germany, from 8.2 to 23.2 percent over the same period, may have been due to 
a greater demand for lower-cost goods produced there (mainly by Kodak) or 
perhaps due to demand for Japanese goods distributed from the UK into the 
West German market. 
In 1968, the largest share of West German imports from Japan was 
taken by motion picture cameras (DM 15.3 million or $3.8 million), with still 
cameras and photographic lenses performing well at roughly DM 12 million 
($3 million) each (DoC, 1968, p. 12). The seven fold increase in the total value 
of West German imports between 1959 and 1967 and the 20 fold increase over 
the entire 1956 to 1968 period indicates how open the West German market 
had become, not only for Japanese goods. 
In contrast, West German still camera exports to Japan faced an 
increasingly tough climate from the mid-1950s. The market liberalization in 
Europe was not reciprocated by Japan until the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Between 1954 and 1959, West German camera exports to Japan fell from DM 
11.9 million ($3 million) to DM 544 thousand ($136 thousand) (see table 4.5). 
By 1968, the industry recovered slightly to DM 1.7 million ($425 thousand). If 
exports to Japan of photographic lenses are included in the 1968 figures, the 
total was DM 3.2 million ($800 thousand) or almost twice that of still cameras 
alone (DoC, 1968, p. 7). Thus, the demand for high-quality West German 
photographic lenses remained stronger than demand for West German still 
cameras. Worldwide, West German still camera exports increased by 20 
percent over the 1954 to 1959 period, but a decreasing share went to Japan. But 
by 1968, the situation in West German photography industry had worsened 
such that total exports fell back to the levels of the previous decade. 
Total unit production of Japanese still cameras surpassed West German 
production in 1962 at 3.1 million vs. 2.6 million units. By 1974, Japan's 
production reached nearly twice (1.75 fold) the West German levels at 6.6 
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million vs. 3.9 million units. 13 Japan's total exports of still cameras exceeded 
West Germany's in 1967 at 2.3 million units, and by 1974, the Japanese still 
camera exports more than doubled to 4.8 million units while the West German 
total was 3.1 million units. US exports of still cameras fluctuated over the 1964 
to 1994 period close to the levels of West German exports. Value figures for 
Japan, West Germany and the US from 1964 to 1994 shown in graphs 4.3 and 
4.4 indicate the same trends as unit production. 
Part of the challenge that the Japanese photography firms faced 
overseas was that they were viewed as a collective, that is as the Japanese 
industry. Evidence of this is the American Society of Magazine Photographers 
Memorial Award presented on May 3,1961 to "The Japanese Camera Industry 
for their constant cooperation with professional photographers to improve the 
instruments with which we work, and the high professional standards 
attained by them, which have benefited the whole field of photography. " OCII, 
1984, p. 150. ) According to the JCII, this recognition of the contribution of 
Japanese firms to the advancement of the photography industry was helpful in 
lowering some of the protectionist barriers against Japanese cameras and 
lenses in Europe, but as discussed above much was left to be done. 
Japanese firms would not have been able to supply affordable goods 
that European consumers wanted if they had not invested in new 
manufacturing equipment, improved their mass production techniques, and 
applied new materials and technologies. The West German photography 
industry faced two problems by the late 1960s: labor shortages and wage 
increases (DoC, 1968). The former meant that capacity increases were difficult 
to bring about without increased mechanization, and the latter meant an 
increase in the price of goods. In contrast, Japanese firms invested heavily in ct, 
plant and equipment based on a five-year plan starting in 1955. According to 
Miyabayashi (1963, pp. 44-47), a JCIA survey of 40 member companies in 1956 
13 For the 1962,1967 and 1991 figures see JCIL 1991, p. 4; and for the 1974 figures see 
"Germany and Japan 1975, " 1976, p. 25. 
The Heyday of Export Promotion 
col 
ei 
N. 
u 
Too t 
E661 
Z661 
1661 
-0661 
- 6861 
8861 
L861 
-9861 
- 5861 
V861 
E861 
Z861 
1861 
0861 
6L61 
8L61 
LL61 
9L61 
5L61 
VL61 
EL61 
ZL61 
IL61 
OL61 
6961 
L961 
9961 
5961 
L-4 V961 
wl r14 W) eq In In In en C4 eq eq C4 
rL 
u 
o 
to) 
.iu 
00 
cy, 
91 
z 
0 CA 
126 
U3A UOIII! W 
The Heyday of Export Promotion 
cl 
u 
V661 
E661 
Z661 
1661 
-0661 
- 6861 
8861 
L861 
9861 
5861 
V861 
1861 
Z861 
1861 
0861 
6L61 
8L61 
LL61 
9L61 
5L61 
VL61 
EL61 
ZL61 
IL61 
OL61 
6961 
8961 
L961 
9961 
5961 
V961 
G5 
-0 P, 
W 
rA 
127 
§ gcý ýýýeýýeýýýý cr C> 0808 CD 0802? C> 
rA r4 
f4 00 
U3A uollllly 
The Heyday of Export Promotion 128 
revealed plans to purchase a total of 4,347 domestic or foreign-made machine 
tools (e. g. automatic lathes, drilling machines, milling machines and gear 
cutters) over the 1956 to 1960 period. By March 1961, the plan had been carried 
out. It was part of a manufacturing industry-wide plan to replace obsolete or 
obsolescent machine tools which at 10,105 machines accounted for roughly 
two-thirds of all precision equipment according to a 1958 MITI survey. The 
concrete results of the new investment for the photography industry was that 
it allowed firms to shift from manual to automatic lens machining, to employ 
specialized machines for camera body making, and to raise precision levels of 
finished products through improved inspection methods. 14 
Modern production facilities in Japanese photography factories allowed 
firms to cut their production costs (Tashima, 1963). Using 1952 as the base year 
(1952=100) of an index of average production costs in Japan, costs fell to 95.3 
in 1955 and continued downward to 68.5 in 1960 (Miyabayashi, 1963, p. 81). 
Retail prices of cameras plummeted to 65 in 1960 (1955=100) and relative to 
other consumer durables, only televisions experienced a more dramatic retail 
price drop (see appendix 4b). At the same time, West German wages rose by 
20 percent and prices increased by roughly 10 percent (Miyabayashi, 1963, pp. 
127; 129). West German prices were affected by the relatively large share of 
labor costs which reached roughly 35 percent of total production costs by the 
end of the 1960s (DoC, 1968, p. 3). 
Although cooperation with the government, the JCII and the JCIA for 
camera/lens export promotion was important, it was not the only reason for 
the success of the Japanese photography firms in Europe. Firms also needed to 
establish their own reputations by differentiating their products. To do this, 
they developed effective marketing and distribution channels, pursuing a 
formula of one sales agent per country (iciii kuni icId eejento Izoshiki) (Takahashi, 
1963, p. 14; Tashima, 1965, p. 26). This is particularly notable in Europe where 
14 See Cohen (1949, pp. 201-208) on the state of Japan's machine tool industry during WWII 
and on the usability of the existing machine tools by 1949. 
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each leading Japanese exporter has one sales agent in nearly each country (see 
appendix 4c). 
Unlike many Japanese industries, the camera/lens firms did not rely 
heavily on general trading companies (sogo slioslia) for building overseas 
markets. Most trading companies had no experience with selling cameras or 
the other optical goods produced by the photography firms (e. g. microscopes, 
telescopes and optical measuring instruments), and therefore had no idea how 
to go about developing export markets for them. 's Today, only a four 
photography firms are core members of horizontal keiretsu groups (i. e. Asahi 
Optical in Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Canon in Fuyo, Kyocera in Sanwa, and Nikon in 
Mitsubishi) (Gerlach, 1992). Three are members of more than one horizontal 
keiretsu group (i. e. Konica with Mitsubishi and Sanwa, Minolta with Mitsui, 
Sanwa and Sumitomo, and Olympus with Fuyo, Sanwa and Sumitomo) and 
one apparently has diffuse ties to one keiretsu group (e. g. Fuji Photo Film with 
Mitsui) (cf. Wilkie, Farr and Gallagher, 1995). 
The keiretsu group can be important since firms often rely on skill and 
experience of the trading company in the keiretsu to help with overseas 
markets. However, in the early 1950s, when the photography firms began to 
export directly to the US market, keiretsu groups did not exist or were in the 
early stages of reorganization. The GHQ deconcentration program run by 
American'New Dealers, 'who were against the power of big business, broke 
up Japan's prewar zaibatsu concerns because they believed that these family- 
run holding companies had controlled most. of the Japanese wartime economy 
and had willingly cooperated with the military (Nakamura, 1981; Tsuru, 1996). 
It was not until after the Occupation ended in 1952 that the horizontal keiretsu 
were organized as the successors to the zaibatsit but without the family ties or 
the holding companies. Keiretsu groups usually have one main bank, one 
trading company and one insurance company at their core (cf. Gerlach, 1992). 
Since the camera/lens manufacturers did not rely on trading companies, it 
Is Information based on interviews with industrialists, Spring 1996. 
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was essential that each firm learn about local market conditions by 
establishing an agent to handle their trade in each country (Takahashi, 1963). 
In the US, many of the photography firms set up manufacturing and/or 
distribution arrangements with Japanese firms in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Argus tied up with Mamiya, Ansco with Minolta, Kodak with Chinon, 
and Sears Roebuck with Asahi Optical at first and later with Mamiya 
(Miyabayashi, 1963, p. 116). The Japanese cameras were supplied on an 
original equipment manufacturer basis, because it was cheaper for the US 
firms than trying to keep up with their Japanese competitors. A similar 
situation emerged in West Germany where many photography firms admitted 
that competition from their Japanese rivals was cutting into their market 
shares and their profits in the early 1960s. As a consequence, some Japanese 
and West German firms developed technical tie-ups and production 
agreements. 
In 1974, Zeiss and Yashica set up an arrangement in which Yashica 
manufactured the camera body for the Contax RTS and Zeiss made the lenses 
(Lewis, 1991, pp. 134; 146). When Zeiss closed its Brauschweig (West 
Germany) factory in 1972, the firm exited from the consumer camera business. 
The firm claimed that the strong Deutsch mark was why they decided to close 
the plant, but the real reason, according to Lewis (1991), was the success of the 
Japanese cameras and lenses. Yashica was absorbed into Kyocera in 1983, and 
today, Kyocera/Yashica continue to manufacture Contax cameras outfitted 
with Zeiss lenses. 
In 1972, Ernst Leitz approached Minolta to discuss a cooperative 
production arrangement involving licensing and patents, not capital or stock, 
for their Leica cameras. 16 According to Miyabayashi, Minolta was thrilled at Ck 
the proposal, but it took over six months for Minolta to modernize the 
proposed Leitz-Minolta CL camera to make it profitable to manufacture. Leitz 
16Personal communication from Akio Miyabayashi, Senior Corporate Advisor, Minolta Corp., 
29 June 1998. 
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had drawn up the camera specifications for hand-made production, but 
Minolta used an automatic conveyor-belt system. Technologically, there was 
no difference l5etween the Leica and the Minolta lenses outfitted for the 
camera, but the price of the Minolta was less than half of the Leica lens. The 
Leitz family sold the company to a Swiss firm and changed production 
strategy to manufacture only their Leica M line of cameras in Canada and 
Portugal. Many other camera models were supplied by Minolta (among 
others) on an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) basis. Leitz sold the 
Minolta OEM cameras after minor modifications and with their own lenses for 
two to three times the price of Minolta's own models. 
By the end of the 1960s, Japanese firms dominated the 35 mrn camera 
market which had traditionally been the West German preserve (see chapter 
three), and they concentrated on the SLR format. 17 In the early 1960s, lens 
shutter (LS) cameras rose in the popularity over focal plane (FP) shutter 
cameras, although SLR cameras (of the focal plane shutter type) saw 
considerable growth (see appendix 4d). In 1960, the value of LS camera 
production in Japan reached $18.8 n-dllion and grew by 40 percent (to $26 
million) the following year. Production of FP shutter cameras slipped by 
roughly 50 percent over the same period. However, SLR camera production 
expanded by over 35 percent between 1960 and 1961 (from $7.6 million, to 
$10.3 million) and became the camera of choice among hobbyists by 1970 
(DoC, 1962, p. 4). Japan's strength in SLRs and their rise in popularity due to 
reductions in production cost helped the Japanese exporters gain control of 
European markets. 
The editors of Camerart (April 1990, p. 25) characterize the 1960 to 1975 
period as one of 'development' because. technological advances meant that 
cameras became more high tech. Electronics minimized the number of 
accessories, decreased weight, improved focusing performance and shutter 
17 Kodak's West German subsidiary, specialized in 35mm camera production, was also 
affected by the Japanese competition (Focal Encyclopedia, 1978). 
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speeds and cut production costs (Tashima, 1963). New materials made it 
possible to achieve faster, more accurate timing between the light meter, flash 
and shutter, to improve the clarity of optical glass and to reduce the weight. 
Computers were used in optical design to minimize production time and to 
achieve consistent quality (Boon, 1970). An important effect of camera 
automation was that it improved the performance of photographic film 
through, e. g. metering systems that measured how much light hit the film 
surface. With better film performance, more photographs were taken and 
more film was processed (see chapter five). 
Conclusion 
Exports of Japanese cameras and lenses went to the US market first through 
the military PXs and later through 'regular' channels. Because of conditions 
described in chapter three, the US market was wide open to Japanese cameras 
and lenses, and Japanese exports expanded at a rapid rate throughout the 
1950s. Japanese camera/lens firms repeated this performance by expanding 
exports to European markets during the following decade. Cooperation 
among the Japanese camera/lens exporters was vital in developing the US and 
then the European markets, and they did this with the help of the JCIA, the 
JCII, Kinji Moriyama and MITI. 
I 
In the US, the New York camera center actively aided all Japanese 
exporters with market research, service and distribution. Similar camera 
centers were planned for Europe in the early 1960s to help develop export 
markets there. Instead, in 1963, MITI created four Light Machinery Centers in 
New York, London, Dusseldorf and Bangkok for all Japanese exporters of e. g. 
cameras/lenses, electronics and sewing machines. The marketing activities of 
the camera/lens exporters were absorbed into the new MITI controlled 
centers. As Japan pursued trade and capital liberalization in accordance with 
international norms, MITI lost its tight rein on Japan's industrial development. 
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This was an undesirable situation for MITI, so it developed new means of 
control over Japanese firms through, for example, the Light Machinery 
Centers. But by that time, the growing international success of the Japanese 
camera/lens exporters meant that they were beginning to become less 
dependent on cooperation with each other and with MITI. 
In Japan, the domestic market for high-quality cameras and lenses 
(which were being promoted as exports) remained small until the excise taxes 
were lowered in April 1962 thanks to the efforts of zoku politician Moriyama. 
Thereafter, domestic demand grew for higher-priced cameras and lenses and 
the variety of cameras for sale expanded. Many firms were forced out of 
business and domestic competition turned to cut-throat pricing. To bring the 
situation under control and to prevent more firms from gong bankrupt, the 
JCIA member companies agreed to price controls and to bi-annual product 
introductions. Problems of price competition appeared again after the 1964 
Tokyo Olympics due to overcapacity. This time, the leading JCIA member 
companies (mostly the exporting firms) formed a recession cartel to maintain 
retail prices and cut production by 20 percent. The cartel which was approved 
by MITI and the JFTC lasted one year. 
Most of the camera/lens exporters sought to increase their exports to 
Europe so as to avoid capacity reduction altogether. This came at the same 
time that trade and investment barriers were falling throughout Europe, 
making for greater market access than had been possible a decade earlier. 
(Barriers fell less quickly in Japan, especially for color photographic film 
which remained protected until 1971. See chapter five. ) Rising disposable 
incomes, the growth of leisure time and a favorable foreign exchange rate for 
the yen (unchanged since 1949) also contributed to the Japanese camera/lens 
exporters' success in European markets. Cameras and lenses produced by 
Japanese exporters appealed to European customers who wanted high quality 
but affordable cameras. Exports to Europe rose quickly and by the end of the 
1960s, Japanese firms controlled the global market for cameras and lenses. 
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Perceptions of the quality of Japanese cameras and lenses changed as 
the market for automated, mass-market products grew. The JCIl and the 
JMDC made a strong effort to raise product standards and assure consumers 
that all exported cameras and lenses had been tested and that all camera 
designs were original. Higher-tech, high-quality products such as compact 35 
mm SLRs with instant return mirrors and interchangeable lenses created new 
demand for Japanese cameras/lenses as firms differentiated their product 
lines (see appendix 4d). Consumers in the US and Europe purchased mass- 
market Japanese cameras/lenses that offered a similar range of options and 
quality as professional cameras/ lenses at much lower cost. 
West German firms were slow to realize that Japanese high-quality, 
reliable and yet inexpensive cameras and lenses had created a mass market for 
photography in the 1960s. Falling camera/lens prices due to process 
innovations in Japanese camera/lens manufacturing combined with rising 
disposable incomes in the US and Europe meant that photographs and 
picture-taking became a part of everyday life. The rise of photojournalism and 
magazines such as Life (US), Paris Matcli and Picture Post (UK) meant that 
photography touched more people's lives than ever before. The increased 
interest, awareness and accessibility of photography played an important part 
in the success of the Japanese camera/ lens manufacturers and their products. 
During the 1950 to 1973 period, Japanese camera/lens exporters out- 
performed American and West German firms in manufacturing, marketing 
and distribution. Japanese cameras and lenses began to set industry standards 
and test the limits of innovation and creativity. But, it took time before the 
image of shoddy Japanese workmanship was overcome in the US and Europe. 
Moriyama emerged as a key figure in the 1960's tri-lateral Japan-US-West 
Germany talks about the direction of the global photography industry. His 
efforts to break down misperceptions of Japanese cameras/lenses and to 
assure the Americans and West Germans that Japanese firms would not drive 
all competitors from the market earned him the name 'Mr. Japanese Camera! 
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Nonetheless, the battle for global dominance in cameras and lenses during the 
1960s ended with the Japanese firms ahead, where they have stayed ever 
since. (See appendix 4e for sales and profit figures for eleven Japanese 
camera/ lens manufacturers from 1966 to 1975. ) 
Japan's industrial policy of export promotion worked very well in the 
early years when cooperation among the camera/lens exporting firms was 
perceived as important for the success of the whole industry (i. e. all of the 
exporters). But it became increasingly less important by the early 1970s 
because Japanese camera/ lens firms led the global industry and rivalry among 
them intensified. P. B. Stone wrote in 1969 (p. 73) that "Japanese camera 
makers are in a position which is at once both embarrassing and funny to 
behold. They have cleaned up the world market and most of them simply 
don't know what to do next. " Japanese camera production reached a peak in 
the late 1970s, and Trevor Boon (1970, pp. 115-118) wrote for the Financial 
Times that once the Japanese camera firms reached maturity in the 1970s, 
production would move to countries (e. g. Hong Kong, East Germany and the 
Soviet Union) which could offer cheap versions of both simpler and slightly 
more advanced cameras. 
The indusiýy, they thought, would follow the pattern predicted by 
Raymond Vernon's (1966) product-cycle theory. Japanese firms would move 
production out of Japan to maintain cost advantage, and over time relinquish 
camera/lens manufacturing to other firms in favor of purchasing them on an 
OEM basis. The 'old' Japanese camera/lens firms would concentrate instead 
on developing higher-value added products. What happened instead was that 
Japanese camera/lens manufacturers diversified into other products with 
optics as their core technologies. The firms' advances in other areas (e. g. 44 
business machines, specialty cameras and optics) were continuously applied to 
camera/lens technologies. How and why this was done is the subject of 
chapter five. 
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Appendix 4b European Sales Offices Established by Japanese Photography Firms, 1961-1983 
---- --------------------- ------ --------------- - -- - -------- 
Year Est. Name of Office Country Other Functions 
1961 Nikon AG Switzerland 
1962 Asahi Optical Europe, N. V. Belgium Imports, Rep. Off ice 
Yashica Europe GmbH WG (Hamburg) Imports 
1963 Canon Optics S. A. Switzerland 
Olympus Optical Europe GmbH WG (Hamburg) 
1965 Minolta Camera Handelsges. mbH WG (Hamburg) Imports 
Minolta (Schweiz) GmbH Switzerland 
1966 Sankyo Europe Export & Import GmbH WG (Dusseldorf) 
1967 Fuji Photo Film (Europe) GmbH WG (Dusseldorf) 
Pentax Handelsgesellschaft mbH WG (Hamburg) 
1968 Canon Amsterdam B-V- Netherlands Imports, Rep. Office 
Nikon Europe B. V. Netherlands Imports, Rep. Office 
1969 Copal Europe GmbH* WG (Hamburg) 
Ricoh Nederland B. V. Netherlands Representative Office 
1970 Canon Svenska AB Sweden 
Elmo (Europe) GmbH WG (Dusseldorf) Representative Office 
1971 Yashica Handelsges. mbH Austria 
1972 Canon France S. A. France 
Canon Italy S. P. A. Italy 
Nikon GnbH WG (Dusseldorf) 
1973 Konishiroku Photo Ind. (Europe) GmbH WG (Hamburg) Representative Office 
Minolta Vertriebsges. mbH Austria 
1974 Chinon Vertriebsges. mbH Deutschland WG (Neurenberg) Representative Office 
Olympus Optical AB Sweden 
1975 Canon GmbH Austria 
Minolta France France 
Olympus Optical Co. (UK) Ltd. UK 
Yashica AG Switzerland 
1976 Canon UK Ltd. Camera Division UK 
Fuji mex Ltd. UK 
Olympus Optical Co., GmbH Wien Austria 
Olympus Nederland B. V- Netherlands 
Sankyo Seiki (Schweiz) AG Switzerland 
1977 Konishiroku Photo Ind. UK Branch UK 
1978 Minolta Nederland B. V. Netherlands 
Ricoh Deutschland GmbH WG (Frankfurt) 
1979 Nikon UK Ltd. UK 
Pentax UK Ltd. Pentax House UK 
Sigma Deutschland GmbH WG (Frankfurt) 
1980 Oy Canon Finland 
Dansk Fuji Film A/S Denmark 
Minolta UK Ltd. UK 
Yashica Svenska AB Sweden 
1981 Pentax France S. A. France 
1982 Minolta Svenska AB Sweden 
Pentax Svenska AB Sweden 
Pentax (Schweiz) AG Switzerland 
Tamron Vertriebsges, mbH WG (Frankfurt) Office with Sigma 
1983 Asahi Pentax Nederland B. V. Netherlands 
--- -- -- - ---------------------- - ------------- - ----------- - --------------------- - ------------------- - --- - ---- -- 
Source: JCII (1984) Sekai no Nihon Kamera (The Global Japanese Camera), Tokyo, JCII, pp. 438-440. 
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Appendix 4e 
Growth Indicies for Eleven Camera Manufacturers and Average Monthly Wages, 
Fiscal Years 1966-1975a (FY1966=100, thousands of yen) 
Aggregate Operating Working Owned Tangible Value Number A verage 
Sales Profit Capital Capital Fixed Added of Monthly 
(Loss) A SsetS b Employees Wagese 
--------- 
1966 
----------------------------- 
100.0 100.0 
-------------- 
100.0 
-------------- 
100.0 
------------- 
100.0 
------------- 
100.0 
-------------- 
100.0 
------------- 
55 
1967 120.9 168.5 109.3 116.4 111.4 122.2 100.7 65 
1968 147.5 219.4 124.6 137.9 125.0 149.0 105.4 76 
1969 202.4 348.1 164.4 180.2 160.3 201.4 111.5 90 
1970 251.2 419.0 212.4 252.3 204.6 246.3 116.0 108 
1971 267.4 245.4 242.3 267.1 234.7 238.3 122.2 115 
1972 315.2 281.2 274.6 290.4 261.7 264.8 123.7 130 
1973 391.1 399.2 345.1 345.0 298.2 341.1 122.3 167 
1974 442.0 240.2 397.6 367.1 333.8 399.6 121.4 212 
1975 474.1 279.4 419.3 380.4 350.9 411.7 115.6 221 
---------- 
Note: 
------------------------------------------- 
'The fiscal year begins on I April. 
-------------- ------------- ------------- -------------- -------------- 
b Acquisition cost. 
c Wages not presented as an index. 
Source: MITI (1978) Sangyo Kikai Soran, Industrial Machinery Section, Information Machinery 
Industry Division, "Shashinki, " p. 416. 
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5. Going Global 
Introduction 
Competition among Japanese photography firms took place in an increasingly 
global marketplace by the end of the 1950 to 1973 period. The decade of the 
1970s brought about many changes in world markets. First the postwar 
expansion came to an end with the collapse of the international monetary 
regime in 1971 and the first oil crisis in 1973. Trade barriers among the 
industrialized nations were lowered from the 1960s which raised levels of 
economic interdependence among nations through trade. With that came the 
rise of the multinational corporation, led at first by American firms that 
exploited the lower costs of overseas production. In the 1980s, multinationals 
"globalized' international business (cf. Dunning, 1993). 
In Japan, the era of high-speed growth came to an end in the early 1970s 
as the nation faced its first postwar appreciation of the yen and economic 
restructuring to cut its dependence on Middle East oil (cf. Lincoln, 1988; 
Nakamura, 1981). The new floating exchange system meant that the era of 
undervalued Japanese exports was over (cf. Tsuru, 1996). Firms had to find 
new ways to stay competitive international markets, and they did this through 
continuously raising quality and implementing better management of 
manufacturing processes. Japanese camera/lens and film makers became 
world leaders and followed the trend of globalizing their business, especially 
after 1980 OCIA, 1987). How the Japanese photographic firms went global and 
how their behavior was affected by their relationships with the government 
and with their competitors worldwide is the subject of this chapter. 
As discussed in chapter four, Japanese firms dominated world 
production of cameras and lenses by the late 1960s. Japanese goods gained 
141 
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popularity and market shares first in the US in the 1950s and then in Western 
Europe, which until the 1960s was dominated by West German firms. In 1961, 
Japan controlled 40 percent total world trade in cameras, and more than 40 
percent of Japanese camera exports went to the US market (Miyabayashi, 1963, 
pp. 127-128). By 1974, world camera capacity was divided among the US at 49 
percent ($7.4 billion), Europe at 24 percent ($3.6 billion) and Japan at 27 
percent ($4 billion), but Japanese firms were the clear technological and 
market leaders in the 35 nun format OCII, 1984, p. 310). 
During the 1950s, Japanese camera/lens firms pursued export 
promotion to the US, the largest market for photographic products, and US 
market access was helped by sales to US military post exchanges (PXs) (see 
chapter three). The PX 'exports' earned foreign exchange (i. e. US dollars) 
which helped cover the cost of Japan's imports and reduced Japan's economic 
dependence on the US government. American security policy also favored 
building a strong Japanese economy which could act as a bulwark against the 
rise of Communism in East Asia. Japanese camera/lens exporters became 
heavily dependent on US sales, and by the end of the 1950s, looked to 
European markets to expand exports. Following the 'one agent per country' 
system described in chapter four, firms set up distribution networks in all 
major European markets. As trade barriers fell throughout Europe and 
distribution improved, Japanese camera/lens firms entered head-to-head 
competition with their traditional rivals in West Germany. 
High-quality Japanese cameras and lenses satisfied the expanding 
demand for reasonably-priced, mass-market goods among consumers in 
industrialized countries who had more disposable income and leisure time 
than ever before. Mass production helped Japanese camera/lens firms keep 
prices low, and this trend continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s; 
standardized, modular parts and integrated circuits (ICs) meant that fewer 
moving parts became the norm. Manufacturing was made easier and lower- 
skilled labor could be used to produce modern, compact cameras and even 
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more technologically-advanced cameras and lenses. Quality was consistently 
raised through the use of computer-aided lens design which also reduced the 
time needed to manufacture lenses and increased levels of focusing precision. 
West German firms continued to rely on traditional, hand-made production 
methods for cameras and lenses which kept retail prices high. They therefore 
came to occupy the niche for professional photographers. 
Export prices of the Japanese goods were also kept low because of the 
stable exchange rate from 1949 to 1971 of 360 yen to one US dollar. This helped 
Japanese firms compete against West German firms in the 35 mm format first 
in the US market and then in European markets. Despite pressure revalue the 
yen-dollar exchange rate throughout the late 1960s, the Japanese goverru-nent 
cleverly avoided doing so by playing off of American security fears in East 
Asia first in Northeast Asia (i. e. China and the Koreas) and later in Southeast 
Asia (i. e. Vietnam). It was impossible to be sure in the 1960s that what 
appeared to be positive growth in Japan -- in terms of exports as well - was 
not merely a streak of good luck. American military security in East Asia and 
general insecurity about Japan's future economic potential worked in favor of 
Japanese exporting firms because they enjoyed increasingly favorable terms of 
trade over the 1949 to 1971 period. After 1971, however, new methods of 
maintaining competitiveness had to be found (see below). 
Export promotion of cameras and lenses and the institutions that 
supported it (e. g. Japan Camera Industry Association (JCIA), the Japan 
Machinery Design Center GMDC) and the Japan Camera and Optical 
Instruments Inspection and Testing Institute GCII)) had begun to reach the 
limits of their usefulness to the camera/lens firms by the early 1970s. 1 The 
JCIA, the JMDC and JCII served two crucial functions in terms of export 
promotion: they insured that the standards of Japanese export goods were 
high and helped exporters build overseas markets. Before 1973, the JCII 
1 The official name of the Japan Camera Inspection Institute OCII) changed in May 1973, but 
the acronym stayed the same (Lewis, 1991, p. 77). 
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conducted market surveys, set industry standards, and developed so-called 
"public relations! The last involved creating an image of high quality Japanese 
goods, effective customer service and fair trade, sponsoring camera shows, 
initiating multilateral industry 'summits' on the direction the global industry 
should take and generally working to softened criticism of Japanese trading 
practices. But these market-building services became less interesting to the 
Japanese camera/lens exporters once they had established themselves in 
American and European markets. 
After 1973, Japan's economic structure, the international trading regime 
and the relationship of the photography firms to the government changed. As 
noted in chapter four, the 1950 to 1973 period is characterized more by 
cooperation between industry and government and less by rivalry. 
Camera/lens exporters raised the level of competition with one another in an 
increasingly globalized market and the changing value of the yen put pressure 
on firms to keep production costs low so they could defend their world 
market shares. The result was that firm-firm rivalry among the leading 
Japanese camera/lens makers grew. Relations with the Japanese government 
became less important, especially for those firms that became more dependent 
on global sales than on the Japanese market. (This is discussed in more detail 
below. ) 
On the photographic film side, the situation was very different. There 
are only two photographic film makers, Konica and Fuji Photo Film, making 
for an oligopolistic market in Japan. The camera/lens makers also have an 
oligopoly, although it is with many firms (cf. Encarnation, 1992). Photographic 
film manufacturing is quite different from that of cameras/lenses, because 
film requires substantial investment in manufacturing capacity and high levels 
of R&D to achieve economies of scale, technological consistency and reliability 
of the product. And, because Kodak enjoyed a dominant position in world 
markets for so long, only a few firms were willing to enter the market for 
photographic film. 
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Japan's producers of photographic film (and photographic paper) 
supplied a captive domestic market until the early 1970s, because it was closed 
to imported film through quotas and import tariffs and to foreign competition 
due to foreign capital controls (cf. Mason, 1992). Import quotas on color 
photographic film were dropped in 1971, and tariffs on photographic film and 
paper were gradually reduced throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see graph 5.1). 
At the same time Japan's direct investment restrictions were lifted and when 
Kodak Japan was set up in 1977, the market was opened up to global 
competition. However, informal barriers, i. e. non-tariff barriers, through the 
distribution system were set in place, and aggressively controlled especially 
by Fuji Photo Film. Fuji used distribution to guarantee retail shelf space for 
their photographic film and paper and employed incentives for wholesalers 
and retailers to prioritize sales of Fuji's products. Such distribution 
arrangements allowed Fuji to enjoy 70 percent market share in Japan by 1995, 
while Konica held 20 percent and the remaining ten percent was divided 
between Kodak and Agfa at seven and three percent respectively. The details 
of how the photography industry, i. e. camera/lens and film makers, went 
global and how firm-firm rivalry increased, while goverm-nent-industry 
cooperation decreased over the 1974 to 1995 period is presented in the 
following pages. 
Export promotion, import protection andfilm 
The Japanese photographic film manufacturers trailed their competitors in the 
US and West Germany on a technological level throughout the 1950 to 1974 
period and did not begin to close the gap until the 1980s. As described in 
chapter three, the market leader, Kodak of the US, dominated the industry by 
periodically introducing new film formats and cameras to go with them. 
Camera/lens manufacturers that tried to introduce new cameras based on film 
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formats not supported or prioritized by Kodak were usually forced to 
withdraw and remodel the cameras to suit the supply of Kodak film. 
Kodak's success in consumer photographic film may have been helped 
by 'first mover' advantages and by the firm's dominance in the professional 
market, i. e. supplying movie film stock to Hollywood studios. As a first 
mover, Kodak built a reputation from the late 1880s onwards for reliable, 
high-quality photographic film supplied in limitless quantities. According to 
Chandler (1988, pp. 492-494), the advantage gained early by a first mover, 
such as Kodak, is through extensive investment in manufacturing, 
distribution, and management (and in Kodak's case research) which allows the 
firm to corner the market and raise the barriers to entry for would-be 
challengers. Managerial talent and organization is crucial for managing firms 
built for scale and scope production. Kodak did all of these and successfully 
retained its technological position by defending its extensive web of patents 
(Brayer, 1996; Jenkins, 1975). The firm expanded its market position through 
horizontal integration at first (until US antitrust laws ended that strategy) and 
then through vertical integration (see chapter three). 
Although Kodak has led the industry throughout most of the twentieth 
century, its Kodachrome color film system (introduced as movie film in 1935, 
sheet film in 1938 and negative color roll film in 1941) did not become the 
industry standard. 2 Instead, Agfacolor Neu of 1936 developed by Agfa 
(Germany), Kodak's most forn-ddable competitor until WWII, set the 
standard. 3 According to Helmut Gernsheim (1986, p. 28), since 1950, all 
2 Kodachrome film was developed by two American musicians, Leopold Godowsky and 
Leopold Mannes, and scientists at the Kodak Research Park. According to Gernsheim. (1986, p. 
28) "three layers of emulsion are coated on film support ... The top layer is sensitive only to 
blue 
light, the middle layer to green and the bottom layer to red. [ ... ] After development the 
residual silver bromide in each layer is re-exposed and independently developed in coupler 
developers ... Different coupler 
developers are therefore used for each layer, and after 
dissolving away the positive silver image a subtractive colour photograph of yellow, magenta, 
and cyan (blue-green) dyes remains. " Naomi Rosenblum (1984, p. 607) describes the 
Kodachrome process as a chromogenic type using the dye-injection method. 
3 Rosenblum (1984, p. 606) describes Agfacolor Neu as a "three-layer film in which color 
couplers were incorporated in the layers and released during development; this enables the 
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leading photographic firms have marketed color film under their own brand 
names, and all are "more or less based on the Agfacolor patent which, as an 
enemy invention, became available to the allied powers. "4 Ansco (US), for 
example, introduced its Anscocolor film (based on the Agfacolor process) in 
1942 and Konica introduced Sakura Color 35 mm film one year earlier. The 
exceptions to the Agfacolor/Kodachrome processes are Polaroid color film of 
1963 which is both the film and the print in one and the Polaroid SX 70 instant 
color film which develops automatically in natural light. 
Agfa lost its prewar technological advantage vis-A-vis Kodak and the 
firm also lost market share during and after WWII to, among others, Kodak 
and Polaroid of the US, Gevaert of Belgium, Ilford of the UK, Pathc- of France 
and Konica and Fuji of Japan. But Kodak remained the postwar market leader. 
During the early 1960s, many American and European firms merged due to 
the American 'invasion' of capital into Europe (cf. Spero, 1990). In 1963, Ilford 
became part of the ICI, and the following year, 3M (US) bought Ferrania (Italy) 
and Agfa merged with Gevaert. Later, Agfa was absorbed into the Bayer 
Group. Competition in Europe to Kodakýs dominance came mainly from Agfa 
throughout the postwar period, while other European firms concentrated on 
narrow specializations, e. g. Ilford in black and white film. 
In 1945, Japanese photographic film firms lagged behind the world 
market leaders largely due to the domestic chemical industry. However, firms 
made strides throughout the 1950s in the production of photographic film, 
sensitized paper and dry plates (see appendix 5a). In 1959 production value, 
Fuji Photo Film was the largest - three times larger than its Japanese rival 
Konica - of the four leading Photo-Sensitive Materials Industry Association 
(PSMA) members, the other two being Mitsubishi and Oriental. Fuji's sales 
film to be processed in individual darkrooms. " It is a chromogenic type process using the dye- 
incorporation method found in most color papers and films (p. 607). 
4 Gernsheim (1986, p. 28) notes that three firms (one each American, British and Japanese) 
brought out film on the Kodachrome principle, but does not specify which ones. Nishimura 
states that Konica experimented with both the Agfacolor and Kodachrome processes, bringing 
out both types in 1941 (Konica, 1987, pp. 15,34). 
Going Global 149 
breakdown for fiscal year 1958 indicate that 72 percent of the firrnýs profits 
came from photographic film sales, while the next two largest profit centers 
were sensitized paper and cameras/lenses at roughly nine percent each (Fuji 
Photo Film, 1959, introductory data). 
On an international scale, Japanese firms were quite small. In terms of 
assets, number of employees, output and sales, Kodak was from eight to over 
40 times larger than Fuji Photo Film in 1959 (see table 5.1). Average figures for 
American and Japanese firms' profitability, indicate that the size differential 
between the two firms was unusually large, the average American firm being 
roughly twice the size of the average Japanese firm. It should be noted that the 
figures are presented in yen at the 1949 yen-dollar exchange rate which by 
1959 was generally perceived of as undervaluing the yen. 
US-Japan comparisons of firm size'can be misleading because firms in 
Japan and America are organized differently. The vast majority of Japanese 
firms are single-product or don-dnant-product firms (Fruin, 1992). Over the 
postwar period, Japanese firms have generally not grown in size; they have 
instead developed extensive inter-firm relationships for their vertical supplier 
and distributor networks, i. e. the keiretsuka or keiretsu-ization of business in 
Japan (Gerlach, 1992). According to Mark Fruin (1992, p. 23), Japanese 
[flirms remain small and concentrated in particular market niches 
because focal factories excel at full-product line diversification while 
interfirm networks manage product and markets outside the 
focalized scope of single- and related-product firms. 
A Japanese firm such as Fuji Photo Film therefore has its own supplier and/or 
distribution networks in the form of a vertical keiretsu, that is, smaller firms 
that have regular business relationships with Fuji, the larger 'parent' firm 
(Gerlach, 1992). An American firm such as Kodak is vertically integrated with 
control over the whole production process from raw materials to finished 
product, and usually relies on a multidivisional management structure 
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Table 5.1 Comparison of Eastman Kodak and Fuji Photo Film, 1959 and 
Average Profitability Ratios for the US and Japan 
(billion yen, percent) 
---- ------------- - ------------------ - --------------- - ---- - ---------------------- - ----------- - --------- 
Capital Number Working Annual Sales 
Stock Of Capital Sensitized Other Total 
Employees Materials Goods 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Eastman Kodak (A) 105.7 46,200 288.5 214.1 115.0 329.1 
Fuji Photo Film (B) 2.5 5,833 16.0 14.4 2.8 17.2 
Ratio of A/B 42.3 7.9 18.0 14.9 41.1 19.1 
--- ------- ---- - ----- - ------ - ---- -- -- - -------- --- ------- -- --- ----------- ---- 
Cap ita I Prof ta b ility Ra tio Sales Profitability 
(Manufacturing Avg. ) Ratio 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
US Avg. (A) 14.7 12.0 
Japanese Avg. (B) 6.2 6.4 
Ratio of A/B 2.4 1.9 
150 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: A Seki, M. Takeuchi & H. Yaguchi (196 1) Kamera Fuirumu, Tokyo, Yugenkaku, p. 108. 
IVA 
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Genkins, 1975; Chandler, 1988). A vertically-integrated corporation is larger in 
every respect than a firm with vertical keiretsu. (See below on distribution 
keiretsu in film and horizontal keiretsu. ) 
Fuji Photo Films success in the Japanese market can be attributed to its 
prewar history of close cooperation with the Japanese government on the 
domestic supply of photographic products, especially film and paper. 
Throughout the prewar years, Fuji benefited from the government's policy of 
kokusanka (i. e. domestic manufacture) of photographic film, and from the 
support of Dai-Nippon Celluloid and thereby the Mitsui zaibatsu in achieving 
that goal (Fuji Photo Film, 1959, pp. 7,21,37) (see also chapter three). Konica 
began producing photographic film in 1929, five years before Fuji Photo Film's 
establishment. Dai-Nippon Celluloid (established in 1919) was in the late 1920s 
the only Japanese firm that made film base (Fuji Photo Film, 1959, p. 6). But by 
1938, both Fuji Photo Film and Konica made base film as part of the 
government's push for kokusanka of photographic paper and film OCIA, 1987, 
p. 174). 
According to Ryousuke Nishimura, former president of Konica, the 
Osaka Experimental Center of Engineering played an important role in 
advancing Japan's fledgling sensitized materials industry in the late 1920s 
(Konica, 1987, p. 34). The Japanese government invited Dr. Max Leo, chief 
engineer of the Erneman Dry Plate Works in Germany, to work at the Center 
between 1927 and 1930 on developing photographic emulsion techniques. 
Many engineers who worked on the project, including Nishimura, were 
recruited into Japanese photography firms, thereby spreading the knowledge 
that had been developed at the Center to the firms. 5 
In the late 1920s, Japan's photography firms working in sensitized materials (i. e. film and 
paper) manufacture were Konica, Oriental Photo Industry (established in 1919), Toyo Dry 
Plates (1919 and in 1934 absorbed into the new firm Fuji Photo Film), Asahi Photo Industry 
(1925) and Nippon Photo Industry (1926) (Fuji Photo Film, 1959, p. 7). By 1938, an additional 
five firms, including Fuji, had joined the industry OCIA, 1987, p. 174). Asahi Photo Industry 
which introduced Japans first photographic film, Kiku, went bankrupt in 1943 (Konica, 1987, 
p. 34). 
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As mentioned above, Japanese photographic film manufacturers were 
protected from foreign competition in the Japanese market during the post- 
war years until the early 1970s and the onset of capital and trade deregulation. 
Protection was designed to prevent dependence on imported film, and to 
secure a dependable and low-priced supply of film to the domestic market. As 
noted in chapter one, the development in Japan of internationally-renowned 
cameras and lenses stimulated demand for photographic film. Since the 
photographic film industry had been established as part of the government's 
kokusanka policy in the prewar period, it was not unexpected that 
photographic film manufacturing would be nurtured in the early postwar 
period. 
After the early 1960s when Japan joined the GATT, the OECD and the 
IMF, the Japanese goverru-nent's direct controls over the economy and 
industry to stimulate postwar econon-tic recovery began to wane. This also 
meant relaxing the tools of the 'developmental state, ' e. g. Japan's industrial 
policy for export promotion that had been so effective during the period of 
high-speed growth (cf. Johnson, 1982; Johnson, 1995; Nakamura 1981; and 
Tsuru, 1996). But change did not come immediately for the makers of 
photographic film. Although quotas on color film imports were lifted in 1971, 
import tariffs remained high at 26 percent (see graph 5.1). 
In the late 1960s, Kinji Moriyama, the camera/lens firms' zoku 
politician, urged that film be opened up to international competition by 
lowering import tariffs (Yayama and Ito, 1988, p. 340). Photographic film 
makers, especially Fuji Photo Film, did not support his position. They believed 
that the industry still needed tariff protection so that it could catch up 
technologically to Kodak in the manufacture of high-quality color film 
(Kobayashi', 1970). The four leading Japanese sensitized materials (i. e. 
photographic film and paper) makers (i. e. Fuji Photo Film, Konica, Mitsubishi 
Paper and Oriental) held only seven percent of the world market in 1969 while 
Kodak held a full 75 percent, argued the president of Fuji Photo Film, 
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Setsutaro Kobayashi in 1970 (p. 19). This was quite different from the situation 
in cameras/lenses where Japanese firms dominated world markets by that 
time. 
Sakae Haruki (former president of Fuji Photo Film) had successfully 
argued a decade before Kobayashi that imports of sensitized materials to 
Japan had to be prevented so that exports could be promoted and firms would 
be allowed to catch up with Kodak (1959, pp. 13-14). The fear among the 
Japanese photographic film makers was that in an open market, the leading 
Japanese firms would be swallowed up by world leaders Kodak and Agfa. In 
the early 1970s, however, Moriyama's view prevailed, although at first he did 
not enjoy the full support of Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) officials OCII, 1984, pp. 255-263). But gradually MITI and the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) gave in when Kodak began to push hard to lower Japan's 
import tariffs particularly on 35 mm amateur color roll film in the early 1970s. 
As Japanese import tariffs fell, production of photographic film (i. e. 
color roll film, black and white film and X-ray film) in Japan rose (see graphs 
5.2 and 5.3). In terms of quantity, exports of Japanese photographic film rose 
steadily after 1975, while domestic shipments (not including imports) 
increased only gradually. In value terms, however, the domestic and export 
sales follow roughly the same trend. The figures imply that japanýs prices of 
photographic film have been higher than export prices since the 1970s, and 
therefore revenues from domestic market sales are very important to the two 
Japanese photographic film makers, Fuji Photo Film and Konica. 
The breakdown in value of Japan's total photographic film production, 
domestic shipment and exports indicates that of the three film products (i. e. 
color roll, black and white roll and X-ray), color roll film accounts for nearly 
half of all sales (see graph 5.4). In fact, the value of color roll film exports rose 
faster than for either black and white or X-ray film exports since 1980 GCIA, 
1995, pp. 56,62). Naturally, there has been a corresponding rise in number of 
pictures taken in Japan and elsewhere, and over 97 percent of those taken in 
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Japan in 1995 were in color. Color film sales in the large US market surpassed 
black and white film sales by 1963 (Wolfman, 1971, p. 39). Therefore, not only 
are domestic sales important to the Japanese photographic film makers, color 
roll film sales (domestic and export) produce particularly large profits. 
Exports of Japanese photography goods (i. e. cameras, lenses and film) 
to the US continued to expand and from the early 1970s, attracted the 
attention of American industry analysts. Augustus Wolfman, a photography 
industry consultant, editor and publisher, noted in his 1971172 Wolfinan Report 
(1971, p. 4) that the US share of the world photography market dropped by 
roughly three percent from 1969 to 1970 while the Japanese share rose two 
percent. Market growth was mainly in color photographic film rather than 
cameras and other equipment because of their average life span and growing 
saturation of markets. In 1970, amateur color film (for still cameras) accounted 
for 70 percent of total film sales in the US, with nearly 70 percent of that figure 
being for 126 cartridge film. The market for 35 mm single-lens reflex (SLR) 
cameras was limited to photo hobbyists in the early 1970s which meant that 35 
mm film sales in the US were only a small part of the market. 
In 1970, Belgium (Agfa-Gevaert) supplied over 26 percent of US 
imports of photographic film and paper (Wolfman, 1971, p. 6), but Japanese 
firms took only a non-dnal amount. Fuji's exports to developed countries rose 
rapidly after 1973, up 30 percent in that year, 15 percent in 1974 and 24 percent 
in 1976 OCII, 1984, pp. 469-470). In 1980, Japanýs exports of color film to the US 
were up 96 percent on the previous year, and color film shipments by 
Japanese firms rose nearly 40 percent worldwide (Glazer, 1982, p. 2). Eugene 
Glazer wrote in a 1982 industry report (p. 2): 
More than a year ago, we concluded that the Japanese were 
intensifying their aggressiveness in world color film markets and 
were backing increased shipment levels with strong promotional 
campaigns. The most recent Japanese export and US import statistics 
for color film do not show any signs that shipment activity is 
slowing. 
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To counter the Japanese assault, Kodak raised its advertising budget for the 
US by 66 percent from 1979 to 1980, outspending Fuji Photo Film eight to one 
(Glazer, 1982, p. 3). 
America's 1981 imports of color film were split among 35 mm at 35 
percent, 126 cartridge at 43 percent and 110 cartridge film at 26 percent. 
Japanese firms, particularly Fuji Photo Film, supplied all three film formats, 
but according to Glazer (1982, p. 3), Japanese color film exports did much 
better in non-US markets since the US imported only 22 percent of total 
Japanese exports, or "an unusually low figure compared with those for other 
Japanese products. " By 1982, Fuji held 10 percent of the US market, Kodak 
held 80 percent and the remaining 10 percent was split between 3M and 
Konica UCII, 1984, p. 472). Konica did poorly at first in the US market when it 
used its Sakura Color brand name, but improved its position after the early 
1980s with its new Konica brand name. 
KodaVs strategy to counter the growing Japanese challenge in color 
film was the Disc format introduced in 1982, but it failed miserably (see 
chapter three). This was partly due to the concurrent rise in popularity of 
compact 35 mm lens shutter (LS) cameras which made high-quality 
photographs available to amateur photographers at a reasonable price (see 
appendix 5b). Not only were Japanese cameras and lenses world market 
leaders by the early 1980s, color film had also become a successful Japanese 
export OCII, 1984, p. 472). In 1984, Fuji became the official photographic film 
sponsor of the Los Angeles Olympic Games; it was the first time in 25 years 
that Kodak was not chosen to be the official Olympic sponsor (Sieg, 1994, p. 
12). The pressure on Kodak in its home market was mounting in the early 
1980s, and the obvious strategy was to retaliate in Japan. 
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Barriers to entry in the Japanese market 
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Foreign capital controls in Japan frustrated would-be investors, such as 
Kodak, and prevented them from establishing sales and/or production 
facilities in Japan until the late 1970s (Encarnation, 1992; Mason, 1992). In 1977, 
Kodak established Kodak Japan with the primary purpose of getting closer to 
Japanese photographic film consumers and building closer relationships with 
suppliers and distributors in Japan GCIL 1984, p. 463). Apparently, the 
investment amounted to little more than an effort to provide technical and 
marketing support for Nagase, Kodak's primary distributor in Japan (Dewey 
Ballantine, 1995, p. 6; Sieg, 1994, p. 102). Albert Sieg, president of Kodak Japan 
from 1984 to 1991, wrote (1994, p. 74) that the original purpose of Kodak's 
investment in Japan was to try and "better meet customer needs, not tangle 
with competitors. " But Kodak developed little competitor intelligence about 
Fuji Photo Film and Konica, and as a result was "'always in a reactive mode, 
responding to each wave of attack and counter attack as it rolled through the 
marketplace" (p. 74). 
Competition in the Japanese market had grown fierce in sensitized 
materials by the early 1980s particularly as Fuji left Konica behind 
technologically OCII, 1984, p. 466). 6The Japanese film makers competed on 
price in the domestic market but this had led to 'excess competition/ 
bankruptcies and confusion in the market. To deal with the problem, the 
PSMA member firms set price ceilings, and in 1971, the firms became the focus 
of a JFTC raid for price fixing (Lewis, 1991, p. 136). 7Kodak claims that price 
fixing continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s and that the JFTC knew 
about it, but did nothing (Dewey Ballantine, 1995b, pp. 124,134-136). The 
figures presented in graphs 5.2 and 5.3 confirm that Japan's domestic prices 
6 Dewey Ballantine (1995a) claims that Konica suffered from quality control problems in their 
photographic film and lacked market savvy. 
7 This may have been partly due to the fact that Japan's antimonopoly laws were strengthened 
after 1970. 
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were appreciably higher than export prices given the volumes that were sold 
in each market. (The figures for domestic shipments do not include imports. ) 
Kodak became frustrated in Japan in the 1980s because the market was 
effectively closed to competition through the distribution system. According 
to Sieg (1994, pp. 102-103), Kodak had been forced to limit its distribution to 
two firms (i. e. Kusuda and Nagase) in the early 1950s due to the Japanese 
government's import controls. Prior to WWII, Kodak had used a wide 
network of distributors and Sieg notes that when these firms were abandoned 
by Kodak, Fuji Photo Film took them over. 
Dewey Ballantine (1995a, pp. 6,68) notes in a report prepared for 
Kodak that Kodak used Nagase and Asanuma Shokai as their Japanese 
distributors until 1960. No mention is made of Kusuda. They say that Kodak 
was told by the Japanese government in 1960 to choose one distributor in order 
to control imports into Japan. Dewey Ballantine discusses how Kodak's choice 
(forced by the Japanese government) of Nagase over Asanuma as their main 
wholesaler left great bitterness among the Asanuma people. 8 (Asanuma and 
Konica were Japanýs first agents for photographic products in Japan in the 
1870s (Lewis, 1991, p. 4). Unlike Konica, Asanuma chose remain in 
wholesaling. ) 
Under Kodak's new arrangement, all wholesalers had to purchase 
Kodak's products through Nagase; Asanuma was one of the largest 
photographic goods tokuyakuten (wholesalers) and would have preferred to 
purchase directly from Kodak (Dewey Ballantine, 1995a, p. 93). Dewey 
Ballantine claims (p. 116) that the historic moment for Kodak came in 1975 
when Asanuma was pressured to join Fuji's increasingly exclusive wholesale 
network, i. e. its distribution keiretsu. Fuji asked Asamuma to sell its new 
Pocket 110 system (competing with Kodak's Instarnatic system) otherwise Fuji 
would cut off all trade with the firm. When Asanuma refused and turned to 
8 Lewis (1991, p. 136) notes that Kodak had an exclusive relationship with Nagase in 1972. 
Obviously there is considerable confusion about what really happened. 
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Nagase (not to Kodak) to see if Kodak products could cover the loss of Fuji, 
Nagase did not react. Asanuma subsequently joined Fuji's vertical keiretsu. 
Dewey Ballantine blames Nagase for not informing Kodak of the situation, but 
Kodak was really to blame for not being pro-active enough in Japan at that 
time. 
According to Sieg, Kodak was forced to limit the number of distributors 
to tzvo in 1960. About that, he wrote (1994, p. 102): 
Those distributors [that were abandoned in 1960] never forgave us, 
even after the government eased restrictions and we attempted to 
expand our network; many told us in no uncertain terms that they 
would never work with us because of the way we treated them in the 
past. Instead, they stuck with Fuji and became part of one of Japan's 
most successful alliances. 
Sieg says he realized in 1984 that if Kodak Japan were to succeed in the 
Japanese market, the firm would have to control its distribution system. The 
choice was either to set up a distribution network from scratch, which 
required people, organization and time (for relationship building), or to buy 
the existing Kodak distribution from Kusuda and Nagase's Division for Kodak 
Products. Kodak Japan chose the latter which Sieg (1994, p. 103) admitted 
" require[d] extraordinary acts of delicacy and diplomacy but really didn't 
have a downside" if everyone could be pleased. The arrangement with 
Kusuda went quickly, but it took two and one-half years to conclude the deal 
with Nagase. 
Kodak Japan chose a typical 'Kodak' vertical integration strategy, not a 
typical 'Fuji' vertical keiretsu strategy, for its distribution in Japan (see above). 
If Kodak Japan had instead chosen to build up a vertical keiretsu from scratch, 
it ii'unlikely that Kodak's Rochester heaZlquafters w6uld have approved of 
the time or the money that such an investment would have required. And by 
the early 1980s, Kodak needed to make up for lost time; Japan had not been a 
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priority throughout most of the postwar period. 9 Kodak again took a short- 
term approach to the Japanese market when it closed its R&D center in 
Yokohama (opened in 1986 to show its commitment to the Japanese market) 
due to profitability concerns (cf. Sieg, 1994). 
In the recent case brought by Kodak against Fuji Photo Film at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), Kodak claimed that the delayed opening of 
the market and the locked up of the distribution keiretsu system made it 
difficult for the firm (as well as other firms) to make much headway in Japan, 
especially since the 1970s (Dewey Ballantine, 1997a and 1997b). 10 As noted 
above, Japan's domestic film market is today 70 percent controlled by Fuji 
Photo Film, and the remaining 30 percent is divided among Konica, Kodak 
and Agfa (at 20, seven and three percent respectively). According to Sieg 
(1994), Fuji controlled over half of the distribution of photographic film in 
1984. Kodak and Agfa (and to a lesser extent Konica) therefore all faced the 
same problem of distribution discussed above, hence their low market shares. 
One method for gaining entry into the Japanese market (i. e. to get 
around the distribution keiretsu problem) is to set up an exclusive relationship 
with a Japanese firm, but often this requires a compromise on the part of the 
non-Japanese firm (cf. Encarnation, 1992; Gerlach, 1992; Mason, 1992). For 
Polaroid it was a good option and in 1981 Konica obtained exclusive rights to 
the sales of Polaroid products in Japan (Konica, 1987, p. 30). Recently, Agfa 
pursued another strategy and increased its market share - mainly at Kodak 
and Konica's expense - by supplying Daiei, a large supermarket chain, with 
their own label film. The cost of gaining market share was brand recognition. 
The reason Fuji was not affected is its close relationship (through cross 
shareholding in some cases) with its entire distribution keiretsit (i. e. 
9 Notes by Mark Mason from an interview with Albert Sieg in 1986. 
10 Dewey Ballantine (1995a and 1995b) and Wilkie, Farr and Gallagher (1995) are the 1995 
Section 301 case which was transferred to the WTO (Dewey Ballantine 1997a and 1997b) when 
the Japanese government refused to negotiate on a bilateral basis (Katz, 1998). 
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wholesalers, retailers and labs) which ensures that Fuji film gets adequate 
shelf space and even marketing priority. 
Japan's photographic film distribution mirrors the evolution of 
I orderly" distribution in cameras/lenses in the 1960s and 1970s. The main 
problem in Japan for the JCIA member firms was how to maintain reasonable 
retail prices and secure broad distribution throughout Japan for their goods 
(cf. JCIA, 1987; RMKK, 1971). The aim was to prevent black markets, gray 
markets and price cutting, and most importantly that the firms stay in 
business. Camera/lens makers were especially concerned about price cutting 
because they produced their goods on very thin profit margins, and as the 
camera/lens technology advanced, pressure on retail prices grew (Camerart, 
June 1990). 
By 1971, the camera/lens firms had established their own private sales 
companies to develop strong domestic distribution networks. They were: 
Olympus Trading, Canon Camera Sales, Cherry Trading (for Konica), Kowa 
Camera, Bronica Sales, Yashica Trading, Zeus Sales (for Minolta), Mirax 
Trading (for Miranda), and Ricoh Camera Sales (RMKK, 1971, p. 6). According 
to Miyabayashi (1963, p. 51), the situation in the early 1960s had been "rather 
confused" because (p. 54) "the sales system of the camera industry has not yet 
developed into an organization of exclusive affiliation. " From an industry 
point of view, the problem was that few manufacturers had their own sales 
companies to deal directly with wholesalers, so a firm often dealt with only a 
few. " This meant that their products did not get the best possible visibility in 
the market. 12Because there were few exclusive sales firms attached to the 
11 Only wholesalers that belong to the Camera Wholesale Trade Association (39 members in 
1963) are called tokuyakuten. Others called 'middlemen' (roughly 100 in 1963) acted as 
wholesalers but they tended to be price-cutters and were "chiefly responsible for the frequent 
price crashes" (Miyabayashi, 1963, p. 54). 
12 The camera/ lens firms have been described as 'unusual' in their keiretsu group relationships 
(interview Spring 1996). Recall that the camera/lens firms set up their own overseas 
distribution in the 1950s and 1960s generally without the help of trading companies. There 
may be some connection between the camera/lens firms' choice of overseas and domestic 
distribution systems. 
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cameras makers (mostly due to inadequate funds) until the early 1970s, 
wholesalers had controlled camera/lens sales (cf. Seki et al, 1961). That 
changed, however, when the JCIA - and later the PSMA'- member firms 
developed strong networks of distributors to varying degrees, depending on 
individual company strategy. Better distribution ensured that the leading 
firms' products retained market shares in Japan after the market was opened 
to foreign competition. Increased firm-firm rivalry for market share after 1974 
tested the strength of each firm's distribution network. 
joint research and technological advancement 
Research in cameras, lenses and film took place within firms during the 1974 
to 1995 period. Up to 1973, the government and the JCIA, JCII and PSMA were 
involved in promoting research and developing standardization of 
manufacturing (see chapter four). Furthermore, the industry associations 
promoted cooperative research in important technological areas through MITI 
and other government agencies. For example, in 1952, five optical companies 
developed a rare earth optical glass (called F15) at Fuji Photo Film! s Odawara 
plant, using MITI's Industrial Technology Agency financing (Lewis, 1991, p. 
80). The Japan Optical Engineering Research Association established in 1962 is 
another example of a government-industry research association formed to 
promote advances in lens design and production. It folded in 1981 due to lack 
of interest on the part of the member firms (Camerart, May 1988). Early 
research on light meters took place at the JCIA and all members had access to 
improvements in the technology OCIA, 1987). Later, advances in measuring 
light through photographic lenses to improve metering systems in cameras 
took place in the firms (i. e. Nikon and Minolta) as rivalry among the 
camera/lens firms heightened (see chapter one). 
The repair and information services of the JCII-JCIA camera centers in 
New York and Okinawa in the 1950s also helped firms learn about each 
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others' technological advances (see chapters three and four). As long as the 
firms thought they had to "export or die, ' these activities were perfectly 
acceptable, but when competition in technology and for market shares 
heightened by the late 1950s, sharing research was no longer practical. This is 
why the light machinery centers (established in 1963 by MITI) became less 
important to the leading exporters of cameras/Ienses in terms of product 
information. What is significant about the early easier flow of knowledge 
among firms was that it helped raise technological levels and probably 
encouraged the leading firms to make their own contributions to, for example, 
advancing optical measurement technologies. 
Cooperative research projects in the 1970s were quite different from 
those during the early recovery years, and MITI's role in Japan's industrial 
development changed (cf. Johnson, 1982). No longer could MITI control the 
direction of Japanese industry, but seed money was still given to new research 
and the government set up numerous joint government-industry research 
projects (Fransman, 1990). Many of these helped firms invest in technologies 
that would have been too costly or risky for one firm to take on alone. One of 
the earliest large-scale research projects designed to put Japan ahead of its 
competitors (i. e. the US) and sponsored by MITI was the Very Large-scale 
Integration (VLSI) Project from 1976 to 1980. The aim was to make computer 
chips that could store higher levels of information than those currently 
available, and in this way catch up to IBM in semiconductor technology (cf. 
Anchordoguy, 1989; Callon, 1995; Flamm, 1996; and Fransman, 1990). 
By the early 1970s, Japan had an advantage worldwide in optics 
technology due to the advances made by the leading camera/lens 
manufacturers. This became quite useful for the advancement of 
semiconductor technologies since "[a]s things turned out, optical technologies 04 
also became dominant in the semiconductor production process" (Fransman, 
1995, p. 16). As part of the VLSI project, advancements in photolithography 
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were required, but the members of the VLSI project, all electronics firms, did 
not have access to the technology. According to Jon Sigurdson (1986, p. 85): 
Optical engineers are needed but they are not available from the 
universities. Optical engineers in Japan are in fact only found in 
optical companies. Consequently, the integrated circuit makers do 
not have easy access to optical engineers and have been and still are 
dependent on optical companies. 
Martin Fransman suggests that although photolithography was pursued as 
one of the technologies for VLSI fabrication, it was not favored by MITI or the 
project firms because of the lack of optical engineering capability outside of 
the camera/lens firms. Toshiba and Nikon had earlier discussed cooperation 
on developing photolithography for an optical step-and-repeat machine, and 
one was actually built by Nikon at MITI's Electrotechnical Laboratory as part 
of the large-scale integration project (Flamm, 1996, p. 62 note 75; Fransman, 
1990, pp. 69-71). Later the machine's design was used by Nikon to produce the 
first commercial wafer stepper system for IC production. 
For the VLSI project, Canon and Nikon were subcontracted as 
equipment suppliers and the first two now dominate the world market for 
optical semiconductor equipment (Flamm, 1996, p. 105; Fransman, 1995, p. 
163; Sigurdson, 1986, p. 120). Kenneth Flamm (1996), Fransman (1990) and 
Sigurdson (1986) agree that the VLSI project resulted in benefits beyond what 
was expected. It created synergy between the firms that possessed the core 
technologies of electronics (i. e. Fujitsu, Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC and 
Toshiba) and optics (i. e. Canon and Nikon) and created inter-firm links 
between the users and suppliers of IC equipment. Subsequent government- 
industry projects served to reinforce these bonds, e. g. Optoelectronics, 1979- 
1986, for optical semiconductors, SORTEC, 1986-1996, for synchron 
lithography, and Optoelectronics Devices, 1986-1996, again for optical 
sen-dconductors (Miyazaki, 1995, p. 62; OECD, 1993, pp. 75-82; Stowsky, 1989, 
p. 255). 
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Another spillover effect of the project was to raise the level of 
technology in cameras/lenses. Consumers are only willing to pay a certain 
amount for a camera in the mass market range, but the firms continued to 
produce more advanced mass-market cameras throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
(cf. JCIA, 1990 and 1995). The Japanese camera/lens companies concentrated 
on mass production to keep costs down. Sizable investments in capital 
equipment also allowed prices to fall, and as markets grew, volume 
production helped keep costs down. 
Canon was the first of the camera/lens exporters to diversify its 
product line (at first unsuccessfully in electronic calculators) with the aim of 
insulating the company against fluctuations in demand for cameras/lenses in 
Japan and export markets (Canon, 1994). Other firms also realized by the early 
1970s that they needed to diversify their product lines to avoid getting 
squeezed when markets for cameras and lenses became saturated. They 
pursued "full product-line diversification" in Fruinýs (1992) words, using 
optics as their core technology for their new office products (e. g. facsimiles 
and photocopiers) and medical optics (e. g. endoscopes and gastrocameras). 
Canon which developed the plain paper copier in the early 1960s 
competes with Ricoh and Fuji Xerox today for the top slot in photocopiers, 
and with Minolta and Konica in office machines. 13As noted above, Nikon and 
Canon are world leaders in steppers, equipment used for manufacturing 
sen-dconductors. In 1997, Nikon held 50 percent of the world market. Rather 
than moving into office equipment, Olympus pioneered the modern 
endoscope when it entered medical optics field in the 1970s. The firm's 
decisive response (to the changing prospects for camera/lens sales) meant that 
in 1997, Olympus held 70 percent of the world market for endoscopes. Asahi 
13 Ricoh, formerly one of the 'top five' firms changed its strategy to rely on original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) or other arrangements which allowed them to remain in the market 
without high levels of inveshnent in new camera product development. The sources for the 
corporate data are company annual reports. 
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Optical followed in medical optics much later with gastrocameras and in the 
mid-1990s also manufactured endoscopes, but mainly for export markets. 
Despite predictions (e. g. Boon, 1970; Stone, 1969) of saturated markets, 
over capacity and increased competition from low-wage countries and firms 
in the late 1960s (see chapters two and four), Japanese camera/ lens production 
continued to grow into the 1990s (see graphs 5.5 and 5.6). Until the early 1970s, 
the domestic market was the most important segment of Japanese firms' 
camera sales (see chapter four), but after 1975, exports expanded rapidly both 
in quantity and value. This was by and large a consequence of continuous 
technological advances and application of new materials which raised the 
barriers to entry for new competitors. Leading manufacturers also began to 
rely less on camera sales as a percent of total sales as they diversified into 
related products. The knowledge gained in the new fields often appeared as 
new camera electronics and advanced lenses, and advances in camera/lens 
technologies were fed into the newer product areas. Know-how seems to have 
moved relatively easily from one product area to another. Therefore, there 
was organizational learning (cf. Fruin, 1992). 
By the early 1970s, a pattern had emerged in terms of company size and 
shares of cameras to total sales. Canon led the industry in terms of aggregate 
sales, while Asahi Optical took up the last position. In 1976, Canon's aggregate 
sales were over )(100 billion ($340 million) with just over half coming from 
camera sales (see table 5.2). Canon diversified its product line early, dropping 
its dependence on camera sales to 24 percent by 1985. The firm most 
dependent on camera sales, Asahi Optical, also reduced its share from 93 to 56 
percent over the same 1976 to 1985 period. Throughout the 1990s, Asahi 
Optical increased its dependence on cameras at above the 60 percent level, 
while Canon continued to reduce its dependence to only 8 percent by 1995. 
But the firm has not diversified out of cameras. In fact, it ranks as the largest 
supplier among all the camera/ lens firms. 
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Table 5.2 Capital Stock, Sales & Employment Figures for the Top Seven Camera/Lens 
Manufacturers 1976" and Sales Figures for the Top Five, 1985 and 1995 
(million yen, percent) 
1976 
Capital Number of Aggregate Camera' Camera Industry 
Stock Employees b Sales Sales Share Share 
BA AIB AIC 
Canon 8,328 4,510 101,974 51,922 51 18 
Nikon 5,729 5,423 63,115 43,468 69 15 
Minolta 3,936 5,003 50,129 37,074 74 13 
Olympus 3,197 3,127 53,568 29,210 55 10 
Asahi Optical 2,700 2,724 26,906 25,155 93 9 
Yashica, 1,215 1,069 19,906 19,906 100 7 
Chinon 1,000 1,317 27,143 21,201 78 7 
TotaW 26,105 23,173 342,741 283,350 80 
1985 1995 
Aggregate Camera' Camera 
Sales Sales Share 
BA AM 
Aggregate Camera' Camera 
Sales Sales Share 
BA AM 
Canon 575,369 135,492 24 2,165,626 177,537 8 
Nikon 173,346 85,321 49 288,485 115,372 40 
Minolta 198,627 115,831 58 333,656 96,606 29 
Olympus 128,566 40,134 31 252,097 62,825 25 
Asahi Optical 57,635 32,544 56 68,600 40,500 59 
Totals 1,133,543 409,322 3,108,464 492,840 
Notes: * Figures based on the calendar year for Canon. 
b Establishments of 50 or more employees. 
"Camera' includes still cameras, cine cameras and projectors, interchangable lenses, etc. 
d The total forCamera Sales' is for the whole industry and is taken as C. 
Sources: MITI (1978)Sangyo KikaiSoran, Industrial Machinery Section, Information Machinery 
Industry Division, "Shashinki, " p. 416; JCIA, Nihon Kamera Kogyo-shi, Tokyo JCIA, 1987, p. 147; 
Asahi Optical Co., Ltd., Jigyo Hokokusho FY 1995; Canon, Inc., Annual Report 1996; Minolta Co., 
, Ltd., Annual Report FY 1997; Nikon Corp., Annual Report FY-1997; Olympus, Annual Report 1997. 
Going Global 172 
For Nikon, Olympus and Minolta, the next largest firms in terms of 
aggregate sales (at $215 million, $180 million and $170 million respectively in 
1976), cameras took between 55 and 75 percent share of their total sales. Asahi 
Optical and Yashica, both smaller firms (aggregate sales of $92 million and $68 
million respectively), relied nearly 100 percent on camera sales. (Yashica is 
now owned by Kyocera. ) By 1995, Olympus and Minolta had reduced their 
dependence on camera sales to 25 and 29 percent respectively. Nikon was 
slightly more dependent on cameras; they took 40 percent of aggregate sales. 
All of the photography firms are dependent on exports for at least 30 
percent of their camera/lens production. In 1997, the two firms with the 
lowest export ratios were Kyocera and Fuji Photo Film with 32 and 34 percent 
respectively. The two highest were Canon and Minolta with 79 and 76 percent. 
Konica, Nikon, Asahi and Olympus were at least 50 to 65 percent dependent 
on exports. By product in 1992, Nikon exported 30 percent of its steppers, 40 
percent of its measuring equipment and 18 percent of its optical goods (Nikon, 
1993, statistics supplement, p. 101). Although the industry picture in graphs 
5.5 and 5.6 give the impression that the whole industry is quite dependent on 
exports, in fact, there is considerable variation among the firms. There is also a 
wide spectrum of more and less globalization and firm-firm rivalry. The 
Minolta Alpha 7000-Canon EOS autofocus SLR war is one example of intense 
firm-firm rivalry in cameras/lenses in the late 1980s (see chapter one). 
The manufacture of photographic fiIm is very different from that of 
cameras/lenses. The sensitivity of black and white and color film is 
determined by the "size of silver halide crystals suspended in the gelatin 
emulsion" (Rosenblum, 1984, p. 605). Because color film is more complex than 
black and white film, and dye-couplers are used with the silver crystals. The 
larger the silver crystals the faster the film; larger crystals are more light 
sensitive and allow faster shutter speeds. But faster film is grainier, producing 
"less tonally-defined images, " especially if enlarged (Rosenblum, 1984, p. 606). 
Silver prices are a factor in the price of photographic film, and with faster film, 
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more silver is consumed. Photography is, according to the US Bureau of 
Mines, the largest user of silver. Their estimates indicate that the percent of 
silver used in photographic film rose from 25 percent to 46 percent between 
1973 and 1988 (Martin, 1989, p. 52). Efforts have been made to recycle or lower 
the amount of silver used in photographic film; digital photography is also 
one step in that direction. 
The market for 35 mm film worldwide is huge. In 1988,85 percent of 
all film purchased in Japan was 35 nun, in the US the figure was 70 percent 
and in Europe, 65 percent (Martin, 1989, p. 103). Worldwide, exposures on 
color film that year were estimated at 39 billion (p. 9). Demands for faster film 
came from consumers, because cameras were moving in the direction of 
compact, 35 mm IS shutter cameras which had relatively small lenses, often 
with zoom functions. Smaller lenses allow less light to hit the film, i. e. they are 
not "bright' lenses. Longer lenses with smaller lens apertures, i. e. telephoto 
and zoom lenses, mean that less light will reach the film. Increased rivalry 
between Fuji, Konica and Kodak in the early 1980s also led to a series of 
technological innovations in 35 mm photographic film OCII, 1984,468). For 
these reasons, photographic film manufacturers have pushed film speeds 
higher and higher especially since the late 1970s OCIA, 1987, p. 180). 
Firm-firm rivalry in 35 mm film really started in 1982, when Kodak 
introduced its FIR Disc 200 (for the new disc cameras) (Dewey Ballantine, 
1995a, p. 97). This set off a race between Kodak and Fuji to see which firm 
could bring out the best 200 ISO film. Fuji introduced a new, faster speed film, 
HR400 in 1982, notably the same year that Kodak brought out a slower (200 
ISO) film OCIA, 1987, p. 180). It took nearly a year for Kodak to develop its 
own 400 ISO film, the VR400. According to Dewey Ballantine (1995a), the US 
market is more receptive to 200 ISO film while the Japanese market seems to 
prefer 400 ISO. Increased 400 ISO film sales in Japan have cut into the market 
for the slower 100 ISO film, that is, people did not buy both 400 and 100 ISO 
film. They chose one or the other. (In general, faster film costs more. ) The film 
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war between Kodak and Fuji and the battle for market shares in Japan as 
witnessed by the WTO case indicate just how global the photographic film 
business has become. 
Toward global production 
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) to East Asia has been on the rise since 
1985. The Plaza Accord in 1985 adjusted the US dollar (widely believed to 
have been over-valued) vis-A-vis the other major currencies which had the 
effect of causing a drastic appreciation of the Japanese yen. (Another 
appreciation of the yen came in 1993. ) In fact, between 1985 and 1990, Japanese 
manufacturing FDI took almost one third, the largest share, of total Japanese 
investment to East Asia (Machado, 1996, p. 47). In actual dollar amounts, 
manufacturing investments grew from $24.4 billion to $104 billion between 
1985 and 1992. As a percentage of all firms investing in manufacturing 
facilities, Japanese firms represented 36 percent in 1991. Although Japanese 
firms were successful at home, by the mid-1980s, bi-lateral trade friction with 
the US and Japan's other trading partners and the yen appreciation had forced 
them to re-think their manufacturing strategies. 
According to Shigeki Tejima (1996, p. 372) of the EXIM Bank, "Japanese 
FDI, at first, was oriented toward Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
and later spread to Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and China. " 
In 1996, he continued (p. 372), Japanese firms were "... keenly considering new 
possibilities of investment in Vietnam, India and all other Asia Pacific 
countries. " In the photography industry this pattern held true. Firms moved 
conventional goods production to the first-tier newly-industrialized countries 
(NICs) in East Asia at first, and kept higher value-added goods in production 
facilities in Japan (see table 5.3). 14 Some aggressive firms realized that new 
14This; information is based on interviews with business leaders in the photography industry, 
Spring 1995. By second tier NICs, I am referring to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand in the first instance and in more recent years to Vietnam and China. 
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Table 5.3 Japanese Camera/Lens Manufacturing Facilities in East Asia, by Country 
---------------- 
Country 
----------------------- 
Company 
--------------------- 
Est. Year 
-- 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Products 
----------------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Taiwan 
------------------------ 
Ricoh 
-------------------- 
1966 LS cameras 
Canon 1970 SLR, LS cameras, IL 
Asahi Optical 1975 photographic lenses (incl. IL) 
Konica 1989 LS cameras 
Olympus 1989 n. d. 
Hong Kong Kyocera 1967 SLR, LS cameras 
Asahi Optical 1973 SLR, LS cameras 
Olympus 1988 LS cameras 
China Olympus 1990 LS cameras 
Canon 1990 LS cameras 
Minolta 1994 LS, SLR cameras 
Olympus 1994 LS cameras 
Ricoh n. d. LS cameras 
Kyocera n. d. cameras 
Fuji Photo Film n. d. cameras (incl. APS) 
Malaysia Minolta 1973 SLR, LS cameras 
Minolta 1988 camera parts (incl. shutter unit, body) 
Canon 1989 LS cameras 
Copal 1991 shutters 
Thailand Nikon 1990 IL, SLR cameras 
Konica 1995 one-time-use cameras 
Indonesia Fuji Thoto Film n. d. LS, instant cameras 
Nitto Kogaku n. d. LS cameras 
Philippines Asahi Optical 1990 LS cameras 
Asahi Optical 1992 photographic lenses 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: n. d. = no data; LS = lens shutter; SLR = single-lens reflex; IL = interchangeable lenses 
APS = advanced photo system (24 nun) 
Sources: MITI, "General Trend of the Japanese Camera Industry, " mimeo; JCIA, Nihon Kamera 
Kogyo-shi, Tokyo, JCIA, 1987, p. 354; Toyo Keizai, Nihon Kaisha-shi Soran, part 2, Toyo Keizai 
Shimposha, 1995; annual reports; MITI (1981) Sangyo Kikal Soran, Tokyo, Industrial Machinery 
Section, Information Machinery Industries Div., ch. 15 "Shashinki, " p. 233 based on Toyo Keizai data. 
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export markets could absorb excess production and by seeking methods to cut 
production costs further, they could sell to an ever larger mass market. Off- 
shore production, for example in Taiwan, also served to insulate them against 
future incidences of 'excess competition' and helped firms avoid trade barriers. 
Early investments came in East Asia for off-shore assembly and sales and in 
Europe for distribution networks to build market share. However, the real 
push for off-shore production did not come until after 1985. 
In cameras, as in other consumer goods industries, both prices and 
productivity have shaped Japanese FDI patterns since 1985. The result has 
been the rise of 'reverse imports' to Japan of photographic goods (i. e. cameras 
and lenses) made by Japanese firms in East Asia. Price pressures forced most 
camera/lens makers to move not only assembly but also parts of their 
production out of Japan over the 1985 to 1995 period. Heightened firm-firm 
rivalry, expansion of markets for Japanese consumer goods in Asia and 
continued saturation of matured markets in the developed countries in the 
early 1990s contributed to this trend. 
The most damaging to the photography firms' profitability over the 
1985 to 1995 decade has been the effect of unpredictable foreign exchange 
rates, particularly the yen-dollar rate, which has forced some drastic measures, 
unthinkable just a few years ago. These include purchasing components from 
the company which offers the lowest price (regardless of keiretsu 
relationships), sacking employees (of the parent firms not the subcontractors) 
in Japan, and moving low as well as high technology manufacturing out of 
Japan. In addition to exchange rate fluctuations, the pressure to keep the price 
of photographic goods low (especially of compact cameras and lenses but also 
on other goods), have made these changes necessary for corporate survival. 
Since the mid-1990s, however, the lack of domestic demand in Japan for 
higher value-added goods coupled with the further appreciation of the yen in 
1993 made 'hollowing out' a real threat: production of some higher value- 
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added goods moved to East Asia. 15 The situation was so bad in the late 1980s, 
that when the JCIA was approached by MITI to write a vision statement for 
the 1990s for cameras/lenses (similar to the one they had prepared in the 
1980s) they refused (cf. JCIA, 1979). The firms did not know where the 
industry was going, because production was moving out of Japan (see table 
5.3). 16In recent years, plants have been built in Vietnam, and through their 
established sales and manufacturing agents in Hong Kong, many firms moved 
into China. 
Has an East Asian production network emerged in the photography 
industry so firms can take advantage of low-cost, low-tech production and 
then export the goods to the open US market (cf. Hatch and Yamamura, 1996)? 
Tejima (1996, p. 374) notes that firms "realized that the most effective economic 
organization is not the conventional domestic network of Japanese assemblers 
and parts suppliers (that is, a closed system within Japanese companies in 
Japan) but international production networks. " There is considerable 
agreement (e. g. Tejima, 1996; Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995; and Hatch and 
Yamamura, 1996) that one of the forces that shifted Japanese manufacturing to 
Asia was bi-lateral US-Japan trade friction over Japan's mounting export 
volumes to the US especially after 1985. But Tejima, unlike the others, appears 
to base his explanation on Japanese firm strategy rather than on government 
guidance. 
Production of cameras in Japan had all but disappeared by 1995, and 
imports of photographic goods had grown. 171n terms of actual trade between 
Japan and other countries, there has been a marked increase in imports to 
Japan of both simple and complex cameras and lenses. The value of the 
imports of 35 nun roll film cameras (i. e. simpler types of cameras, mainly 
compact IS cameras) nearly tripled while the value of SLRs (i. e. more complex 
15 Hollowing out is the Japanese term for de-industrialization, or the loss of basic 
manufacturing in an economy. 
16 Information based on interviews with JCIA officials, Spring 1996. 
17 Only Canon and Nitto Kogaku had camera manufacturing facilities in Japan in 1996. 
Going Global 178 
and higher value-added cameras), increased by a factor of 16 from 570 million 
yen to 8.1 billion yen over the period 1990 to 1995. In terms of increased 
imports to Japan from East Asian countries, 35 mm roll film cameras showed 
the greatest change (see table 5.4 and appendix 5b). In optical products, a 
similar trend appeared. The value of imported photographic objectives (i. e. 
lenses) doubled between 1990 and 1995. As with camera production, 
considerably more lenses were being produced in Asia in 1995 than in 1990. 
Lenses are more complex technologically than most types of cameras, and 
many firms had their lens production in Japan in 1996.18 
In photographic film, the countries of origin of imports broadened quite 
a bit between 1990 and 1995. The major of shares Japanýs imports came only 
from industrialized countries, with low or insignificant levels of imports 
coming from Asia. This is because firms such as Fuji have manufacturing 
plants for film and paper in the US, not in East Asia (Katz, 1988, p. 9). Like the 
camera/lens firms, the film makers rely on the FDI in industrialized countries 
to avoid charges of anti-dumping (e. g. the case brought against Fuji in the US 
in 1993) and to tap into local creativity (e. g. Canon's "kyosei' policy Of 
respecting the country of origin in technology development) (cf. Canon, 1994). 
In the photography industry, assembly plants and manufacturing 
plants have been established in East Asia to serve the local Southeast Asian, 
the Japanese and the US markets. Shrinking corporate profits in Japan in the 
early 1990s, forced many firms to pursue this type of corporate strategy. That 
is, firms decided to utilize the second-tier NICs as a manufacturing base for 
certain products, and to raise the technological level of these plants over time 
when and if conditions for manufacturing in Japan worsen. Hatch and 
Yamamura (1996) claim that Japanese firms exploited low-cost labor in East 
Asia by setting up production facilities there. Furthermore, they say that 
Japanese firms are now exporting 'Japanese' goods made in East Asia to the 
US to avoid additional complaints from the US of the large bi-lateral trade 
18 Information based on interviews, Spring 1996. 
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imbalance in japanýs favor. They also stress the importance of institutions and 
the specificities of each nation, but they dismiss the ability of multinationals to 
make strategic decisions independent of the desires of Japanese government 
bureaucrats. 
The evidence from the photography industry does not fully support 
their claims. Hatch and Yamamura leave no room for the possibility that firms 
might have led and that the government might have taken credit after the fact. 
It is also possible that the business lobby forced concessions from the Japanese 
government to allow these production networks to grow (cf. Encarnation and 
Mason, 1990). What has happened is that Japan is reverse importing 
cameras/lenses because production in Japan has become too expensive or 
otherwise unprofitable. In japanýs photography industry, reverse imports are 
concentrated in cameras and lenses, but not in photographic film. 
Conclusion 
Government policy became gradually less important to the photographic 
firms after 1974, and the firms came to depend more on their own strategies 
directed at globaLmarkets. Firms did not all behave in the same way; some 
relied more on government guidance than others. Other factors that had 
changed from the pre-1974 period were the international monetary regime, the 
1970s oil crises and the economic slow down in the industrialized countries as 
the postwar boom ended. During the 1980s, US and EU tolerance of Japan's 
persistent export surpluses grew thin and once the Soviet threat was gone, 
Japan's role in US security policy in East Asia decreased while the perceived 
threat of the Japanese economy to US competitiveness increased. Consumer 
preferences were also changing and markets for cameras/lenses became 
saturated. Therefore, firm-firm rivalry increased among the camera/lens and 
film manufacturers and as technological levels reached new highs, firm-firm 
battles were fought over market shares. 
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There was no apparent technological threat from the Japanese makers 
to US domination in photographic film until the 1980s. During the 1960s and 
1970s, Japan was strongly urged to abandon its protective measures by the 
OECD, GATT, etc., but as noted in chapter one, the tendency was to change 
course very slowly, and not before the photography industry was ready. 
Market and trade opening in photographic film is a good example of what 
Shigeto Tsuru (1996) called 'not too soon and not too late' liberalization (see 
chapter two). In this case, it means that the camera/ lens and film makers were 
able to organize distribution in the domestic market before trade and capital 
barriers (e. g. import quotas and tariffs and investment restrictions) were 
completely removed in the late 1970s. 
Kodak was seen as a giant in the world photography industry, so it was 
clear to the Japanese photographic film makers that a reliable supply of goods 
to the important domestic market had to be secured. By making the Japanese 
market a stable source of income (through the distribution system), firms 
sought to protect themselves against take-overs, mergers and/or bankruptcy. 
The camera/lens firms set up their own sales companies in the 1960s to secure 
better distribution throughout Japan. The result was that diffusion of cameras 
among the Japanese population rose from 53 percent in 1966 to 82 percent in 
1978, reaching roughly 87 percent in 1994 (see appendix 5c and JCIA, 1995, p. 
24). Fuji Photo Film was more aggressive than Konica in setting up its 
distribution keiretsu with four of the main photographic goods tokuyakuten. 
This was perhaps due to Konica's weaker position in film technology and to 
its posture as being more independent of the government than Fuji. 
During the 1974 to 1995 period, Fuji Photo Film challenged Kodak first 
in volume manufacturing and second in photographic film technology. Fuji's 
relative strength in the US market vis-A-vis Kodak also grew. In 1998, Fuji held 
19 percent of the US market, up from 10 percent in 1994. Kodak, on the other 
hand held 60 percent of the market, down from 80 percent only four years 
earlier (Katz, 1998, p. 9). Kodak's efforts to change Japan's competition policy 
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in the mid-1990s through its Section 301 case and then the US government's 
WTO case were not successful (cf. Dewey Ballantine, 1995 a and 1995b; and 
Katz, 1998). But APS and the increase of foreign ownership (close to 40 
percent) in many firms and the unstable banking/ keiretsu situation may erode 
some of the rigidities that have developed in Japan's distribution system and 
investment structure. This may all work to Kodak's advantage in the long 
term. 
There was both cooperation and rivalry in the government-industry 
relationship regarding photographic film in the post 1973 period, some of 
which may be attributed to the firm's relationship to its horizontal keiretsu 
group. 19 Michael Gerlach (1992, p. 191) notes that membership in a horizontal 
keiretsu group implies "a variety of business interests, some of them not 
directly related to corporate profitability. " As shown above, Fuji Photo Film 
(quasi-affiliated with the Mitsui group) cooperated more closely with the 
government than did Konica (affiliated with both the Mitsubishi and Sanwa 
groups) during the 1974 to 1995 period. Konica's independence from a specific 
group, may have allowed it more leverage to pursue its own path and 
business strategy, while the opposite may have been the case for Fuji. 
Similarly, among the leading camera/lens firms, i. e. Canon, Minolta 
and Nikon, some tended to cooperate with the Japanese government during 
the post-1973 period while others did not. Canon and Nikon developed the 
know-how to make steppers for semiconductor manufacturing within the 
VLSI research project from 1976 to 1980. Jay Stowsky (1989, pp. 249-251) 
makes the point that for the advancement of semiconductor technologies in 
Japan, keiretsu structures "provided an ideal institutional context for close 
collaboration between semiconductor device makers and their fledgling 
equipmeni suppliers. " 
19 Fruin is more circumspect saying (1992, p. 30), "Group membership ... is not determinative, 
not especially predictive, and not at all indicative of behavior. Historical and contemporary 
reasons may be adduced for this. " 
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Canon is a core member of the Fuyo group, and tends to cooperate with 
other firms or with the Japanese government when it suits Canon's overall 
strategy. Nikon is a core member of the Mitsubishi group, and seems more 
likely to cooperate with other firms and with the government perhaps at the 
expense of its own firm strategy and profitability. In contrast, Minolta is 
loosely affiliated with Sanwa and Sumitomo, and leans toward pursuing an 
independent business strategy. This may explain why Minolta was not a 
member of the VLSI project. 
According to Gerlach (1992), some firm behavior can be explained by 
the fact that the newer keiretsu, i. e. Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuyo and Sanwa, are 
much larger and more loosely organized than the keiretsu based on the oldest 
zaibatsu groupings, i. e. Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Furthermore, core 
members of these groups participate in the group's presidents' council (sliadio- 
kai) which meets on a regular basis to discuss group business. In the case of 
Fuji Photo Film which is quasi-related to the Mitsui group, the distinction 
between core members and quasi-related firms serves to emphasize the 
difference between old-guard group members (24 firms in Mitsui) and the 
newer, extended group firms (44 firms in Mitsui) (Gerlach, 1992, pp. 172-173). 
In the Mitsui group, the two tiers of firms meet in separate councils (the 
Nimoku-kai for the core members and the Getsuyo-kai for the quasi-affiliates) 
to discuss business. The structure of the horizontal keiretsu presidents' councils 
and the information transfer function that they perform is reminiscent of the 
industry associations (i. e. the JCIA and the PSMA) and the regular meetings 
held by the presidents of the leading firms to discuss conditions in the 
industry (see chapter three) (cf. Dore, 1986; Fruin, 1992). 
Fuji Photo Film has its own network of firms within its keiretsu, it is also 
part of the Mitsui group, albeit not a core member. Canon likewise has its own 
vertical keiretsu and is part of the Fuyo group. Nikon is a core member of the 
Mitsubishi group, Kyocera a member of the Sanwa group and Asahi Optical 
part of the Dai-Ichi Kangyo group. Konica, Minolta and Olympus are more 
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independent, or their shares are held in roughly equal parts by the financial 
institutions of two or more groups. 
The vertical and horizontal keiretsu serve functions in the Japanese 
market which may be more actively utilized by some firms than others. The 
firm-industry association-government link in the photography industry over 
the 1974 to 1995 period indicates that cooperation (organized through the 
industry associations and with the distributors) was used for price 
maintenance, that is maintaining some price stability and uniforn-dty 
throughout Japan (cf. Dore, 1986). While this behavior is not supported by 
neoclassical economics, it served to protect the firms by allowing them to 
reinvest their profits (which were higher at home than overseas) in R&D, to 
expand their production lines and recycle advances in technology back to 
original lines (especially true for cameras and lenses, but also noted by Dewey 
Ballantine (1995a) in film). As a result, they raised the technological levels of 
their products (i. e. cameras/lenses and film) and raised the level of firm-firm 
competition on a global scale. Not all firms were as active in expanding their 
product lines and directing their profits into R&D that could keep them at the 
forefront of the industry technologically. And perhaps not all firms were able 
to do it successfully. 
The positive side of cooperation and rivalry in the photography 
industry during the post-1974 period is that many firms participate in an 
oligopolistic structure (five in cameras/lenses and two in film). This is far 
more than participate in the rest of the world. In the US, for example, only two 
firms, Kodak and Polaroid, are photographic goods makers and Polaroid is 
struggling to stay in the market altogether. 20 The negative side of Japan's 
oligopolistic structure in the photography industry is that prices are kept very 
high, but consumers also enjoy a wide selection of goods. Firm-firm rivalry in 
the photography industry was mainly in product innovation (coupled with 
20 Information based on interviews, Fall 1996. 
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effective sales and marketing) as firms attempted to capture ever larger global 
market shares. 
The domestic cost of production gradually forced many firms to move 
manufacturing facilities out of Japan, mainly to East Asia where labor costs are 
lower and local markets could be expanded. Since 1985, Japanese 
photographic firms moved lower-technology manufacturing and then higher 
and higher technology manufacturing to their East Asian subsidiaries. How 
this will affect keiretsu structures is still unclear, but as the economic situation 
in Japan continues to flounder, many firms have shifted away from traditional 
main bank (horizontal keiretsu) shareholding to increased levels of foreign 
shareholders. Canon and Fuji are now more than 40 percent owned by non- 
Japanese shareholders, and this apparently is becoming the norm among 
large, successful firms. 21 How the photographic firms' relationships with their 
suppliers and distributors, what has been identified as X-efficiency in Japanese 
firms (cf. Dore, 1986), have been affected by changing economic conditions 
worldwide is also not yet clear. The evidence from the photography industry 
during post-1974 period indicates that the 1990s are bringing about changes to 
the Japanese economy which are led not by government economic policy but 
by firms that are-dependent on global markets. 
C% 
21 This trend was confirmed by Masamoto Yashiro, Non-executive Chairman, Citicorp Japan at 
an Asia-Pacific Technology Seminar in London, 6 July 1998. 
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Appendix 5c Diffusion Rates of Major Durable Goods 
in Japan, 1966 and 1978 
-------------------------------------- 
Item 
---------------- 
1966 
---------------- 
1978 
-------------------------------------- 
Cameras 
---------------- 
52.9 
---------------- 
82.1 
Washing Machines n. d. 98.7 
Color Televisions 0.3 97.8 
Vacuum Cleaners n. d. 97.8 
Refrigerators n. d. 97.5 
Automobiles 12.1 51.8 
Stereos 16.7 56.7 
Tape Recorders 17.9 59.6 
Pianos 4.2 15.1 
Bicycles" 71.8 76.8 
Golf Sets b 4.4 15.5 
-------------------------------------- 
Notes: * 1967 figure 
----------------- --------------- 
b 1969 figure 
n. d. = no data 
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Source: T. Kano and Y. Tezuka (1979) Kamera Shashin Gyokai, 
Tokyo, Kyoikusha, p. 128. 
6. Conclusion 
Introduction 
The story of Japan's government-industry relations vis-a-vis the photography 
industry should not be limited by traditional industrial policy analysis. 
Instead, it should be told from an international political economy perspective 
which includes, e. g., security, technological change, knowledge and 
information flows, the finance and production structures and how the relative 
importance of these factors changed over time. As discussed in chapter two, 
much of the literature on Japan's government-industry relationship is general 
and therefore contributes little to our understanding of how specific sectors 
evolved in Japan during the postwar period. In addition, some literature (e. g. 
Callon, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Kon-dya, 1988; Trezise, 1976; Tyson and Zysman, 
1989) stresses one factor above all others (e. g. state/ bureaucratic intervention 
or market forces) as the key to unlocking the mystery of Japan's economic 
'miracle. ' The state-centered approach credits government bureaucrats with 
the success of Japan's postwar economy (e. g. Johnson, 1982 and 1989; van 
Wolferen, 1990), and the market forces argument assumes that the state did 
nothing to aid the recovery and subsequent growth of the Japanese economy 
(e. g. Trezise, 1976), especially with regard to industries driven by domestic 
demand (e. g. Komiya, 1988). 
The term 'industrial policy' was not commonly used in Japan until the 
early 1970s (Komiya, 1988 and 1990; Okuno-Fujiwara, 1991; Suzumura and 
Okuno, 1986) and it is certainly not unique to Japan. ' Industrial policy cannot 
be discussed without taking economic and noneconomic factors into account 
I See chapter two for a more detailed discussion. 
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or without acknowledging that there is considerable variability among 
industries (Magaziner and Hout, 1980). Nonetheless, the debate over who or 
what controlled Japan's spectacular economic success in the post-WWII period 
continues. 
The 'developmental state' or the 'revisionist' view of industrial policy is 
that a higl-dy-educated bureaucratic elite (in the MoF and MITI) guided Japan's 
economic 'miracle' through effective planning and politics (e. g. Fallows, 1989; 
Johnson, 1982 and 1995; Prestowitz, 1988; and van Wolferen, 1990). 2 At the 
other extreme are liberal econon-dsts who, if they recognize industrial policy's 
existence, see it as a response to 'market failure, ' yet there is little agreement on 
what are appropriate responses by governments to such situations (e. g. Eads 
and Yamamura, 1987; Kon-dya, 1988; and Trezise, 1976). The 'pluralists' (e. g. 
Aoki, et al, 1996; Calder, 1993; Okimoto, 1989; and Vestal, 1993) place 
themselves somewhere in between the contrasting liberal economic and 
revisionist viewpoints. Generally, they recognize that bureaucrats in Japan 
believe that the invisible hand of the market (i. e. industry) at times needs the 
visible hand of government (i. e. the bureaucracy) to keep things on the right 
track (cf. Okimoto, 1989). The pluralists take the industrial policy discourse 
one step closer to- international political economy, because they go beyond the 
strong bureaucrat vs. market failure debate. 
Studies based on sectors and firms which analyze the role of the firm in 
Japan - and grew in popularity during the 1990s (e. g. Ab6,1997, Aoki, 1990; 
Aoki and Dore, 1994; Callon, 1995; Dore, 1986; and Fruin, 1992) - are another 
step in that direction. Some studies focus on one or more industries, but they 
seldom analyze a large number of firms within the industries and most 
concentrate on the industries' relationships with specific bureaucracies. A few 
scholars, notably Mark Mason (1992) and Dennis Encarnation with Mark 
Mason (1990), have focused on multinational corporations (MNCs) vis-a-vis 
Qk 
2 The realist view in political theory (i. e. that state intervention and trade protection were 
crucial for latecomers to the process of industrialization) is very close to the revisionist 
position. 
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Japan's government-industry relationship. 3 MNCs (and other non-state actors) 
are important in the international political economy because they have 
changed the terms of global competition by taking an active role in national, 
regional and international policymaking (Stopford and Strange, 1991; Strange, 
1996). Although a great deal of advancement has been made toward 
developing the international political economy perspective, it has proved 
difficult to move away from the traditional market-state framework (cf. 
Strange, 1996, p. 185, note 2), and the debate over Japan's industrial policy is 
no exception. 
As described in chapter one, the words 'rivalry' and 'cooperation' are 
used to capture the relationship between the state and the market in the 
Japanese photography industry over the post-war period. Both rivalry and 
cooperation existed throughout, but one often took precedence over the other. 
The three main relationships identified in the photography industry are: 
bureaucrat-politician; 
government-industry; and 
firm-firm. 
The evidence presented throughout this thesis shows that government policy 
was at times beneficial and at times problematic for the firms in the Japanese 
photography industry. Kinji Moriyama is quoted in his biography (Yayama 
and Ito, 1988, p. 335) as saying that there was a "balance between competition 
and cooperation" (kyoso to kyocho no baransu) in the photography industry's 
relationship with the Japanese goverrunent. Instead of a balance, the 
photography industry demonstrates that the three relationships identified 
above were characterized more by cooperation during the recovery years up 
to the early 1970s, and more by rivalry after that point. (This is discussed in 
more detail below. ) The word 'rivalry' was chosen over 'competition) because 
even though 'competition' is adequate to describe the firm-firm and the 
MNCs might be more appropriately called transnational corporations. 
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goverrunent-industry relationships, it pales when applied to bureaucrats and 
politicians, who are rivals rather than competitors. 
The story of the Japanese photography industry shows tlwt industries are 
different and finns are different. Moreover, it indicates that the relationship 
between governments and industries is affected by many factors some of 
which are beyond their control and which shift in importance over time. This 
is why more research on government-industry relations in specific industries 
and firms (in Japan and elsewhere) is needed to further our understanding of 
the power relations in international political economy. 
Beyond industrial policy 
The literature review in chapter two analyzed the industrial policy debate, and 
concluded that there is a need to develop the discourse beyond industrial 
policy (and international economic relations) toward international political 
economy. Most industrial policy analyses overlook important factors in the 
international political economy that affect the government-industry debate, 
e. g. a historical perspective, security arrangements, information flows, 
technological change and changes in structural power. An eclectic approach 
was chosen for this thesis, because first, many important aspects of power and 
authority are ignored in the industrial policy literature, and second, the 
international political economy literature is still underdeveloped. The aim was 
to provide (to the extent possible) a full picture of government-industry 
relations in the photography industry. 
The evidence from this thesis shows that Japan's export-oriented 
consumer goods industries (e. g. the photography industry) exemplify the 
change that occurred in Japan's government-industry relations and the growth 
of Japan's MNCs in the global economy, especially in the last ten years. As 
discussed in chapter one, these industries have attracted very little scholarly 
attention (save the electronics industry), and the traditional preoccupation 
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with the so-called "strategic' industries (e. g. steel, shipbuilding, 
petrochemicals, automobiles, semiconductors and computers) predominates 
the literature. Empirical data on most non-strategic Japanese industries is 
lacking, especially in English which has prompted leading scholars to call for 
in-depth case study analyses of other sectors (cf. Yonekura, 1996). 
It is generally agreed that Japan's industrial policy heyday was prior to 
the early 1970s (cf. Callon, 1995; Vestal, 1993). Dynamic change over time 
means that industrial policies in, for example, 1960 differed from industrial 
policies in the 1980s (cf. Vestal, 1993, p. 2). This is because the consensus 
needed for effective industrial policyrnaking began to break down in the early 
1970s, and the tools to carry it out became more limited as Japan's successful 
economy came into the international, and especially the American, spotlight. 
As Japan's geostrategic importance in American foreign policy waned, the US 
government grew more sensitive to the demands of the American business 
community and to narrow econon-dc indicators, e. g. bilateral US-Japan trade 
balances. 
The military-strategic motivations which shaped Japan's early economic 
recovery based on export promotion are vital to understanding the success of 
the photography industry and other early export-oriented industries (cf. 
Cohen, 1949; Itoh and Kiyono, 1988). The geostrategic concerns of US foreign 
policy were critical for facilitating Japan's economic recovery and growth from 
the Allied Occupation right up into the 1970s. Japan's strategic position and 
role as a strong American military, political and economic ally must be ta ken 
into account in any political-economic analysis of Japan's postwar period. 
Import substitution has lost favor with economists, but it is exactly this 
policy (i. e. export promotion and import protection) which worked in Japan's 
early postwar years. Japan's over-riding need was to generate US dollars 
through exports to pay for imports and happily this occurred in a regional and 
international environment which favored import substitution. Without the 
flow of foreign exchange (in US dollars) into Japan to pay for the imports that 
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the economy needed for survival, Japan's economic recovery might never have 
taken hold. As described throughout this thesis, Japanese firms were 
encouraged to export goods that American consumers demanded and to 
recycle some of the dollar earnings into up-grading Japan's industrial 
structure. Over time, the value of Japanese exports rose and the increased 
levels of US dollar earnings hastened economic recovery (cf. Itoh and Kiyono, 
1988, pp. 156-157). A central objective of US foreign policy in the late 1940s was 
getting Japan and Western Europe back on their economic feet. 
The backbone recovery industrieS, 4 including cameras/lenses and film, 
benefited from export promotion and import protection and helped lay the 
foundation for the later development of higher value-added industries (cf. 
Ab6,1997; Hidaka, 1997). This history of import substitution helps explain 
how economic recovery came about and how Japan came to be dependent on 
the export-oriented sector to drive economic expansion (cf. Calder, 1993). 
Exports were successful because of what became a very favorable exchange 
rate for the yen which meant exports could be profitable even when sold at 
very low prices in overseas markets. The exchange rate remained favorable for 
exports until the early 1970s, when the Bretton Woods system began to break 
down. Little political pressure was directed toward the Japanese government 
to revalue the yen because until the early 1970s, Japanese economic recovery 
- as a central feature of US security policy in East Asia - took precedence 
over international trade. 
Because Japanese exports were given priority over goods to be supplied 
to the domestic market, export-oriented firms were able to benefit most from 
export-oriented government policies. As the photography industry shows, 
none of the non-exporting firms survived to the present day the intense 
competition in the industry itself. This is because exporters benefited from 
institutional support (provided by both bureaucrats and politicians) in the 
4 These were the industries promoted in the late 1940s and upon which recovery was based. 
See chapter one for a more detailed discussion. 
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form of the inspection institute and the industry associations. The former 
worked to raise the quality and technological standards of all exports while 
the latter encouraged firms to cooperate through e. g. technological 
development and information sharing. In addition to receiving help in 
improving the quality and international competitiveness of their products, 
exporters were also given help in developing overseas marketing channels. All 
of these activities improved knowledge flows and camaraderie among the 
exporters and insured a degree of social/business control. 
Before the 1970s, much of Japan's industrial policy was focused on the 
industrial and financial aspects of promoting exports and protecting the 
domestic market from imports. Capital flows were bureaucratically controlled 
and much of the financing to make recovery possible came from government 
(mostly long-term lending) and commercial (mainly short-term lending) 
banks. Foreign direct investment was difficult to arrange at best (cf. Mason, 
1992) and most imports were regulated via quotas. In general, the Japanese 
government took a 'developmental state' approach, and kept close watch on 
how the economy was recovering. 
Supportive policies to aid one industry (e. g. machine tools in general, 
Komiya, 1988) created spillovers into other industries which were dependent 
on, for example, high quality machine tools. Thus, a supportive atmosphere 
for economic growth was created not only for the recipients of specific 
industrial policy measures, but also for all industries affected by the directly- 
supported industry. As recovery turned to prosperity, keiretsu structures 
(horizontal and vertical) worked to improve efficiency and thereby reduce 
transaction costs. The horizontal keiretsu (i. e. the reformed and reorganized 
pre-war zaibatsu, or concerns) supported group firms through bank lending in 
an unstable economic environment (especially during the 1950s and 1960s), 
Ok 
while the vertical keiretsu developed to improve business efficiency which, 
once the exchange rate advantage was gone, helped exporting firms price their 
goods competitively. 
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After 1973, the three main relationships (bureaucrat-politician, 
government-industry, and firm-firm) in Japan were dramatically transformed 
by internal and external pressures. In particular, authority over the market 
changed in Japan and globally, and consumer goods industries which are very 
price sensitive were particularly vulnerable to this change. Cooperation was 
gradually replaced by rivalry in the three main relationships and the story of 
the photography industry indicates the extent of the shift in power relations. 
Export promotion of Japanese cameras and lenses was such as success 
in the US and Europe that all international (mainly West German) competition 
had been eliminated or was on the defensive by the early 1970s. This had 
major consequences for firm-firm relations, especially once all the top 
camera/lens firms were Japanese. Moriyama's role shifted from promoting 
and marketing 'Japanese' cameras and lenses to developing international 
cooperation among the remaining photography firms, i. e. keeping 
international photographic relations smooth. The two firms that made film as 
well as cameras/lenses (i. e. Fuji and Konica) were able to benefit from the 
protected Japanese domestic market during the early 1970s. 
But this did not last long as international pressure grew for Japan to 
abandon the developmental strategies of export promotion and import 
protection. Pressure from the US in particular increased as the importance of 
Japan's military-strategic role in US foreign policy decreased. In response to 
external pressures and to popular pressures at home to break the corporatist 
arrangement between firms and the government, MITI was restructured (cf. 
Johnson, 1982). One consequence for the photography industry was a reduced 
role for the industry associations and the inspection institute. But this trend 
had already begun in the 1960s after MITI took control of the camera 
information centers that had been set up due to political (rather than 
bureaucratic) initiative. 
Competitive threats within the global photography industry came 
mainly from Japanese companies, not from non-Japanese companies as in the 
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past. Thus, after the early 1970s, competition increased among the global 
market leaders (i. e. the Japanese firms) for world market shares through 
technological and product innovation. Some firms (e. g. Canon and Minolta) 
turned toward diversification and large-scale production strategies, while 
other firms (e. g. Nikon and Asahi Optical/Pentax) pursued niche strategies. 
MITI's later industrial policies facilitated joint government-industry research 
projects including the development of optics technologies (rather than 
cameras, lenses or film) for steppers which are used in semiconductor 
fabrication. For two of the leading photography firms, Canon and Nikon - 
rather than for all of the exporters as in the past - steppers became a lucrative 
sideline. 
The increased mobility of international finance meant that firms were 
freer to move capital and/or operations out of Japan. This new mobility 
combined with exchange rate pressures on the yen from the mid-1980s, 
encouraged firms to invest in manufacturing facilities (rather than marketing 
offices) in East and Southeast Asia. Fluctuating exchange rates encouraged 
firms to seek least-cost supply alternatives instead of remaining locked into 
traditional vertical keiretsu relationships. 
Partly as a result of international (mainly US) pressure, the photography 
industry's inspection institute (the JCII) was 'deregulated' in 1989, but in fact 
export inspection had already lost all of its effectiveness; quality control 
among the Japanese photography companies was the highest in the world. The 
convergence of photography and electronics into digital imagery was made 
clear when a new competitor, i. e. Sony, introduced the world's first digital still 
video camera, the Mavica, in 1984. Furthermore, the creation of the Advanced 
Photo System consortium (composed of one American and four Japanese 
firms) in the late 1980s underlined the fact that the photography industry 
associations had lost their purpose in the 1990s. In response to the unbounded 
globalization of the industry and the blurred distinction between industries, 
MITI was unable to rally enough interest among the photography firms to 
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create a 1990s'visiore statement for the Japanese photography industry. With a 
global photography industry composed only of transnational Japanese firms, 
Japanese bureaucrats were no longer in a position to exert much influence on 
the industry or on the individual firms. 
There are six main points that sum up the objectives of this section. 
First, many government-industry analyses are general and draw highly 
generalized conclusions (e. g. Eads and Yamarnura, 1987; Magaziner and Hout, 
1980). The assumption that industries and firms behave in the same fashion 
regardless of what they produce leads to very general conclusions. Second, 
many scholars overlook the fact that Japan's industrial policy changed 
dramatically over the postwar period, particularly after the early 1970s (e. g. 
Callon, 1995; Fransman, 1990). The importance of a historical perspective has 
been clearly shown (e. g. Dore, 1986; Fruin, 1992; Vestal, 1993). Third, when it 
comes to goverrunent-industry relations and attitudes toward industrial 
policy, the US is more the exception than the rule. Two-country comparisons 
(usually US-Japan comparisons, e. g. Gerlach, 1992; Okimoto, 1989) generate 
only broad conclusions. Fourth, as the tendency to 'fit' data to a particular 
model or theory has grown (cf. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993), the general 
has taken priority over the specific masking important differences (as well as 
similarities) among industries and firms. Fifth, the strict boundaries between 
acaden-dc disciplines (e. g. between business and economics, economics and 
politics) must be crossed through, for example, the eclectic approach to 
improve our international political economy analyses. If, for example, this 
thesis had ignored the roles played by firms, technology or information flows 
in the evolution of the Japanese photography industry, the conclusions would 
have been very different. Finally, the rise of multinationals in the photography 
industry tells a universal story of the globalization of business. This is where 
there appears to be some degree of convergence among industries and firms; 
certain similarities (i. e. among industries and among firms) appear to have 
developed that cross national borders. However, the Japanese state still plays 
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an important role in negotiating FDI arrangements, especially with the 
authoritarian states of East and Southeast Asia. 
Surprisingly little heed has been given to the success of Japan's export 
promotion/ import protection strategy in Japan's economic 'miracle' and 
consequently few industries (particularly the non-strategic ones) have been 
studied in any depth. This is why this analysis of the Japanese photography 
industry is so important. 
In the next two sections, rivalry and cooperation are presented as a 
general overview of Japan's postwar growth and expansion relative to the 
Japanese photography industry. To show how the balance between rivalry and 
cooperation shifted over time, the most salient examples of politician- 
bureaucrat, government-industry and firm-firm cooperation/ rivalry are 
reviewed. It is clear that both rivalry and cooperation always existed in the 
Japanese photography industry, but that one usually took precedence over the 
other. 
More cooperation, less rivalry, 1945-1973 
Prior to the early 1970s, the bureaucrat-politician, government-industry, and 
firm-firm relationships were generally cooperative. The Japanese economy 
was devastated by WWII. It was geographically and politically isolated in 
Asia, and it was dependent on the US for military security. According to Lester 
Thurow (1992, p. 29), "[fln 1950, the United States had a per capita GNP four 
times that of West Germany and fifteen times that of japan. "5 Japan was still a 
minor economic power in 1960 (three percent of world GNP) as compared 
with the economies of Western Europe (Spero, 1990). The economy of the 
United Kingdom alone was twice the size of Japan at that time. 
5 For comparisons sake, on a per capita basis, Japan received up to 1950 one-third of what the 
American zone in West Germany (with one-fifth of the population) was allocated by the US 
government for its initial recovery (Manchester, 1978, p. 598). 
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Article Nine of the postwar constitution prevents Japan from acquiring 
the means to wage war (Tsuru, 1996, pp. 28-29). US policy toward Japan's 
rearmament changed by 1952 to allow - and even encourage - Japanese 
firms to engage in arms manufacture. Richard Samuels (1994, pp. 131-132) 
notes that Japan's postwar constitution "leaves the legal status of weapons 
manufacture even more vague than it does the maintenance of military 
forces. " Immediately after WMI, Japanese firms were restricted to 
manufacturing civilian or consumer products, that is, necessities or luxuries 
with a positive to high income elasticities of demand. The Allied Occupation's 
General Headquarters (GHQ) policy after 1948 was that Japanese industry 
should recover; the industries that were designated to be converted from 
military to civilian production were called heirva sangyo, or "peace industries. '6 
Camera/lens and film manufacturing belonged to this category (Seki, et al, 
1961, p. 3). In the late 1940s, GHQ supplied Swiss machine tools to only four 
firms, Canon, Minolta, Nikon and Seiko, to help them recover. Most machine 
tools in operation at that time were of very poor quality (cf. Cohen, 1949). 
Since every firm could not be supplied with machine tools, only a handful 
were selected. Favoring a small number of firms is a fundamental aspect of US 
finn rivalry rather than cooperation. industrial policyýwhich encourages finn- 
GHQ policy, it turns out, contrasted sharply with the Japanese goverrunent's 
post-Occupation policy of aiding many (but not all) firms enter the US market 
in the n-dd-1950s (see below). 
In the late 1940s, the American business community enthusiastically 
supported the idea of opening up the Japanese market to US goods and the 
setting of a single exchange rate; they saw the potential of the Japanese market 
for American goods (cf. Tsuru, 1996; Mason, 1992). Technology imports (which Ck 
were costly due to licensing fees) were needed by Japan to bring the economy 
on track, but they required far more foreign exchange (i. e. US dollars) than 
6 GHQ (i. e. General MacArthur) was restricted from making economic policy after MacArthur 
rejected proposals contained in the Young Report in 1948 (Tsuru, 1996). 
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Japan's exports earned, so higher and higher value-added goods were 
promoted in order to cover the shortfall (cf. Ab6,1997; Krause and Sekiguchi, 
1976). In an effort to begin bringing Japan's merchandise trade into balance, 
foreign exchange flows were controlled by the 'link system' which tied the 
allocation of foreign exchange for imports of, e. g. raw materials, to export 
performance (Itoh and Kiyono, 1988, pp. 169-173; 179 note 3). 7 The US 
government allocated federal funds to Japan to pay the cost of Japan's imports 
most of which originated in the US. Consumer goods made in Japan were 
channeled through US military post exchanges (PXs) located in Japan as 
'domestic' exports to the US. Cameras and lenses manufactured by the firms 
that received the Swiss machine tools were required to supply 80 percent of 
their output to the PXs as exports. When US military personnel returned to the 
US, they took their cameras/lenses with them, creating a base from which 
export promotion could later take off. 
In the photography industry, firms cooperated to re-establish prewar 
industry associations, but their efforts were not welcomed by GHQ on the 
grounds that firm-firm cooperation constituted anti-competitive behavior. 
After the Occupation ended in 1952, however, the industry associations (e. g. 
the Japan Camera Industry Association OCIA) and the Photo-Sensitive 
Materials Manufacturers Association (PSMA)) were encouraged to reorganize 
by the Japanese government because they could act as information 
intermediaries between the firms within the industry and between firms and 
their relevant bureaucracy. Thus, there was both govern nien t-indits try andfirnz- 
firm cooperation after 1952. 
One of the key actors helping the camera industry at this time was 
p9litician Kinji Moriyama who helped set up the Japan Camera Inspection 
7 In June 1948, Prime Minister Yoshida said, "As Japan lacks raw materials, she must depend 
upon their importation in order to export processed articles. The exportation of highly 
processed articles, therefore, is more profitable and desirable in obtaining dollars than that of 
coarse manufactured goods. In other words, the value of yen spent for obtaining dollars 
through export must be lower in the case of highly processed articles than in that of coarse 
goods. " See "Economic independence and Export, " Kogyo, June 28,1948 cited in Cohen (1949, 
pp. 495-496, note 186). 
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Institute OCII) for the inspection of export goods. This was done to comply 
with the Export Inspection Law and to raise the standards of Japanese-made 
cameras and lenses. Moriyama worked on behalf of the photography firms to 
lower excise taxes (determined by bureaucrats) on cameras and film sold in 
Japan. Most consumer goods, were luxuries for the average Japanese 
household in 1950, and as such were subject to excise taxes which dampened 
domestic demand. But exports and domestic sales were keys to the success of 
the photography industry and specifically to the exporting firms during the 
postwar period. Once the excise taxes had been significantly reduced, 
domestic demand for export-quality cameras and lenses grew quickly. 
Moriyama's involvement in the industry is an example of politician-bitreaticrat 
rivalry. Over time, he became a zoku politician (i. e. a politician who works on 
behalf of a specific industry) for the photography industry (cf. Curtis, 1988). 
To correct Japanýs balance of payments, the US market was opened to 
Japanese exports in the early 1950s and sales of low-cost Japanese 
cameras/lenses grew. Japanese goods competed mainly with West German 
goods in the more specialized 35 mm. market rather than other formats 
dominated by US manufacturers. West German cameras/lenses were of very 
high quality and enjoyed an excellent reputation, but Japanese goods were 
cheaper, so they gained market share quickly. Part of the JCIA's and the JCII's 
role was to sponsor camera shows and conduct market surveys to help 
establish a reputation of quality and reliability for Japanese cameras/lenses 
overseas. The camera information and service centers that were set up in New 
York (1955), Okinawa (1956), London and Dusseldorf (1963) were staffed by 
representatives of the JCIA member firms, the JCIA, the JCII and later by 
officials from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) OCIA, 
1987; JCII, 1984). The centers were concerned with the service and sale of all 
brands of exported cameras/lenses and with spreading information about 
Japanese cameras in overseas markets. The JCII's inspection activities were 
directed solely at exported cameras/lenses. Thus, there was govenirtient- 
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industry cooperation in overseas marketing activities and finn-firm cooperation 
among exporters in building export markets. 
Industry and government also cooperated in research to ensure that 
Japanese camera and lens designs were not merely copies of other 
manufacturers' designs. The Japan Machinery Design Center GMDC) and the 
JCII cooperated to create the famous black-and-gold 'Passed' seal of assurance 
that exported cameras and lenses were of unique designs and were thorougl-dy 
inspected and tested for the highest quality. Another example of governinent- 
industry cooperation was on technological development for improving lens 
performance and production and developing automatic light metering 
systems. Most of this research was carried out at the JCIA (in cooperation with 
the member firms) in the 1950s, and the research carried out at Fuji Photo 
Film's laboratory on optic glass, for example, received funding from MITI. 
After the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, firms that had expanded production 
capacity faced a recessionary climate and cut-throat price wars (i. e. 'excess 
competition'). The 12 leading JCIA member companies which controlled 80 
percent of total Japanese camera production in 1965 applied for and were 
granted the right to form a recession cartel for one year OCIA, 1987). The firms 
agreed to control retail prices (i. e. not engage in cut-throat pricing) and cut 
production of 35 mm cameras by 20 percent OCII, 1984; Miyabayashi, 1963). 
This was another example of government-industnj cooperation. At roughly the 
same time, MITI decided to withhold funds from the camera information and 
service center in New York and instead establish in 1963 four Light Machinery 
Centers in New York, London, Dusseldorf and Bangkok. The camera/lens 
manufacturers were forced to join the new centers, albeit somewhat reluctantly 
(cf. Yayama and Ito, 1988), since at that time they were Japan's most successful 
exporters of light machinery (cf. Miyabayashi, 1963). In this instance, there was 
some government-industry rivalry. 
During the 1950 to 1973 period, Japan enjoyed an increasingly favorable 
foreign exchange rate at 360 yen to the dollar from 1949 until 1971. Japan's 
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stable exchange rate was important in helping Japanese firms build dominant 
market shares in the US by 1960 and in Europe by 1970. Tariffs, quotas, foreign 
exchange controls, export tax credits and restrictions on FDI and corporate 
ownership were some of the key components of export promotion and import 
protection that had allowed Japan's economy to recover quickly after the war, 
and helped the photography companies overtake and surpass all other 
camera/lens manufacturers globally by the early 1970s. Military and economic 
dependence on the US protected Japan from international pressure (which 
grew throughout the 1960s) to revalue the yen and to conform fully to 
international trading arrangements (e. g. the GATT, OECD and IMF charters) 
by lowering tariffs, eliminating quota restrictions and opening the market to 
foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The period up to 1973 was characterized by econon-dc expansion in the 
developed countries which meant rising incomes, more leisure time and the 
appearance of a consumer society. Because consumers had more money and 
free time (some of which was spent on holidays) than in the past, goods that 
had previously been perceived as luxury items were now demanded by a 
larger proportion of the population. Japanese photography firms invested in 
plant and equipment (particularly machine tools in the 1950s) to upgrade their 
product lines and expand manufacturing capacity to meet increased demand. 
Long-term lending through the Japan Development Bank (among others) was 
important in the early recovery years when firms needed to invest in new 
plant and equipment. Firms that received government lending, e. g. JDB loans, 
could easily obtain additional loans from commercial banks. 8 Expanded 
supply and demand translated into growth for many of the Japanese 
photography firms, particularly the exporters. Postwar economic expansion 
worldwide and Japan's economic recovery coincided during the 1945 to 1973 
8 As firms became more transnational, the need for development financing disappeared and 
performance replaced government guidance as an indicator of creditworthiness. 
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period, a time that was generally characterized by govern men t-indtis tnj 
cooperation in the Japanese photography industry. 
More rivalry, less cooperation, 1974-1995 
Japanýs promotion of high value-added exports and protection of the domestic 
market from imports allowed Japan to achieve a balance in its merchandise 
trade (exports minus imports of traded goods) in the early 1960s. However, the 
more important current account (net exports of goods and services minus net 
imports of goods and services, including invisible trade such as royalties paid 
on patents) did not begin to show a surplus until the late 1960s (Lincoln, 1988; 
Nakamura, 1981). The 1950 to 1973 period was one of economic recovery 
through an industrial policy of export promotion. 
After 1974, export promotion was no longer possible since Japan's 
trading partners were beginning to react to the floods of Japanese goods 
entering their markets. Import protection had also run its course since Japan 
was forced to open the domestic market to international competition. By the 
late 1970s and especially throughout the 1980s, Japan's export trade grew very 
quickly resulting in considerable friction with Japan's trading partners, 
particularly with the US. Industrial policy pursued by the US had helped 
create a situation where most consumer goods were no longer manufactured 
in the US. Many US multinationals were being supplied by Japanese firms on 
an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) basis. This did not apply to 
infrastructure or services, e. g. finance, housing, roads and highways and 
retailing, which have flourished in the US. Most American firms (in e. g. ships, 
aircraft, weapons, space-related technology and computers) became highly 
'IVA 
dependent on defense contracts for their direction and livelihood (cf. Florida 
and Kenney, 1990; Melman, 1971). 9 To compete with the Soviet Union, many 
9 Samuels (1994) discusses how the Japanese economy which is highly dependent on consumer 
goods industries has generated economic growth successfully, without dependence on military 
industries, quite unlike the US. 
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invested in military-related R&D and concentrated on developing new 
n-dlitary-use technologies rather than consumer goods. 
During the Occupation of Japan, American expectations had been that 
most of Japan's post-WWII restrictions on trade and investment would be 
removed relatively quickly after economic recovery had been achieved. For 
most of the 1945 to 1973 period, however, the US market was opened to 
Japanese goods, but the Japanese market remained closed to imports which 
competed with foreign exchange-earning exports. FDI to Japan was limited to 
those few large US firms that were willing to part with some of their 
technological know-how (Itoh and Kiyono, 1988; Mason, 1992; Encarnation 
and Mason, 1990; and Tsuru, 1996). According to Kinji Moriyama (Yayama 
and Ito, 1988, p. 335), the secret to the photography industry's success was that 
the developed countries "'turned a blind eye to [Japanese imported] cameras" 
(kamera gurai oome ni mite yaro) because the Japanese economy was perceived as 
being weak. Without the open export markets in the US in the 1950s and in 
Europe in the 1960s, the photography industry might never have recovered or 
prospered. 
Until the early 1970s, the Japanese government avoided opening the 
domestic market to imports, complying with international trading norms and 
removing restrictions on, e. g. FDI, by playing off the conflicting interests (i. e. 
security, diplomacy and trade) of the US Pentagon, Commerce and State 
Departments. But the American government grew less and less tolerant of 
Japan's seemingly closed market once the US-Japan bilateral trade balance got 
too far out of hand, particularly during the 1980s (cf. Tyson, 1992). Trade 
became a major American political issue in the US due to the recessions of the 
1970s and pressure on Japan to become more like the US (i. e. to have an open, 
transparent economy in which firms operate on a level playing field) 
continued to mount throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Americans also 
became concerned that military security had compromised their nation's 
economic security. 
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Because of the legacy of WWII, Japan was an unwelcome political and 
trading partner in Asia until the mid-late 1980s when Japanese investments 
were seen as an alternative to the fading American presence (Lincoln, 1993; 
Magaziner and Hout, 1980). When the East Asian newly industrializing 
countries (NICs), the second-tier NICs and then China took off, more of the 
world's attention was focused on the economies of Japan and East Asia. 10 It 
became the new growth area four decades after the end of WWII and 
American firms wanted to take advantage of it. Suddenly, many American 
firms became interested in investing in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia. 
Japan's levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) rose substantially in the 
1980s, and firms in the photography industry were quick to develop marketing 
and distribution in the East and Southeast Asian markets through FDI. Firms 
used FDI to sustain and control trade through the establishment of local 
distribution networks, much as they had done in the US and Europe (cf. 
Encarnation, 1992). Later in the 1980s when the yen became too strong for 
firms to manufacture profitably in Japan, the photography firms moved 
assembly and production into the region. Firms typically did this in a follow- 
the-leader pattern reflecting the degree of firin-firin rival? y that existed. Good 
relationships with subsidiary firms were important throughout the period, but 
changed in degree and in kind as the needs of the industry changed. Once 
manufacturing moved overseas and price pressures on production in Japan 
became intolerable due to the high yen (after 1985), supplier relationships 
became strained and were often replaced solely by price-quality 
considerations. 
Photographic film manufacturers faced a very different climate when 
they attempted to repeat for film the export promotion strategies which had 
worked so well for their cameras/lenses. Because the film manufacturers also 
produce cameras and lenses (they were always ranked among the top seven 
10 The NiCs are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore; the second-tier NICs are Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
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producers in terms of sales for all types of cameras/ lenses), they were already 
experienced in successful export promotion and import protection for 
cameras/lenses. In the 1970s, however, export promotion was no longer a 
practical option; the Japanese market could no longer be protected by tariffs, 
quotas and various capital controls, and Japanese exports became less 
welcome in the US and Europe. Government-industry cooperation (including 
with the JCIA and the PSMA) was needed, according to MITI and the firms, to 
organize camera/lens and film distribution in the Japanese market to achieve 
retail price maintenance and prevent powerful foreign competitors from 
gaining significant market share through price wars. 
Once Japanese import quotas and restrictions were lifted in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, Japanese firms manufacturing cameras/lenses (i. e. not 
photographic film) were world leaders and therefore no longer susceptible to 
foreign competition or takeovers. The film manufacturers (i. e. Fuji Photo Film 
and Konica) were not as strong and they chose two different routes to manage 
the inevitable - competition in an open world market. Fuji Photo Film 
purchased controlling shares in several major wholesalers to secure its huge 70 
percent domestic market share. " The remaining 30 percent was divided 
among Konica (20 percent), Kodak (7 percent) and Agfa (3 percent) in 1995. 
Konica which was less keen on government-industry cooperation and more 
inclined to firm-firm rivalry chose not to pursue such an extensive distribution 
keiretsu scheme. 12The 'keiretsu-ization' (keiretsuka) of film distribution pursued 
by Fuji Photo Film is considered to be anti-competitive behavior by free 
traders. From the mid-1980s onwards, the US engaged Japan in various 
bilateral talks to deregulate the Japanese market to allow access by foreign 
companies (cf. Prestowitz, 1988), and recent US-Japan talks have addressed the 
keiretsu-dominated distribution system. It was unsuccessfully argued by the 
11 Fuji Photo Film's wholesalers apparently keep Fuji film on the retailers' shelves, not the other 
brands (cf. Dewey Ballantine, 1995a and 1995b). 
12 Konica consistently innovated camera/lens technologies over the postwar period and 
developed its own copiers, but its contributions to advancing photographic film technology 
suffered. 
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US (for Kodak) that the distribution system (dominated by Fuji Photo Film) 
acts as a non-tariff barrier to firms (e. g. Kodak and Agfa) which are not part of 
the system (cf. Dewey Ballantine, 1995a and 1995b; Katz, 1998). 13 
Firm-finn rivalry is especially keen in mature industries where market 
shares have been established. Once the Japanese camera/lens manufacturers 
had triumphed in the US and Europe by the early 1970s, firm-firm rivalry 
among them intensified. Many of the leading firms (e. g. Canon, Minolta, 
Konica and Fuji Photo Film) diversified into other optics-based products (e. g. 
photocopiers, facsimile machines, steppers, gastrocameras and endoscopes) 
(cf. Fruin, 1992). Intense firm-firm rivalry in national and global markets has 
also fed pressures to achieve economies of scale in the photography industry. 
Their challenge was to expand their markets enough to satisfy demand 
through large-scale production. Large production volumes also meant that 
prices would be kept low which was important as cameras/lenses came to be 
more technologically complex. 
Canon used an American television ad campaign in 1976 to build 
product recognition for the Canon AE-1, the world's first computerized 
camera. Their aim was to raise awareness of the Canon brand and to expand 
Canon's US market share which was until that time comparatively low 
(Sandoz, 1997). The trend of 35 nim SLR cameras as mass produced, mass 
market goods (i. e. high quality cameras sold at very reasonable prices) began 
after that time with Canon in the lead. Computerization and the use of a 
central processing unit in each camera reduced the number of camera parts 
from around 1,300 to roughly 300 parts. As a result, cameras became more 
reliable and cheaper to produce (Sandoz, 1997, p. 110). 14 When Minolta 
introduced its Alpha-7000 autofocus SLR camera in the mid-1980s, it stole the 
leading position from Canon which had held the top spot since 1976 with the 
13 This was the crux of the unsuccessful VV70 case brought by the US government on behalf of 
Kodak against the Japanese government and Fuji Photo Film. 
14 The sales price of the SLRs fell by between $100 and $150. 
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AE-1.15 Canon retaliated launching the EOS camera two years later and a swift, 
intense battle ensued between Minolta and Canon for the number one spot in 
the industry. Nikon joined in somewhat later with its own autofocus SLR line. 
The situation was similar in the photography industry in the 1980s, as Kodak 
and Fuji battled over which firm could introduce the highest-speed film. Fim- 
finn ? ivalry over world market shares thus became the norm in the 1980s. 
Globalization of the industry based on global sales has in recent years 
led to global production, i. e. manufacturing in East Asia, Europe and North 
America, for a few firms. 16 Firms' decreasing dependence on bank financing in 
the 1980s may mean the weakening of their bank ties and other problems for 
Japan's financial system (Hoshi, 1994). 17 Japan's banking industry's current 
troubles and the recent increase in foreign ownership of Canon and Fuji Photo 
Film (roughly 40 percent each in 1996) indicates that there may be some truth 
in the notion that keiretsu ties are becoming progressively looser, and that firm- 
firm rivalry might well intensify. 
MITI's VLSI Project (1976-1980) enhanced knowledge creation and 
knowledge flows among the photography and electronics industries through 
government-industry cooperation (cf. Fransman, 1990; Sigurdson, 1986). 
However, the pýroject helped two camera/lens firms, i. e. Canon and Nikon, 
develop stepper technology (for the photolithography fabrication of 
semiconductors) which allowed them to diversify into a new product line. 
Canon and Nikon now control global stepper manufacturing. When in 1981 
Sony launched the Mavica, the world's first digital still video camera, firm-firm 
rivalry crossed traditional industry lines. At the same time, firm-firm cooperation 
across national borders came in the form of the Advanced Photo System (APS) 
consortium (composed of Kodak, Canon, Fuji Photo Film, Minolta and Nikon). 
15 The Alpha-7000 was called the Maxxum in the US market and the Minolta 7000 AF in 
Europe (Lewis, 1991, p. 178). 
16 This trend has not been unique to the photography industry or industry in Japan (Strange, 
1994, p. 183). 
17 According to Hoshi (1994, p. 290) "[a]n industrial firm may develop a main bank 
relationship without being involved in a kig1jo shudan [corporate group or horizontal keiretsu]. " 
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Their aim was to cooperate in developing new, international standards and 
equipment for the 24 mm APS film format, which was sold as a higher 
resolution film than the traditional 35 mm format. Risk against product failure 
was spread across the five consortium members, an important consideration 
for Kodak. In Japan, because only four of the seven leading photography firms 
were included in the consortium, APS challenged traditional governrnent- 
industry relations and acted as one more nail in the coffin of governrnent- 
industry cooperation. Thus, the 1974 to 1995 period was characterized mainly 
by government-industry rivalry. 
Future research directions 
In the photography industry in the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese goverrunent 
appears to have prevented industry leaders from gaining an unfair advantage 
over weaker firms. In the interests of all firms (i. e. not favoring one firm over 
another), policies were implemented to encourage weaker firms to keep up 
with the market leaders. Such policies were a double-edged sword; they 
created a more level playing field for weaker firms while they restrained 
market leaders from pulling too far ahead. Gover=ent intervention in the 
photography industry during the early postwar years (1950-1973) favored 
camera/lens firms that would best be able to export high value-added goods 
to the US and European markets. Policies (i. e. through the JCIA and the JCII) 
were designed to help a relatively large group of firms, not just one or two. In 
doing so, Japanese bureaucrats effectively prevented the leading camera/lens 
firms from creating a monopolistic industrial structure. Instead, they favored a 
large oligopoly. In photographic film, there is an oligopolistic structure with 
only two firms because the magnitude of capital needed to challenge the 
industry leader, Kodak, which was a first mover in the industry (cf. Chandler, 
1988), acted as a strong barrier to new entrants. That two of the four world- 
class film makers have Japan as their nation of origin is quite unusual. 
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Many industries in Japan are characterized by a large number of 
successful firms due to the 'one-set principle, ' meaning that there ought to be 
at least six firms in each industry, one from each of the six horizontal keiretsti 
groups. As discussed in chapters four and five, there was wide variation 
among the Japanese camera/lens and film firms in terms of keiretsu 
membership and degree of cooperation with the governn-lent. Member firms of 
keiretsu groups have not always concurred with bureaucratic guidance (e. g. the 
automobile industry and the steel industry, cf. Johnson, 1982), therefore 
keiretsu affiliation is not always a reliable guide to firm behavior. 
Returning to the original question posed in this thesis: have Japanese 
firms or the Japanese goverm-nent driven the success of the Japanese 
photography industry? This thesis shows that some companies have been 
successful despite government involvement, while others have been successful 
because of it. Government policy and firm behavior are interdependent. A 
firm's decision whether to cooperate with government policies or not may 
depend on how much power firms have to affect their own profitability and 
survival. Their actions may at times look like coordination with government 
policy and at other times not. Policy may at times be shaped by or may be 
formulated to support (or legitin-dze) events that are already occurring, a 
system that works, or something that may have emerged out of practical 
realities, not because omniscient bureaucrats agreed to set forth policies that 
organized the firms to respond in certain predictable ways. In the 
photography industry, when bureaucrats thought they were losing control 
over the firms, they sought to (re)assert their power. One reason for their 
actions was that much of the postwar system was in flux during the early 
1970s, and bureaucrats may have felt that they were in danger of losing their 
raison detre (cf. Johnson, 1982). 
Gover=ent influence was most important in the early years 
particularly because of the tight controls that were placed on the industry 
during the recovery period. But the influence of the government waned as the 
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firms within the industry prospered. US foreign policy objectives aided the 
Japanese photography industry. Japan's economy was very weak in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and it took years for the image of poor quality Japanese 
manufactures to disappear. Government influence after 1974 was not always 
desirable (from the firms' point of view) and not always effective. Over time, 
formulating a policy consensus to promote economic growth before all else 
was challenged domestically and internationally; appropriate government 
guidance became more elusive. Depending on the incentives to cooperate and 
the firm's sense of obligation to go along with the government, firms 
cooperated with government initiatives to varying degrees. The rise of MNCs 
and the opening of the Japanese market to international competition went 
rougl-dy hand-in-hand with the decline in government control over Japanese 
industry, except in the area of FDI negotiations with East and Southeast Asian 
governments. 
In the increasingly globalized world economy, exporting firms can take 
advantage of opportunities (e. g. transfer pricing, proximity to customers and 
markets, lower transport costs and faster response times to local needs) and 
minimize constraints to their profitability (e. g. tax and labor laws, trade and 
investment restrictions). Government tax breaks and FDI incentive packages 
may be crucial to FDI decisions and the most robust firms look worldwide for 
strategic advantages. 
Time plays an important role in determining which firms survive and 
which do not. It is quite likely that Japan's photography industry will continue 
to mature and of the current leading photography (i. e. camera/lens and film) 
firms only a few will be able to remain globally competitive in those products 
in the future. The evidence from this thesis indicates that firms which remain 
dependent on narrow, bureaucratic interests and on the domestic market for 
production and sales may not survive the current recession in Japan and are 
unlikely to be the global business leaders of the future. 
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The difficulty of moving beyond a market-state analysis has been 
highlighted in this concluding chapter. Any account that is dependent on 
actors as the core of the analysis, e. g. bureaucrat, businessman or politician, is 
skewed by personal experience, interpretation and/or ideology. What is 
missing is balance, i. e. drawing on the experiences and perspectives of all who 
were involved in Japanýs economic recovery, not only bureaucrats, 
businessmen, and politicians. The problem is how to achieve this goal. 
Instead of relying solely on industrial policy, this thesis sought to 
develop a broad international political economy perspective through an 
eclectic approach. We need to go beyond the limitations of traditional political 
and econon-dc analysis by considering, e. g., firms, technology, security, human 
interaction and information flows, different types of authority/power and 
how all these factors change over time. Strange (1994) stresses the importance 
of using a broad framework within which a large variety of factors can be 
accounted for without emphasizing the importance of one over another but 
while stressing their interlinkages. And by asking the central question 'who 
benefits?, ' the path to de-mystifying how the Japanese economy recovered and 
prospered in the postwar period, using the photography industry as the case 
analyzed, becomes clearer. 
Some important questions have been raised in this thesis specifically 
about Japan's industrial policy toward the photography industry and 
generally about the Japanese economy. First, is the photography industry 
representative of what has been identified above as 'recovery industries' (i. e. 
cameras/lenses, sewing machines, bicycles and clocks/ watches)? Do the 
camera/lens manufacturers represent a group of firms that were forced by 
GHQ to export goods to bring in foreign exchange (i. e. US dollars) to pay for 
the recovery of the Japanese economy after WWII? Do the film manufacturers 
(which also made cameras and lenses) represent a group of firms that were 
able to benefit or learn from the export promotion and import protection 
arrangement, and then attempt to repeat it after export promotion and import 
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protection were no longer viable? The evidence suggests that that the answers 
to all of these questions is yes. 
US foreign policy encouraged Japanese economic recovery based on 
exports to an open US economy, and because of that policy the US government 
turned a blind eye to what Japanese goods did to the competition (both 
American and European) in the US market. In other words, the US overlooked 
Japan's export promotion and import protection policies because security (i. e. 
having Japan as a bulwark against Communism in Asia) took priority in the 
perception of the national interest. 
Only after US foreign policy shifted toward developing friendly 
relations with China in the early 1970s did criticism of Japanese export 
practices begin to get heard in Washington. American manufacturers of, for 
example, color televisions and automobiles had to compete with inexpensive, 
high-quality Japanese goods which had ready access to the US market. In the 
1980s, as Japanese firms moved into exporting higher and higher value-added 
goods to the US (e. g. various road vehicles, computers and semiconductors) 
complaints by US firms grew and issues of equal market access in Japan for 
American firms became part of the US goverru-nent's agenda. 
American'Policy toward Japan, especially from 1949 to the early 1970s, 
is one of the main reasons why Japanese firms have exported so successfully to 
the US and to the world. Clearly, US military security policy was disconnected 
from US economic security policy for several decades after WWII. Once these 
interests converged, e. g. when American firms specializing in dual-use 
technologies (Le. consumer goods as well as military goods) were threatened 
by Japanese imports, both military and economic security became important 
US foreign policy goals (cf. Samuels, 1994). Books and articles about how Japan 
became, to quote Ezra Vogel (1979 and 1985), 'number one' and how the US 
should 'comeback' illustrate just how important the study of Japan and the 
implications of Japan's economic strength for US foreign economic and 
strategic policy have become. 
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The evidence from this thesis suggests that the backbone recovery 
industries (e. g. cameras/lenses, sewing machines, clocks/watches and 
bicycles) tell quite a different story about japanýs political economy than the 
so-called strategic industries (e. g. steel, automobiles, computers and 
semiconductors). This is important because much of the popular 
understanding about Japan's postwar economic 'miracle' is informed - or 
misinformed - by studies of these 'strategic' industries. Many of these studies 
over-emphasize the role of the state (i. e. the bureaucrats) or the role of market 
forces (cf. Johnson, 1982; van Wolferen, 1990). Popular myths about Japan (e. g. 
Japan's East Asian production network which was orchestrated by MITI to 
deflect bilateral trade conflicts, Hatch and Yamamura, 1996) might reflect a 
Particular agenda because they do not take account of important factors (e. g. 
the growing global nature of Japanese business, not dependent on guidance 
from MITI) that have shaped Japan's postwar economy. This thesis indicates 
that there is much to do to in order to develop the international political 
economy analyses on Japan and one step in that direction would be to analyze 
other similar industries that were promoted via exports in the early recovery 
years. 
The second important question raised by this thesis is whether Japan's 
industrial structure has become dependent on exports. Many scholars have 
described the 'dual structure' of the Japanese economy as having an efficient 
export-oriented manufacturing sector and an inefficient domestic sector (e. g. 
distribution, construction, tobacco and services) (Vestal, 1993; Calder, 1993; 
Katz, 1997). 18 If this is so, Japan has become dependent on its very efficient 
export sector to cover its high dependence on imports (of e. g. oil and primary 
commodities) and the high costs associated with an inefficient domestic 
production and distribution system. Evidence from the photography industry 
indicates that camera/lens firms' experience with export promotion during the 
Is Nakamura (1981) discusses a different dual structure (niju kozo) in the prewar period, 
namely the simultaneous existence of a modem industrial economy and traditional cottage 
industry. 
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recovery period (and with the help of US policies) was utilized when 
photographic film exports took off in the 1970s. The success of Japan's export 
firms may have been the engine behind Japanýs economic growth, but can this 
continue into the future? 
If exports do drive the Japanese economic growth, can the current trend 
toward the globalization of business (i. e. the independence of firms from their 
home econon-des) be reconciled with Japan's dependence on exports? How will 
the economy respond if the export-oriented companies continue to behave as 
other multinationals and choose more or less where they want to pay taxes, 
which labor policies suit them, which type of corporate financing and what 
kind of capital markets meet their needs? To answer these questions, further 
research is needed on specific recovery industries that covers a reasonably 
long historical period (perhaps including the prewar period) and takes an 
eclectic, interdisciplinary approach combining history, econon-dcs, politics, 
international relations and business. In this way, we can begin to put Japan's 
government-industry relationship throughout the postwar period into a wider 
perspective. 
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